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Small scale business owners living and operating businesses in flood prone informal 
settlement areas are amongst the most vulnerable groups of society to climate change 
and associated risks. The state is unable to provide key goods and services in many of 
these areas of limited statehood. How these business owners respond to flood hazard 
in areas of limited statehood is of interest to this research.  
This research explores the governance processes in informal settlement areas in Cape 
Town, South Africa. A key concern in this study is what widespread informality 
means for the lived realities of the poor in environmentally vulnerable communities, 
particularly informal settlement areas. I explore the flood management strategies 
available in both the formal and informal sectors and how they are used by the small-
scale business. 
Using a mixed method approach, in two informal settlement areas in Cape Town,I 
draw out and test factors for comparison with a focus on understanding the 
determinants of small business owners’ choice and use of flood management strategy.  
The main literary contribution that this study makes is to demonstrate the ways in 
which civil associations in the informal sector built social capital that is then called 
upon at times of hazard. These civil associations help the business owners monetarily, 
but they also have inbuilt social capital which members exploit to respond to hazards 
other than the ones that the associations were created for. This way, small business 
owners can count on fellow community members in the face of adversity. I explore 
the ways that social capital is built in these associations, and how members are 
encouraged to contribute towards it and help others in times of need. This research 
helps our understanding of regulations outside of the state, and the governance role of 
non-state actors to respond to multiple hazards. 
By interrogating this governance issue in informal settlement areas and amongst low-
income owners, I contribute to the growing literature on informality in African cities. 
The research makes an important contribution to research study whose framing of the 
state is empirically based, and therefore reflects the reality on the ground in many 





the idea of a Westphalian state and interrogated the state, its functions and interaction 
the populace under this framing. Consequently, such research is unable to capture the 
real nature and governance capabilities of the state and raised more questions that it 
has been able to answer. Further, this framing of the governance role of the state in 
African cities obscures the role of non-state governance actors in both the formal and 
informal sectors.  
To this end, I conducted interviews with a total of 154 small business owners in Joe 
Slovo informal settlement in Langa township and Victoria Mxenge informal 
settlement in Philippi township. The interviews elicited information on business 
owners’ exposure to flooding, their response and the factors that influenced their 
choice to response mechanism. A survey was also conducted to get demographic data 
of the business owners in the research sites, other key government officials, academic 
researchers, and representatives of insurance companies in the formal market. 
Based on this survey data further variables that could influence the choice of flood 
management strategy were drawn and tested in further interviews.  
The findings of the research point to the usefulness of nonstate institutions in the 
response to flooding in poor communities. The social capital built in to civil 
associations and its availability to fellow members at times of adversity makes them 
an adaptive vehicle to respond to numerous other hazards other than the ones that they 
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1.1.	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  STUDY	  
Over a billion of the world’s poorest and vulnerable communities will be exposed to 
numerous climate induced hazards and the added pressure of climate change that may 
result in risks such as flooding (Ayers and Huq 2009). Communities are often aware 
of these hazards yet many continue to make a living in these high-risk areas because 
they have no alternative (Schipper and Cannon 2014. In-migration into urban areas in 
search of services and jobs results in congestion in these underserviced, flood-prone 
areas (Joubert 2013).   
Building the capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change is critical to the 
survival and resilience of these communities. Resilience is understood as the 
“property that that captures the capacity of the entity to anticipate, adapt to and 
recover from an event such that it resumes its original configuration, shape, functional 
relationships and trajectory afterwards” (Welsh 2014:15). 
 
The resilience discourse holds great significance for governance because it marks a 
shift towards a system characterized by unpredictable global risks that are exceeding 
modern society’s capacity and knowledge to deal with them (Giddens 1999). Further, 
the nature of these risks is that they are man-made (as opposed to being natural) and 
are a consequence of society’s advancement and modernization. This is what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Risk society’ (Beck 1989). 
 
Uncertainty is characteristic of the risk society and jeaopardises its resilience. This 
presents new challenges for governance (Welsh 2014. A critical consideration of the 
effects of resilience on governance has become increasingly important because of the 
increasing threat of climate change and its impacts on poor communities. In other 
words, “by looking at the ways in which poor households and communities are 
dealing with changes in weather [associated with climate change] we can understand 





(Moser et al. 2010:22, Emphasis added). 
In developing economies where national and or local governments are unwilling and 
unable to provide sufficient safety nets, communities are forced to build capacity to 
deal with these risks without government assistance programmes (Borzel 2010;).  
This challenge is also associated with “limited statehood” (Risse and Lehmkuhl 
2006:9). Börzel and Risse (2010:118-9). Describe areas of limited statehood (ALS) as 
follows: 
“States or parts of states in which central authorities (governments) lack 
the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which the 
legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, or both, at least 
temporarily. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of 
violence can be restricted along various dimensions: territorially; 
sectorally (i.e. with regard to specific policy areas); socially (i.e. with 
regard to specific parts of the population); and temporarily”.  
From a Hobbesian theoretical viewpoint, ALS have implications for the resilience of 
vulnerable communities.Such implications threaten the lives and livelihoods of people 
in vulnerable communities, causing everyone to be thrown into further vulnerability 
(Wright and Head 2009). Empirical studies have shown that contrary to these 
Hobbesian debates, in many ALS, various non-state actors provide governance (Risse 
and Borzel 2010; Brynen 2008; Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006.  
Non-state governance provision does not suggest that a strong state is not necessary, 
rather that states with weak state institutions are not void of governance. Governance 
is understood as “institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and 
implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods” (Risse and 
Borzel 2010:8).  
This conceptual understanding of the state frustrates the Hobbesian argument that in 
the absence of the state monopoly, violence equates to chaos (Hobbes 1968. 
Governance without the state provides an alternative conceptual perspective on “non-
state-centric approaches to governance, the control of violence, peace-building, and 
development” (Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009 in Kode 2013:6). Further, this 





amongst many (Wood and Shearing 2007; Black 2002). 
The focus of this thesis is on state and non-state actors and the extent to which they 
provide governance to poor communities in areas of limited statehood to respond to 
climate-induced hazards. Using a particular instance of climate induced hazards, 
flooding, I identify three main institutions which, in theory, the poor can use in 
response to flooding. They are the state, formal and informal insurance. However all 
three institutions present unique challenges when confronted with flood management 
in poor informal settlement areas. Within this context, the research takes an interest in 
these institutions, their governance role in flooding, and the challenges unique to each 
sector.  
I develop the idea that these three institutions can be used in response to flooding and 
identify the lacuna to be filled by the research through an analysis of the literature in 
chapter 2. 
1.2.	  Background:	  Why	  a	  focus	  on	  insurance?	  
“Risk spreading mechanisms, including insurance and reinsurance, are important 
components of [flood] governance” (Tierney 2012:344). The use of insurance markets 
to respond to flood hazards varies throughout the world, though some insurance 
products are more commonly used than others. For example, hazard insurance as a 
stand alone product is generally poorly provided in developing economies. Instead, it 
is typically provided in combination with other primary insurance products (Grossi 
and Kunreuther 2005). 
Brown and Churchill (1999: viii) define insurance as the “pooling of risk over a large 
number of similar units, such as households, persons or businesses”. To this end, 
people establish what Wamsler and Lawson 2010 call a ‘security system’ that gives 
them access to ‘ready money’ to protect themselves from multiple risk and recover 
after a loss (Wamsler and Lawson 2012, Slovic 1999). Thus both formal and informal 
insurance, for example through member-based schemes, are included. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that risk mitigation extends beyond insurance (formal and 
informal) and includes other mitigation options such as savings.  
Sometimes savings can be a more adequate risk management product than insurance. 





will likely increase to a level that some may not afford (World Bank 1999). Savings 
play a mitigative role because instead of spreading risk, they can reduce losses and be 
used to cover sudden loss. Also, “the same borrowing groups used for savings and 
lending services can be used as conduit to sell area-based index insurance” (Messer 
2003:16). 
At the outset of this study I considered the role of savings in the management of 
flooding. After persuing this theme extensively I was not confident that it was enough 
to make contributions to the flood governance in the research sites. Further, my 
curiosity about the high membership rates in burial societies – relative to savings 
societies – moved me further away from an investigation of savings societies. 
The research does however acknowledge that family savings is a major buffer against 
the impact of risks. Unfortunatley, the primary purpose of savings in poor households 
is to increase the family’s income and assets. The fact that savings is a fairly low-cost 
way for families to tide over the impact of risk events is a secondary benefit. 
Consequently, households will often obtain some form of insurance cover even in the 
presence of a savings pool – in effect to protect the savings (Manje & Churchill, 
2002:75 in Bester et al. 2004). 
Many poor households are faced with various risks, most of which are not covered by 
formal insurance, highlighting the broader risk framework in the context of insurance 
services evaluation. This study reviews the broader risk mitigation context within 
which lower income households exist. Within this context, it outlines the various 
providers or risk mitigation services including governments, the market and civil 
associations (Bester et al. 2004). 
This type of assistance is generally not considered to be a part of a risk mitigation 
strategy, but rather as coping strategies, as government is the provider of last resort 
and often does not guarantee assistance. However, there is some evidence that poor 
households do factor government assistance into their risk mitigation strategies 
(Bester et al. 2007). 
The financial sector in South Africa is increasingly seeking ways to expand financial 
services to low-income earners (Chamberlain et al. 2011). In 2000, amidst pressure 





Financial Sector Charter promoting Black Economic Empowerment.The standards 
were gazette on 26 November 2012.  
The financial sector code attempts to standardize insurance products so that they are 
more inclusive and accessible to those seeking insurance1. This guidance note to short 
term insurers has four main objectives, and they are to: 
1. Specify the products and target market and short term insurance access; 
2. Specify the measurement principles for qualifying products; 
3. Specify the scorecard for measuring access for the Short-term Insurance 
industry; and 
4. Specify the minimum access product standards. 
Qualifying short-term insurance access products include the areas of low-income 
housing, small enterprises, infrastructure and low-income individuals. Further, the 
guidance note makes recommendations for liability insurance as a need for small 
businesses. The target market for these initiatives are Black people within Living 
Standard Measure (LSM)2 1-5 (Chamberlain et al. 2011).  
Using a scorecard, companies will score points for developing ‘appropriate products’ 
that meet the standards approved by the Charter Council. In an effort to encourage 
companies to develop a range of products, the points will be allocated per product - 
and not per company or product category (Guidance note 804: 7.1). To ensure that 
companies maintain specific standards, the Charter Council has outlined access 
standards that meet both personal and commercial short-term insurance requirements.  
                                                
 
1	  The	  previously	  uninsured	  include:	  “Individuals	  earning	  below	  the	  tax	  threshold,	  households	  with	  an	  
income	  below	  double	  the	  tax	  threshold	  and	  Black	  small	  businesses	  and	  small	  Black	  farmers”	  Section	  
3.1	  of	  the	  Guidance	  note	  GN804	  on	  access	  to	  short-­‐term	  insurance,	  26	  November	  2012.	  
2	  A	   wealth	  measure	   based	   on	   standards	   of	   living	   rather	   than	   income	   and	   is	   based	   on	   an	   index	   of	  
possessions	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   characteristics	   (Ardington	   et	   al.	   2004).	   The	   LSMs	   range	   from	  1-­‐10.	  
Typically	   LSM1	   are	   rural	   dwellers	   with	   no	   basic	   services	   such	   as	   hot	   running	   water	   and	   electricity	  






Through the Mzansi product standards, insurance companies are encouraged to 
provide short-term insurance to low income households for their household contents 
as well as insure their buildings. According to Chamberlain et al. (2011), only two 
market products are compliant with the standard. Notwithstanding the availability of 
these offerings on the market, there has been limited uptake of these products in the 
market. It is estimated that no more than 26,000 policies have been sold since 2000, 
which falls short of the 2010 target of 146,000 (Ismail and Masinge 2011; Prahalad  
2006).  
1.3.	  The	  Analytical	  Framework:	  Climate	  Change	  Governance	  in	  Areas	  of	  
Limited	  Statehood	  
In the governance literature, many of the arguments have focused on public and 
private regulation as key drivers of resilience (Awortwi 2014 Tierney 2012; Wamsler 
and Lawson 2012). Empirical evidence suggests that non-state actors often fall short 
of promised effectiveness and legitimacy of public policymaking (Risse and Börzel 
2010), and that it is likely to be more effective if the state oversees their goods 
provision (Scharpf 1997). Such is a shadow of hierarchy.   
However, when the state is too weak, it is limited in its ability to enforce policy 
regulating the provision of goods and services for the common good (Risse 2011). 
The burden caused by this gap often falls on the community; particularly those 
members of the community that cannot afford to buy services in an often un/under-
regulated market. 
The principle of a shadow of hierarchy thus suggests that strong state regulation is 
needed for effective non-state governance (Borzel and Risse 2010). Risse and Borzel 
challenge the idea of a shadow of hierarchy on two accounts. On one hand, if the state 
is strong enough to cast a shadow of hierarchy over non-state actors to provide goods 
and services, then perhaps it can provide the goods and services itself. On the other 
hand, if the state is too weak, governance without the government is likely to take 
hold (ibid).  
Current literature explains the consequences of weak state regulation in ensuring the 





for the common good through concepts such as “logic of appropriateness” (March and 
Olsen 1989 or through external actors such as international organisations that ore 
considered legitimate (Jessop 1995).  Here, nonstate actors may contribute to 
governance with an aim to protect their reputation if it is at stake (Risse and Borzel 
2010). In South Africa, there are several examples of this, particularly business 
engagement in the health sector  (Müller-Debus et al. 2009; Thauer 2009).  
Where the state is too weak to enforce collectively binding decisions, it is not anarchy 
that prevails. Rather, nonstate actors step in to contribute to climate change 
governance to ensure profitability and competitiveness. This new mode of governance 
is informed by the logic of a shadow of anarchy3 (Axelrod 1985). Examples of the 
shadow of anarchy can be seen in voluntarily enforced rules and norms, such as those 
in transnational governance where there is no state to ensure compliance. The nodal 
governance literature is based on similar alternatives of governance wherein non-state 
actors contribute to governance with/out the state (Shearing and Wood 2007.  
Against this backdrop I explore flood risk management amongst poor, small-scale 
business owners in areas of limited statehood. On one hand this research confirms the 
arguments of governance in areas of limited statehood. A look at the insurance market 
points to voluntary action in the provision of conservative products such as death 
insurance in low income markets yet higher risk products such as flood insurance are 
neither available to the poor, nor does the government require the insurance sector to 
make them available.  
On the other hand, I find active micro-insurance assemblages in the informal market 
that provide insurance services in poor, vulnerable communities and serve a 
regulatory role for religio-cultural principles that are commonly used by the poor. Up 
to now, arguments in areas of limited statehood have largely been influenced by a 
rational choice understanding of social action. According to the logic of consequences, 
given the right incentive, nonstate actors are likely to contribute to governance and 
maximize their utility (Borzel and Risse 2010).  
                                                
 
3	  A	  state	  of	  nature	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  overarching	  authority	  (Moe	  2005).	  The	  risk	  of	  anarchy	  is	  likely	  





This thesis will introduce the influence of sociological understanding on the ways in 
which the poor in areas of limited statehood respond to hazard. The thesis makes a 
contribution to conversations on alternative ‘institutionalisms’, particularly the ways 
in which they highlight the drivers of social action, which challenge rational choice 
rationalism (MacAdam and Scott 2005; Scott 1998). While religio-cultural principles 
do not preclude rational choice rationalism4, they present an alternative view of social 
action and its motivations (Schipper and Cannon 2014; Schipper 2010; Pollock 2007). 
Despite its usefulness in understanding governance challenges in weak states, 
governance in areas of limited statehood does not explain the research puzzle that 
underpins the informal economy literature. At the heart of the informality literature is 
the idea that informal spaces, particularly economic informality, have opened up as a 
result of weak governance. While the arguments for these claims are warranted, the 
theory often overlooks the complementary role of the informal economy to state-led 
governance. Also often neglected in the literature are the strong regulatory 
arrangements that characterize many institutions and associations in the informal 
sector (Lindell 2002; Halfani 1997; Streeck and Schmitter 1985).  
The findings of my research suggest that weak state capacity might motivate poor 
business owners to engage in self-regulation. However, there is also evidence in the 
data that the poor sometimes seek goods and services in the informal sector that are 
not available through the state (albeit often minimal) and the market. This raises 
another possible explanation for the variation in the data.  
With resonance to Adam Smith et al. (1976), when the state is unable or unwilling to 
make and enforce collectively binding decisions, no common goods may be produced 
at all. However, in pursuit of profits, the business sector has a major incentive to fill 
the governance gap by providing these goods and services. And yet the literature still 
points to low market activity in insurance provision for the poor in developing 
economies (Bester et al. 2007).  
                                                
 
4	  Rational	  choice	  rationalism	  assumes	  that	  all	  actor	  choices	  are	  made	  against	  perfect	  information	  on	  





The data in this study also points to a gap in formal insurance for the provision of 
goods and property insurance against flood damage because the market is unwilling to 
provide it. This unwillingness was largely driven by the insurance markets efforts to 
minimize risks associated with defaulting and affordability, and also the poor 
consumer’s collateral such as assets and land ownership. This was hardly surprising 
and is often associated with high transaction costs, particularly because the value of 
low income earners’ policies tend to be less profitable.  
In informal settlement areas, residents cannot own land because their occupation is 
often unplanned and/or unauthorized by the municipal government (Huchzemeyer 
2008 Swilling 2010). Also, the poor’s view and understanding of insurance showed 
that they hold a negative view of the market and its products as unnecessary and 
wasteful. In sum, the insurance market is not willing to take a governance role in poor 
communities nor are poor consumers convinced of insurance’s usefulness. 
Up to this point I have drawn on the governance literature to paint a picture of the 
governance environment in areas of limited statehood. In so doing I have also tried to 
find explanations in the literature of how poor business owners operating in a context 
of informality protect their businesses from flood hazard. A detailed analysis coupled 
with emerging research questions is presented in Chapter 2. 
1.4.	  The	  research	  question	  and	  argument	  
This thesis explores climate change adaptation actions by the poor. The main research 
question focuses on the poor engaged in small-scale, informal economies and asks, 
how do poor business owners in informal areas respond to flood hazards?  
The main research question is addressed by the following sub-research questions 
which, that make up each chapter.  
• What flood management resources are available from the state and its 
collaborative partners in responding to flooding in areas of limited statehood. 
• With limited state-led flood response mechanisms, what insurance services are 





• In an area of limited statehood, without state and market-led flood insurance, 
is the social capital built in burial societies transferable to flood 
protection/insurance?  
 
The research question that the thesis addresses is built on governance in areas of 
limited statehood and insurance literature strands, according to which, where the state 
is too weak to provide insurance goods and services, it sanctions the market – through 
a shadow of hierarchy – to take on these governance actions. And where this is not 
possible, the market acts under a shadow of anarchy to play the governance role in 
pursuit of profits. That said, in areas of limited statehood, both a shadow of hierarchy 
and shadow of anarchy might be missing. In which case, the literature on informality 
suggests that it is the informal market that fills this goods and services void left by the 
market and state.  
I draw on the informality literature to argue that the choice of the poor to seek goods 
and services in the informal sector is not driven solely by a market and state 
governance deficit but can be explained by a logic of appropriateness which draws on 
shared cultural and religious norms. More specifically, the thesis focuses on the 
internal dynamics of the civic society associations that make them legitimate amongst 
their users.  
I argue that the limitations in the market and state offer an explanation for a 
preference for civic association responses to environmental hazard. It is the shared 
religious and cultural customs that build social capital and networks of trust and 
reciprocity. These characteristics make civic associations the ideal vehicle with which 
to respond to flooding in areas of limited statehood.  
This line of argument is informed by and seeks to add theoretical value to existing 
work including effective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997), social capital (Putman 1993), 
the strength of weak ties (Granovetter 1982; 1973), and powers of association (Latour 
1986). 
Even though civic society associations, specifically burial and savings societies, are 
targeted at providing financial support in pre-defined periods and in response to 





to common hazards, including flooding. Religion and the belief in ancestors not only 
play an important role in the governance of burial societies; they are the pillars upon 
which the mutual assistance is built.  
However, despite its strength in responding to social and economic challenges, the 
social capital built within civic associations collapses in the face of flooding. Burial 
society members did not make a link between burial societies and flood response. I 
argue first that that there is a strong link, but its effectiveness is limited by the fact 
that flooding affects whole communities and therefore places a heavy burden on 
members to help one another after a flood event,as there is a high likelihood that they 
too might be in need of help. Putman (1993) draws similar findings on the extent of 
social capital in his study on community and civic engagement Northern and Southern 
Italian communities.  
In this thesis I focus on survivalist business5 owners because these SMEs are an 
important and vital arena of decision-making in both climate change and mitigation 
(Hamann and Börzel 2013). Although small-scale survivalist businesses contribute 
very little to green house gas (GHG) emissions, they tend to be located in ecologically 
sensitive areas such as low lying, water-logged areas. Survivalist businesses are also 
economically sensitive, with little income generated from the businesses and limited 
business knowledge by the owner (Collins and Murdoch 2008). Consequently, 
survivalist businesses tend to be short term and vulnerable to failure if the business 
owner faces a shock such as flood damage to the business. 
The informal settlement areas under study in the city of Cape Town, South Africa 
present a suitable case because they are predominantly located in a low-lying, flood-
prone area commonly referred to as the Cape Flats. The cape flats are made up of 
multiple, highly heterogeneous communities and economic systems (Swilling 2010). 
This poses a major challenge for the City of Cape Town municipal government to 
protect the vulnerable population of the Cape Flats (Graham 2006). 
                                                
 
5	  Medium	   or	   micro	   enterprises	   in	   the	   informal	   sector	   that	   are	   characterized	   by	   employing	   the	  
operator,	   his/her	   family	   or	   unpaid	   labor.	   Survivalist	   businesses	   also	   often	   have	   little	   potential	   of	  





1.5.	  Contribution	  of	  the	  study	  
The crucial contribution that the thesis makes to the literature is on the response 
mechanisms to hazard within both formal and informal economies and their 
effectiveness in responding to flooding. Lopez-Marrero and Tschakert (2011) point 
that there is a pressing and urgent need for more in-depth studies with a focus on the 
numerous dimensions of hazard and resilience in the local level. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on governance in areas of limited statehood is 
by demonstrating the role of informal civic society association as a functional 
equivalent to state and market-led flood risk governance in poor communities. I 
describe the regulatory framework of civic society associations in poor communities 
facing the threat of, and affected by flooding which points to a strong influence of 
religio-cultural principles both in the regulation of the associations and their members’ 
choices of hazard response. Based on this empirical evidence I make theoretical 
claims that the nature of non-state hazard regulation is best understood using a 
sociological institutionalism understanding of social action as opposed to rational 
choice institutionalism.  
The literary contribution of this thesis is to the climate change adaptation and 
governance literatures. I explore this focus through two case studies – one of an 
informal settlement community in Langa township and another in Philippi township. 
The aim is to understand the range of protections outside of the state that the poor can 
take to respond to hazard and their reasons for these choices. To this end, I review the 
state and market-led protections available to small-scale informal business owners in 
these sites to increase their resilience to flood impacts that are a consequence of 
climate change. I then review the more informal arrangements that they depend on to 
respond to flooding. I describe the extent to which informal response arrangements 
have been successful, and explore why they have been so popular while state and 
market-led responses continue to be unpopular and their use limited.  
This thesis shows the different governance assemblages involved in the regulation of 
environmental hazard associated with climate change (Bulkeley 2013) and its 
relevance to both the governance in areas of limited statehood framework and the 





hazard whose management lies in both the human and ecological systems, and 
demonstrate how these systems co-ordinate for a resilient environment. The study 
uses empirical evidence to demonstrate the challenges with multi actor governance in 
climate change as it affects the socio-ecological systems approach. The empirical 
evidence also demonstrates the challenges that climate change presents to 
governments in areas of limited statehood.  
It is increasingly recognized in the literature that many governments lack the capacity 
to protect populations from environmental hazards and are often equally unable to 
oversee policies and regulations that underpin such protections. The governance role 
of non-state actors has become increasingly recognized and important though without 
the enforcement of a shadow of hierarchy, many non-state actors do not take on this 
governance role. Insurance is the largest industry in the world, the “world’s risk 
manager” (Herbstein et al. 2003:156), and plays a key role in climate change 
regulation by absorbing the numerous and varied shocks that society faces (Mills 
2005).  
The changing nature of climate change and associated uncertainty has forced the 
insurance industry to rethink their regulatory role and approach to climate change 
risks. One way of making such efforts has been to invest in and rely more on climate 
models than on actuarial models (Mills 2004). While this approach has significant 
gaps, these shifts point to the impact that climate change has had and will continue to 
have on regulatory institutions, and consequently the behaviors of insurance 
consumers threatened by climate change.  
Another useful example of the institutional shifts brought about by climate change is 
the pressure that climate activists have increasingly placed on the insurance industry 
with the hope that it will influence the long-term release of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
by disinvesting their assets away from polluting industries (Thauer 2013). For 
example, in the early 1990’s, Green Peace began to make the link between climate 
change and insurance studies. Greenpeace was looking for an industry to stand in 
opposition of fossil-fuel dependent industries to limit carbon emissions. With time, 
more and more insurance companies have taken heed of the early warnings of 





progressive industries that attach environmental conditionality to their product 
offerings (Leggett 1993). 
Indeed, the financial services market seems aware of this limitation and in recent 
years have introduced more and more banking and insurance products to capture low-
income earners, but uptake use of services remain slow. A closer look at the insurance 
market points to insufficient products for the poor facing flood impacts. The research 
will also show that despite significant efforts and resource investment, the South 
African government still falls short in its hazard response efforts (Chapter 5).   
There is a growing number of insurance and banking products in the South African 
market that can be used to mitigate flood impacts, however these are still largely 
targeted at residential and business premises secured against a bond. The nature of 
homes in informal settlement areas excludes them from such cover. The insurance 
industry is highly regulated by and reliant on the state regulations and their effective 
execution at the provincial level. I argue that because state regulations are weak, the 
industry is unable to deal with the real cause of flood vulnerability amongst the poor 
and its role remains reactive. 
Formal life insurance, a functional equivalent of burial society 6  cover, carries 
numerous pre-conditions for cover that are unattainable for many small-scale business 
owners. For example, pay slips, a regular income and a permanent address are 
common inhibitors of the purchase of life cover policies by the poor. More 
importantly however, many users want to be able to interact with their insurance 
provider – something which formal insurance does not make accommodations.   
The result of this limited government and market-led hazard response is that the poor 
in vulnerable communities tend to rely more on themselves and one another to 
respond to climate related hazards and associated risks. But their capacity to respond 
and adapt to environmental hazard is limited and this further compromises resilience.  
                                                
 
6	  A	  micro-­‐insurance	  arrangement	  that	  provides	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  funeral	  on	  the	  death	  of	  a	  member	  or	  





The literature relating to resilience remains fairly broad, often describing the 
characteristics of resilient communities, but there remains a gap in the literature on 
community-level adaptation and the numerous drivers of resilience to hazard at the 
informal level (Bahadur et al. 2010). This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature 
by identifying and analyzing some of the resilience mechanisms that are available to 
the poor and why some are more popularly used than others. 
The study’s social relevance is particularly at the level of the unit of analysis: small 
business owners operating informal businesses outside the regulation and protection 
of the state. This is a growing phenomena in the world, in both developing and 
developed economies, and the survival mechanisms of informal businesses needs to 
be better understood in order to gainfully support and make them more resilient.  
1.6.	  Organization	  of	  the	  thesis	  
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The introductory chapter frames the 
research problem and its relevance, particularly relating to climate induced shocks as 
they affect business owners living in and seeking livelihoods in urban constituencies 
in a developing economy context. The research problem is framed in the governance 
literature and in the empirical data. I interrogate these literatures and related research 
questions in greater detail in chapter 2. 
The research presents an empirical puzzle in South Africa where there is low 
penetration of formal insurance amongst low-income earners coupled with a state too 
weak to provide adequate flood response. While there is evidence of civic society 
associations through which the poor access micro insurance, there are no civic 
associations built to respond specifically to flooding.  
Chapter 2 presents the literatures used to frame the main research question that the 
thesis will address. I draw on the governance, resilience and informal economy 
literatures to understand variations in the governance of hazard by relevant actors and 
the preferred risk response mechanisms of the poor in affected communities.  
The research draws on two case study areas in Cape Town, South Africa for empirical 
evidence. It assumes that the extent and quality of services provided in both case 





draws on the nodal governance literature to map the role of the state, the market and 
civic associations in the risk landscape in these poor, urban constituencies in Cape 
Town.  
A research puzzle arises from the analysis of the literatures interrogated in this 
research and forms the main research question: In areas of limited statehood 
characterized by limited market and state-led governance actions, how do poor 
business owners protect their businesses from climate induced hazards such as 
flooding?  
Chapter 3 presents the methodological approach and outlines in detail, the preferred 
use of qualitative approaches by way of case study and grounded theory as used in the 
study as well as their usefulness in addressing the research questions presented in 
Chapter 2. The chapter presents the case selection, data collection, and analysis as 
employed in the study together with the challenges associated with the preferred 
methods. 
Chapter 4 presents the case study sites and describes the nature of the cases. The two 
case study sites of Victoria Mxenge and Joe Slovo informal settlement areas situated 
in Cape Town, South Africa. Both case sites are characterised by informality in 
governance (i.e. goods and services provision) and in the case of Joe Slovo, even the 
leadership is informal. Both research sites are also highly vulnerable to flooding in the 
winter months. And yet, the data shows that business owners in these sites do not 
create or belong to any civic organisations specifically designed to respond to this 
recurrent hazard.  
The chapter characterises business owners in the research sites, and the 
environmental, financial and social contexts within which they operate their 
businesses are drawn upon in the subsequent chapters to address the questions and 
gaps raised in chapter 2. Through this analysis, I aim to add to the governance 
literature by explaining states and market capacities and how these affect the poor’s 





Chapter 5 describes the hazard management options available through the state and 
its partners and the associated challenges. The chapter concludes that the City of Cape 
Town has made significant efforts in reducing flood impacts to communities in 
informal settlement areas in the city. An example of the City’s efforts is the storm 
water infrastructure built in some informal settlement areas, and the municipal 
government’s partnership efforts in flood affected areas. However, limited knowledge 
of the available services, and a lack of confidence in the government undermine these 
efforts. Further, the City itself is filled with enforcement challenges that undermine 
the sustainability of its investments. For example, one of the main culprits of flooding 
in the informal settlements was found to be blocked drains. The City invested in 
building the infrastructure but did not maintain them and ensure that they are not 
blocked. 
Chapter 6 explores the South African insurance industry and the products that it 
offers in poor communities, vulnerable to flooding. Here I test the theoretical validity 
of the market’s governance role coupled with limited state-led flood governance as 
framed by the literature in chapter 2. The research assumes that the role of insurance 
is its ability to provide a public good but that this is highly reliant on government 
regulation, and its affordability. 
The South African government is making greater efforts to ensure greater insurance 
access in poor communities but the high cost of providing insurance in these 
communities and the insurance industry’s unwillingness and limited knowledge of 
these communities limits insurance access. The insurance market in South Africa does 
not play a governance function in poor communities confronted with flood hazard 
because of weak state legislation of the real causes of the urban poor’s vulnerability. 
Poor business owners in the research sites mirror the lack of interest and knowledge 
to engage the insurance industry. 
Chapter 7 describes burial societies and their governance role. I explore burial 
societies as an instance of micro-insurance and a functional equivalent of formal 
insurance. Burial societies are popular associations with large numbers of members. It 





hazard response mechanisms amongst their users, primarily in poor, black African 
communities in South Africa.  
However it is surprising that similar civic associations have not been formed in 
specific response to climate induced impacts, particularly flooding. The chapter 
argues the case that the hybrid nature of burial societies makes them a preferred 
hazard response mechanism because they respond to a wide range of user needs and 
not just shocks brought about by death.  To this end, I also explore the use of burial 
societies in response to flooding.  
The chapter suggests that burial societies and the networks of assistance within them 
do not make direct contributions to flood hazard response. However, I argue that there 
are indirect contributions that members make to flood management. 
The theoretical and methodological chapters are revisited in light of the empirical 
findings within each of these chapters. The empirical findings support a theoretical 
view that cultural and religious embeddedness influence actor’s preferences for risk 
management strategies, particular area in the state’s limited response to death within 
minority groups. 
Chapter 8 pulls all the chapters together and concludes that in areas of limited 
statehood, civic associations are a functional equivalent of state provision of key 
goods and services and the variations of this amongst different cultural and 
community groupings. Even though these civic associations do not translate to fully 
resilient communities, they provide a support system that helps members of their 
community to deal with day-to-day socio-economic hazards including flood impacts 







THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  AND	  RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
“Disaster vulnerability in developing countries may very well be the most critical 
challenge facing development in the new millennium. Rapid population growth, 
urbanization, environmental degradation, and global climate change are all 
contributing to an increase in the frequency and magnitude of disasters. And their 
deadly impact is on the lives and living environment of the poor.”	  
(World Bank 2001). 
 
How do poor communities in informal contexts respond to disaster? Concepts such as 
‘informal’, ‘poor’ and ‘disaster’ are not easily associated with order, but rather tend to 
be associated with ‘strife’ and ‘chaos’. Informality, in particular, is often associated 
with anarchy and lawlessness. The question of how poor communities respond to 
disaster, particularly flooding, is the central question of this thesis. To the onlooker, 
the lives of the poor in African cities may seem disorderly, yet they are home to 
millions of people who, despite “recurrent shocks and pervasive social and economic 
vulnerability” (Holloway 2003:1), continue to live amidst multiple hazards. This 
suggests that order exists, albeit in unconventional ways.  
“A better understanding of community response can provide a foundation upon which 
mitigation and amelioration of future problems can be based” (Flint and Luloff 
2005:404-5). To enrich this understanding, this thesis draws on the growing literature 
on governance and regulation beyond the state that has increasingly focused on the 
governance role of local, informal institutions, particularly in poor, urban 
communities (Hyden 2006; Lourenco-Lindell 2002). However, the literature still 
neglects to a large extent, the ways in which poor communities, living in informal 
contexts, manage risk in a context of limited statehood – that is, how informal 
community association fills the gap caused by market and state failure in response to 





because it points to “the potentials of forms and modes of governance that do not 
necessarily conform to the agenda of mainstream funding agencies” (Hyden 2006:21). 
Research on risk and disaster places considerable emphasis on poor communities as 
the victims of social and environmental processes (Blaikie et al. 1994; Erikson 1976; 
1994; Burton et al. 1978). However, this literature often assumes that the poor are 
limited in their ability to address the recurrent risks facing their community. The 
result is a depicting of poor communities as incapable of reducing their own 
vulnerabilities and reliant upon external assistance (Flint and Luloff 2005). A review 
of the literature on civic association in poor, hazard-prone areas explores internal 
processes used by communities to maintain order in their communities and provide 
their communities of users with goods and services that are otherwise unavailable 
from the state and market. 
Taken together, these strands of literature form a foundation for this study of the role 
of civil society governance in an area of limited state and market-led governance. 
This chapter is structured into four sections. The literature review begins by providing 
a brief overview of flooding, a climate-induced hazard, as it affects the urban poor. 
The second section is a review of prevalent views of governance and the role of the 
state. Terms such as ‘nodal governance’ and ‘governance in areas of limited statehood’ 
have become popular in trying to make sense of current shifts in the governance 
literature as it attempts to explain the position of the state, particularly in developing 
countries. These concepts are introduced and explained in the context of the broader 
body of literature on governance, particularly as these are used in this literature 
review. The growing body of governance literature has not gone without criticism and 
these are highlighted in the discussion. This section frames the shifts in the position of 
the state in the context of market and state failure. The ways in which these co-
ordination failures unfold in many developing economies and their implications for 
governance are also explored. 
The third section builds on the question of ‘governance beyond the state’ and 
addresses the ways in which voluntary associations in poor communities take on 
governance roles in the absence of the state (Singh 2003 Swyngedouw 2005; Rose 





The fourth section reviews the literature on informality and the way processes of in- 
formalisation have taken root in areas of limited statehood. A look at the 
informalisation, as both a process and a sector, positions informalisation as both an 
organic process and a response to a governance deficit. An understanding of 
informalisation as a process in particular, sets the tone for the following section on 
civic society association.  
The last discussion area relates to the role of civic associations and their ability to 
capture the basic needs of their users - that is, the urban poor living in informal 
contexts - for their mere continued existence. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of the most important arguments of the relevant literature and the gaps the thesis 
seeks to fill, presenting a set of questions for discussion that will direct the flow of the 
subsequent analysis. 
2.2.	  Context:	  Governance	  in	  areas	  of	  limited	  statehood	  
I use the governance in areas of limited statehood framework to give a contextual 
framing of the informal settlements in which the research is conducted because they 
are places where the state is unable or unwilling to provide certain collective goods or 
services. This interpretation is informed by the definition of governance in areas of 
limited statehood (ALS) as provided by the Collaborative Research Center in their 
report, Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood (SFB 700).7 Here, governance is 
defined as “institutionalised forms of social co-ordination producing and 
implementing collectively binding rules, or providing collective goods”, while 
statehood refers to a very specific form of formal institutionalised hierarchical power, 
namely “the ability of the state (or an alternative actor) to enforce collectively binding 
decisions, ultimately through coercive means that are guaranteed by a legitimate 
monopoly over the means of violence” (Koehler 2012:6).  
Risse (2011) points to the problematic nature of a typology of statehood oriented 
towards a normative view of the state. A normative view reveals Eurocentricism and a 
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bias towards Western ideas of statehood and the market economy. This analytical 
challenge tends to confuse definitional issues and research questions. The definitional 
issues relate to the common definition of states as political entities that provide 
services and public goods. Such a definition is misleading, because the reality is that 
most ‘states’ in the international system do not qualify. The research challenge and 
the reality in most states is that  
[a]reas of limited statehood concern those parts of the country in which central 
authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and 
decisions in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is 
lacking, at least temporarily (Risse 2011:4).  
2.2.1.	  Dimensions	  of	  ALS	  and	  its	  contextual	  relevance	  
This research takes on the research challenge that Risse (2011) frames in line with the 
characterization of statehood as the ability to enforce rules or to control the means of 
violence along various dimensions: 
Territorial - parts of a country’s territorial spaces. In the research cases, I delineate 
these territories in terms of informal settlement areas that are mostly found within 
townships. I have found no one definition for informal settlement areas in South 
Africa within the literature. However, the characteristics of informal settlement areas 
include: their unplanned residential nature and the housing structures (Stats SA 2001); 
illegality and informality; restricted public and private sector investment; poverty and 
vulnerability (National Housing Code Informal Settlement Housing Programme 
2009); lack of title documents and deeds, ownership of land, access to services (toilets, 
water, electricity) and few points of interest (schools, transport) (LaPsis 2011).  
Huchzemeyer (2004) warns that settlement informality should not be decoupled from 
the processes that lead to it, particularly in South Africa. Land access, its contestation 
and access to basic services have important implications for the definition of location 
and population composition of residents of informal settlement areas in South Africa. 
Sectoral - relates to a specific policy area. The focus of this research is on goods and 
service provision, that is, governance of the market, state-led and informal sectors. 





wherein the state fails to provide even the most basic of needs that results in 
“problems regarding rule-making, implementation and enforcement” (Livingston and 
Walter-Drop 2012:116). Where these state actions are limited or non-existent, the 
informal sector fills the void. 
Social - relates to specific parts of the population. In South Africa, ALS are 
predominantly located in poorer communities. In many of these communities 
governance is provided by social actors other than the state, that is, non-state actors 
(Kode 2013). Though statehood is not necessarily altogether missing, it is often 
limited, leaving spaces for governance provision through social co-ordination or 
collective action. To perform their governance actions and solve collective problems, 
non-state actors engage different modes of co-ordination (ibid). The social capital 
endowments of these actors are therefore critical to their success. For this reason, the 
research focuses on the engagement of the poor with different nodes in the 
governance of hazard. 
Temporal – meaning configurations of limited statehood over time help to 
differentiate between parts, as opposed to complete countries (Risse 2011). Limited 
statehood allows for a more realistic description of the temporal variations of 
governance and service provision. Further, it does not suggest the complete absence 
of goods and services provision, but enables us to interrogate the tension that lies in 
the state’s ability to provide goods and services in times of stress and/or disaster. In 
the research sites, the lack of timely and adequate flood disaster response have led to 
numerous losses to both city infrastructure and the lives and property of residents, 
thus challenging ideas of statehood in these sites. However, this challenge has also 
given rise to greater collective, self-help behaviour among affected residents, 
particularly around times of crisis (Meier 2014). 
2.3.	  Theorising	  state	  and	  market	  limitations	  
Following the idea that goods and services can be provided beyond the state raises 
several key questions that the research addresses.  Perhaps one of the most 
fundamental questions is how effective and legitimate governance is possible in ALS.  
This requires a better understanding of non-state actors, their institutional 





particularly in developing economy contexts where the concept of ALS reveals some 
implicit biases in the Western conceptualizations of governance (Risse 2011). For 
example, Western notions of governance are based on central assumptions of both 
development studies and development policy that fully consolidated statehood has to 
be the yardstick against which most existing states are measured. Risse (ibid) suggests 
that governance refers rather to the various modes of social co-ordination that 
“produce and implement collective binding rules, or to provide collective goods” 
(Risse 2011:9). To this end, it includes state institutions that have either ceased to 
exist, as in the case of failing states, or governance services that are provided beyond 
the state. That is, non-state actors engage in the provision of collective goods.  
Also, “areas of limited statehood are often populated by traditional communities with 
their own social standards” (Börzel and Risse 2010:125). In South Africa this is 
embraced in numerous areas of governance, most notably in the traditional leadership 
system that is fully recognised and used alongside Western styles of national 
leadership. The ALS framework lends itself to an understanding of governance in 
poor, urban African cities, the role of the state (or lack thereof), the role of non-state 
actors and the co-operation of the two in governance. 
2.3.1.	  The	  ‘co-­‐ordination’	  problem:	  Opening	  up	  spaces	  for	  the	  informal	  
Before moving into a discussion on the governance role of non-state actors, I will first 
review the literature on the limitations of state and market governance and how it has 
given rise to widespread informality in governance. A review of this literature is 
important because it points to the governance shortcomings of both the state and the 
market that give rise to this so-called co-ordination problem, which has provided an 
opening for the informal sector to take on some of the governance functions that were 
previously the domain of the state or the market.  
In 1977, economist Burton Weisbrod developed a theory to reconcile the co-existence 
of non-profit organizations and classical economic theory (Salamon and Anheier 
1998:220). According to this theory, the starting point and inherent limitation in 





are provided by neither the state nor the market and rather in the informal sector can 
be explained by the theories of contract, government and philanthropic failure.8 Taken 
together the inability or unwillingness of both the state and the market to provide key 
goods and services to the poor is commonly referred to as a ‘co-ordination problem’ 
(Enjolras 2000). How the informal sector is able to mitigate this co-ordination 
problem can be attributed to their particular type of governance structure and their 
democratic functioning (ibid). However, to appreciate the problems that the informal 
sector has to overcome to provide essential goods and services, I will review the ‘co-
ordination problem’, pointing to the ways in which it has opened up spaces for the 
informal sector to provide key goods and services. 
State	  failure:	  The	  changing	  view	  of	  the	  state	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  governance	  
The idea of the ‘rolling back’ or ‘withering away’ of the state from central 
government has been widely discussed, particularly in the international relations and 
political science literature. This withering away of the state has opened up spaces for 
different governance domains, including the informal sector. Proponents of these 
changes have welcomed regional and international representative politics (Rosenau 
1990). Others still view the sovereign state as the best regulator of political order 
(Krasner 1999). The varying views of a changing state are characterized by its 
strength and weaknesses based on the state’s social, economic and political abilities to 
survive (cf. Migdal 1988).  
The ideal modern nation state is modelled on the state with “full sovereignty and a 
legitimate monopoly over the use of force” (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). Within this 
body of literature, states are categorised according to their ability to deliver political 
goods and services to their populace – successful states are seen as those that can 
provide services, including welfare, order and security (Hill 2005). Many arguments 
for government intervention as they relate to the market failure paradigm are based on 
an idealized notion of the state. Here the state is seen as not only invincible but also 
                                                
 





generous. As Chang (1994:25) in Wallis and Dollery (1999:25) summarizes this 
theory: 
In many theories of state intervention, it is (implicitly) assumed that the state 
knows everything and can do everything. Welfare economics is an extreme case 
of this tendency. In welfare economics it is assumed that the state has all the 
relevant information for social-welfare-maximizing intervention and is able to 
achieve what it sets out to do. At the opposite end of this spectrum are collapsed 
or failed states which are unable to deliver any political goods. However, many 
states, particularly in Africa, and including South Africa fall somewhere in 
between these two categories and can be described as weak or failing.  
Jackson (2000) describes weak states as those that “cannot or will not safeguard 
minimal civil conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and 
good governance”. Gros (1996) adds that in failing states, public authorities cannot or 
are unwilling to carry out the ‘social contract’9. This, according to Risse (2011), is a 
key characteristic of ALS. 
Gros’ (1996) definition is informed by the “dominant neo-liberal perception that state 
organizations are predatory and inefficient, with rent seeking as the primary motive 
for the behaviour of public officials” (Robinson and White 1997:01). While this is 
true of many governments (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, Kiondo 1994 in Lourenco-Lindell 
2002:20), it is problematic in that it presumes that, despite its inefficiency associated 
with corruption, the government would otherwise have the capacity to meet the needs 
of its populace. Many public officials working in governments in ALS are inefficient 
because of limited resources, capacity and knowledge to effectively provide goods 
and services.  
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In ALS there are spaces within which the state is strong and other areas within the 
same territory where it is weak. In many African countries, including South Africa, 
this weakness is characterized by patronage, nepotism and corruption (Dinokeng 
Scenarios 2009) and poor service delivery. Some of these weaknesses are attributed to 
Africa’s colonial legacy and, in places like South Africa, apartheid has been blamed 
for the imbalances in social access to goods and services (Hyden 2006).  
The Western model of the modern state is challenged when developing states have 
limited capacities on rule enforcement and over the means of violence (Risse and 
Lehmkuhl 2006). Consequently the state’s ability to provide key protections not only 
varies within some states, it is sometimes completely lacking in some parts of whole 
territories.  
The role of the state as the principal provider of goods and services is brought into 
question because it is often the leaders and their patrons that benefit from 
government-led services (Chabal 2002 Lund 2007). This personalization of power and 
personal enrichment are linked to what are described as failed states (Herbst 1996; 
Borzel 2010).  
The literature on informality offers divergent views on the origin and pervasiveness of 
informality. One perspective is that the rise and prevalence of the informal sector is in 
itself an indicator of state failure. The growing informal sector can also be a sign of 
what Swyngedouw (2005) calls the ‘junas-faced’ governance beyond the state. With 
this Swyngedouw cknowledges the role of non-state actors in governance but that 
their participation cannot always be equated to democracy. In fact, it can lead to 
“substantial democracy deficit” (ibid: 1993). The reason for this, the author argues is 
that with new arrangements of governance, come new empowered institutional actors 
while simaltaneously disempowering older/other actors. This is particularly true of 
weak or failed states10 (Borzel 2010) often leaving room for the market to take on the 
leading governance role. 
                                                
 





Another perspective attributes high informality to the negligence of the state. This 
view portrays the state as “either oppressive or as a poor performer and obstructive of 
the entrepreneurial efforts among popular groups” (Lindell 2002:15). This state 
negligence, it is argued, results in a disconnect between society and the state, wherein 
people find ways to bypass unfavourable state regulation and policies. This view, 
however, makes two broad assumptions. Firstly, it assumes state contest and the idea 
of informal activity as illegal. Secondly, this perspective assumes a uniform informal 
sphere in which power is concentrated and challenged in one direction, that is, against 
the state. This masks the usefulness of the informal sector to provide key goods and 
services to the citizens of the state. 
For example, “one of the most common ways in which the state provides protections 
to its population is through social security and social insurance schemes, as well as 
policy measures like transfers and subsidies to offer individual and community 
protection” (Jutting 2000:6). However,  
…in many developing economies these social securities are compromised by 
powerful macroeconomic factors such as foreign debt, collapsing commodity 
prices and limited export earnings and the resultant negative impacts on 
employment opportunities are some of the drivers of widespread trends in 
socio-economic vulnerability, undermining resilience to natural or other 
shocks at both household as well as national levels (Holloway 2003:2, ). 
Bulkeley (2013) emphasises the importance of the integration of resilience across all 
levels of governance precicely because of the idea that “contemporary governance 
discources    are about sharing responsibilities between state and non-state actors for 
risk management, and conditions for innovation and change towards a new, more 
sustainable state …even in the absence of guidance from national policies and 
enabling frameworks” to increase resilience (Vedeld et al. 2015:289). 
Given that only a limited proportion of the population in developing countries works 
in the formal sector, coverage is limited to a small proportion of the larger population. 
It is important to broaden the view and understanding of social security to the self-
employed and informal-sector workers. Jutting (2000) points to the importance of 





are formed within a specific ecological and socio-economic setting in Western 
countries.  
Despite an increase in growth in the informal sector, our knowledge of the politics of 
informality are still limited. Lourenco-Lindell (2002) suggests that this limitation is 
the result of deeply rooted views of the informal sector that tend to overlook the 
agency of people and their engagement with the informal economy. Much of the 
literature has focused on defining the informal economy and its potential for 
economic development (Prahalad and Hart 2002). Other perspectives of informality 
focus on the income strategies used by people in the informal economy in the face of 
global economic pressure and changing formal employment (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones 
2002 in Lindell 2010), generally overlooking the experiences of actors in the informal 
sector. 
Another perspective on informal support systems might be better at grasping the 
complexity of informal assemblages. An empirical analysis of support systems, 
instances of co-operation and specific social realities help to capture the multi-
dimensional support systems that lie outside the realm of the state (Lourenco-Lindell 
2002).  
An important perspective, as it relates to this research, is that the informal literature 
has highlighted the kinds of personal networks that urban dwellers build to sustain 
their informal activities (Lourenco-Lindell 2002). Lindell (2010) argues that some 
analyses give little attention to informal economy actors’ potential for collective 
organisation. Further, their organisation is often overlooked as having little capability 
for collective mobilization (cf. Castells and Portes 1989). Contrary to this view, some 
work has emphasised the capabilities and opportunities of collaboration between 
diverse cultural and social backgrounds of urban actors in the informal sector (Simone 
2004).  
The insurance sector is a useful example of a mechanism provided by the state and 
market in many developed economies to help absorb shocks. “In developing 
economies, not only are insurance markets missing, but possible substitutes in the 
form of labour markets and credit markets are either non-existent or do not function 





system, but collection in the informal sector would be difficult (ibid). This begs the 
question:  what do the poor do when faced with this governance gap?  
At the national level and in many ALS, the role of the market is very important in 
providing the goods and services that the state cannot, such as private sector insurance. 
However, it is often the wealthier individuals of a society that are willing and/or able 
to pay for insurance services, while the most needy and vulnerable groups in society 
cannot (Jutting 2000, Robinson and White 1997). Further, a risky environment 
lacking resources, infrastructure and information, “… leads to high unit transaction 
costs per insurance contract and therefore high premiums, which cannot be paid by 
the majority of the population” (Jutting 2000:9). However, even this does not fully 
capture the theoretical and empirical puzzle.  
In summary, this research uses the governance approach as a theoretical lens to 
explain the use of multiple actors as, in the absence (or limited involvement) of the 
state, they respond to the multiple hazards with which poor business owners in 
informal contexts are confronted. This research is informed by a post-positivist 
methodology in which the researcher participates in the in the social world within 
which the study is undertaken. Consequently, comparisons between formal and 
informal for example, are approached with great caution and flexibility (see Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2012). It is with this same caution and flexibility that this analysis 
makes a contribution to an understanding of poor, vulnerable communities and their 
engagement and use of both formal and informal nodes for governance services.  
Market	  failure	  
 “Classical economic theory acknowledges the inherent limitation of the market to 
provide public goods” (Salamon and Anheier 1998:220). Wolf’s (1989:19-20) 
observation of market failure as “…markets may fail to produce either economically 
(efficient) or socially desirable (equitable) outcomes…” is useful in that it 
acknowledges the economic and social dimensions of market outcomes. 
A principal source of market failure is that “the market only values what can be 
quantified and expressed in monetary terms”. However, the aim of “human behaviour and 
activities is not always aimed at actualizing those monetary values. Human beings use 





fuller appreciation of these non-monetary values, a market-focused institutional co-
ordination mechanism in needed” (Enjolras 2000:50). 11 
Another source of market failure, most commonly found in developing market 
contexts, is the limited market competition that results in high prices of goods and 
services that poor urban consumers cannot afford. Wallis and Dollery (1999) cite 
geographical factors, such as large distances or isolated locations that make it less 
profitable for businesses to provide services in remote areas. In South Africa, this is a 
contentious issue in the privatization of water because as water prices increased, the 
poor could not afford it and were forced to purchase it from informal actors. Also, a 
common source of market failure is the undersupply of goods and services. For 
example, the overconsumption of communal goods such as grazing pastures.  
Governments’ legal systems have also been identified as a cause of market failure 
through their exclusionary markets – pushing some actors out and leaving others to 
monopolize the market. It is argued that too much government intervention in the 
market raises the “barriers to entry into an industry which arise from increasing 
returns to scale…Because of the technological nature of production in industries of 
this kind, competition simply cannot exist” (Wallis and Dollery 1999:17). Proponents 
of this view therefore call for less government intervention in market events, which 
they view as organic processes. 
However, the so-called ‘rolling back of the state’ has been criticized for increasing, 
rather than reducing, state regulatory density (Vogel 1996) and many others12 have 
concluded that deregulation never took place (Braithwaite 2000). For example, 
ordoliberals view state activity in economic regulation as part of the solution to 
market failure rather than the problem. The issue for ordoliberals therefore is not 
whether state intervention is necessary, but rather how much is needed to enable 
functioning markets (Siems and Schnyder 2013). 
                                                
 
11	  I	   borrow	   from	  other	   authors	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   as	  March	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   (2010)	   and	   suggest	   a	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  away	  from	  rational	  choice	  institutionalization	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  a	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  institutional	  understanding	  
of	   social	   interaction.	  The	  market	  and	   the	   state	  are	  not	  excluded	   from	   this	   institutional	   landscape.	   I	  
discuss	  this	  at	  greater	  length	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  





One result of these exclusionary markets and demands for rolling back of the state is 
what Kolk and Pinkse (2005) call ‘laggards’. Laggards are companies that do not 
contribute to governance, often as a result of weak company self-regulation and the 
absence of a shadow of hierarchy. The absence of a credible threat cast by state 
regulation explains the significant number of laggards in many developing economies.  
Kapfudzaruwa (2013) reaches the same findings in his study of business’ contribution 
to climate change governance in South Africa and Kenya. Many South African 
companies do not provide governance services where there is neither the threat of 
state regulation or civic society pressure, meaning that there is little risk to their 
company image and profits. The banking, telecommunications and services business 
industries often fall under the ‘laggards’ category, because they, unlike the energy 
sector for example, are arguably less energy intensive and therefore face less 
regulatory, physical and economic risks from climate change. The high proportion of 
companies in the services sector falling into the laggards category results in a shortage 
of affordable services for the poor because businesses can focus more on profits, and 
therefore target middle income and rich households without state sanction. 
Why	  a	  focus	  on	  commercial	  insurance?	  
The research focuses on formal insurance as both a market player and goods and 
service provider, that is, governance. The role of insurance in the governance of 
insurance against climate change impacts has gained increasing attention globally. For 
example, Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC calls upon Convention Parties to consider 
insurance amongst other actions to respond to climate change impacts in developing 
countries (United Nations 1992).  
The idea of insurance as part of a climate change response strategy is informed by 
different views, particularly the view of the insurance industry as a key component of 
economic development and therefore, intimately linked to and impacted by climate 
change impacts, such as flooding (Geneva Reports 2009).  
Insurance is the world’s largest industry and is both an aggregator of climate change 
impacts and a market actor that can play an important role in decreasing human and 
systems vulnerability (Mills 2004).  Put differently, insurance has the financial 





accelerated by climate change. Insurance also has the ability to encourage loss-
reducing behaviours more effectively than the public sector (World Bank 1999). 
Insurance is by no means the panacea for climate related hazards; it is one of many 
actors, including government and civil society, that can manage the costs associated 
with climate-induced losses (Mills 2004).  
In developing countries where climate-induced hazards are growing quickly, 
insurance holds great promise for decreasing vulnerability associated with climate 
change impacts. However, the penetration of insurance in these developing markets is 
significantly low in comparison to that of industrialized countries (Mills 2004). The 
penetration of disaster insurance is particularly low in the low-income segments of 
society (ibid). Consequently, the burden of absorbing the large cost of natural 
disasters falls on national governments that are already struggling to meet other 
development priorities. 
In areas of limited statehood, the state-led social support networks play a limited role 
in responding to social vulnerability (Awortwi 2014), particularly when disasters 
affect whole regions and burden the already limited financial capacity and willingness 
of many national governments. The literature shows that the rural poor, particularly 
those dependent on farming are pushed into further poverty after a climate disaster 
because they take out high-interest loans, sell assets such as livestock, or engage in 
low-risk farming to limit their exposure (Linnerooth-Beyer and Mechler 2006).  
The success of insurance is highly dependent on the financial, political and regulatory 
environment (Mills et al. 2002). Meaning, that insurance regulation should equally 
satisfy the profitability of the insurance providers without compromising availability 
and affordability to the consumer. One way of ensuring this is through government 
policies that can foster a change in the behaviours of insurance consumers, while 
simultaneously maintaining transparency and responsibility in insurance companies to 
get the trust of consumers (Mills 2004). 
To this end, governments are believed to be the best placed to manage these risks 
associated with climate change, particularly flooding, which account for great global 
losses in the public sector (Zhengtang 2011, Huber 2004). By partnering with 





rather than be reactive. However, moral hazard becomes a significant threat. If 
governments provide insurance or support insurance programs, it is likely to be at 
very low rates that cannot cover the cost of the risk (Zhengtang 2011). However, 
areas of limited statehood are characterized by weak regulatory enforcement, making 
their role in the governance of flooding further limited. 
As Paterson (1999) points out, the business of insurance is to maximize their profits 
and to avoid over-exposure to hazards, yet the insurance industry’s reaction to 
climate-induced hazards has been very slow and reactive. The example of health 
insurance and its expansion in low-income countries is an example of the ways in 
which the insurance industry has been proactive in developing new products and 
making them available to low income earners in other sectors. This is in part because 
of the short-term nature of health insurance contracts – making the investment period 
shorter. Insuring climate hazards, on the other hand, is limited by the uncertainty that 
characterizes climate-induced hazards.  
Also, the insurance industry has limited knowledge and experience in providing cover 
for the poor that are highly vulnerable to climate-induced hazards and there is little 
incentive to provide cover because they are often not sanctioned to do so by national 
governments, though this is changing slowly.13 Again, the role that government can 
play in insurance provision to the poor can be greater – as an enabler through 
appropriate policy and as a regulator.  
Access to formal insurance remains an important area that can help poor people 
manage risk. “Across sub-Saharan Africa for example, only 20 per cent of households 
have accounts with financial institutions” (World Bank 2008:35 in Moser et al. 2010). 
A large proportion of low-income people is excluded from formal financial services 
and is pushed to use less secure methods such as informal borrowing.  
With the increased occurrence and severity of environmental hazards and their impact 
on poor communities, coupled with weak government-led goods and service provision, 
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  In	  South	  Africa,	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the research examines the insurance products available to poor business owners and 
their response to formal insurance. 
2.4.	  Theorising	  Multi-­‐level	  governance:	  The	  preference	  for	  nodal	  
governance	  
This research uses governance literature as a theoretical lens to make sense of the 
provision of goods and services where state-led governance is limited, particularly 
relating to the governance of hazard in poor communities. Governance theory, as 
initially formulated, suggests that the state provides all communal resources (Wood 
and Shearing 2007). For example, as Batley et al. (2006:135) point out,  
…the history of the first three quarters of the twentieth century can be seen as 
one where states held clear authority within their borders, acquired growing 
functions and tended to perform them on their own. The latter part of the 
twentieth century and early twenty-first century was characterized by a more 
porous view of the nation-state, fewer directly performed and more 
partnership with other actors. 
In developing countries, it had been hoped that the state would take the lead in 
restructuring the economy towards industrial development, particularly in countries 
dependent upon primary goods export (Todaro 1994). However, this has not 
materialised. In fact, the architecture of the state in many developing countries is far 
from what it was hoped it would be, often demonstrating plural governance systems. 
Multi-level conceptions of governance in the governance literature often deal with the 
European Union (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2003; Kohler and Eising 1999; Benz 
2004). “There is a pressing need to develop refined conceptual tools and normative 
designs that better allow us to break free from the traditional embrace that state- 
centred thinking has held and permit us to understand the limitations and possibilities 
of different sites of governance” (Crawford 2006:458) and to advance more of this 
knowledge outside of developed economies.  
Another useful governance perspective is the policy network perspective because it 
focuses on inter-organizational networks involving a range of public and private 





sovereign position in these networks, but can steer them (Rhodes 1997). Exchanges 
within these networks are characterized by trust, reciprocity, and mutual recognition 
and are regulated by rules agreed upon by interdependent participant organizations 
(Rhodes 1997; Granados and Knoke 2005 in Lindell 2008). However, this perspective 
has been developed in the context of Western liberal democracies and its application 
in developing economy contexts is limited (Lindell 2008).  
The contemporary governance literature points to collaborative forms of governance – 
that is the provision of goods and services from both formal and informal institutions. 
Contemporary views of the post regulatory state are expressed in concepts such as 
‘nodal governance’ (Rhodes 1997; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Wood 
2003; Burris et al. 2005) and ‘smart regulation’ (Gunningham et al. 1998). This 
research draws on and seeks to contribute to the nodal concept of governance. 
2.4.1.	  Nodal	  governance:	  Formal	  and	  informal	  systems	  
Nodal governance is useful in highlighting how power is exercised within a social 
network. In the nodal governance view, actors are seen as nodes with individual 
knowledge and capacities to mobilize and keep the system governed (Burris 2004). 
The state is viewed as one node amongst many (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Nodal 
governance therefore embraces the middle ground between governance with the state 
and governance without the state. This is useful in ALS, particularly contexts of 
informality where state and non-state governance institutions often work within the 
same space (either together or independently) to provide governance services. 
Shearing (2006) cautions against the ‘state-centred’ approach that dominates the 
social sciences, because it limits research from understanding the governing capacities 
of diverse forms of non-state governance. This is especially the case in the literature 
on (physical) security, which challenges the idea of the state as sole provider of 
security and rather recognizes the state as one of many nodes of a network delivering 
security, with the network including the voluntary and informal sectors amongst 





Developing economy contexts provide especially useful cases because they offer 
empirical examples of a plurality of governance in whole territories as opposed to 
broad assumptions of developing economy territories as homogeneous.14 However, 
similar to these multi-level governance approaches, including nodal governance, they 
are limited in their application in the informal economy context. This research makes 
an empirical contribution to this gap by exploring how small business owners 
operating within ALS leverage  multiple nodes of governance, including the state, the 
market and the informal sector, to gain access to key goods and services that help 
mitigate recurring environmental hazards. 
2.5.	  Theorising	  civic	  association	  and	  governance	  in	  poor	  urban	  
constituencies	  
In not being regulated by the state, informal activity is not unregulated.	  
(Harris-White 2003) 
Traditionally, the literature on civic association has been used to explain the visions 
and aspiration for development as a vehicle for the provision of goods and services 
for all.  “Broad promises for the developing world such as ‘health for all’ and 
‘universal primary education’” (Hyden 2006:184) were part of this rhetoric. However, 
there have been significant shifts in the expectations and role of civic associations and 
these shifts are marked as a consequence of the inability of the state to deliver on its 
‘development’ promise. 
In an attempt to solve the research puzzle on the governance role of civic association 
in the shadow of limited state and market-led governance, the literature turns to civic 
society associations and their governance role in ALS. Framing civil society as a 
governance actor allows us to recognize its role as the voice of the poor in shaping 
our views on key issues that have mainly been lumped together under the broader 
concept of development (Hyden 2006:183). 
                                                
 
14	  Liberalism	  is	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Also, a key gap in the governance literature is the result of a modernization bias that 
presupposes both strong states and strong society. This assumes both have sufficient 
resources and capacity to meet their agreed roles. It also presupposes collective self-
organization and established hierarchy (Börzel 2010). In many developing countries 
numerous variables undermine such networks, some of which are low institutional 
capacity, civil society lack of trust in the government and the government’s 
willingness to take on certain roles or responsibilities in the network. While the role 
of government remains important and the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the 
government provides an incentive for co-operation between the government and non-
state actors (ibid), it is not always available or possible, thus, opening up spaces for 
governance by civil society and the informal sector.  
Civic associations are important to governance for many reasons, however, there is a 
tendency to overlook their governance role due to their informal nature. Hyden 
(2006:5) indicates that “scholars find it hard to study things informal. They are hard to 
identify and even more difficult to measure. Because informal institutions are not 
transparent, they are typically left out altogether or spoken of only in general terms 
such as culture”.  
The increased conceptual priority to non-state actors and their governance function 
has pulled civic into theoretical debates on their role in providing the goods and 
services that the state is not providing. However, as Börzel (2010) cautions, where the 
government is weak, so too are its civic associations.  
2.5.1.	  Civic	  society	  association:	  The	  third	  sector?	  
Schuppert (1991) refers to civic associations as ‘the third sector’ and unlike the other 
two sectors (market and state), it is a sector bound together by an appeal to 
voluntarism, whereas the integrity of the state depends on the rule of law, and the 
market on commercial pressure (ibid). Others describe civic associations as 
…structurally separate from government; they do not generate profits which are 
distributed to members, nor are they primarily motivated by commercial 
considerations; they are self-governing in that they control their own activities 





and rely on a significant element of voluntary participation (Robinson and White 
1997:5). 
The literature on civic associations still frames them as a part of a tripartite 
arrangement between the state and the markets (Archer 1994). The idea of ‘good 
governance’ for example is built on this understanding of a triad whose aim is to 
balance growth, stability and equity (Lewis 2002:571). White’s (1998) analysis of 
voluntary associations reveals similar findings, pointing to their role in the 
development of a like-minded culture that facilitates participation and action in 
matters such as good governance so that problems such as patron-clientelism find it 
difficult to take root in these communities. Tontensen et al. (2001) adds that this has 
particularly been a concern in Africa over the last four decades wherein the state has 
performed shockingly badly as a result of mismanagement and corruption, resulting in 
the failure of many state governance structures.  
The problem with this view of civil society is that it assumes co-operation between 
the state, civil society and the economy. Gramsci (1971) presented a different view of 
civil societies. Gramsci suggested that civil society was in fact separate from the state 
and the economy and viewed these as sites of resistance to the state. Examples of this 
type of civil society organisation can be seen in Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
indeed even in Southern Africa.  
In sub-Saharan Africa the non-state sector has played a significant role in the 
provision of health and education services since the colonial period. South Africa in 
particular has a long history of civic association in opposition to the oppressive 
apartheid government. In no other region has the direct involvement of civic 
organisations in service provision achieved such prominence and for this reason 
merits detailed consideration (Robinson and White 1997:9). 
Although the characteristics of civic association are often made with reference to the 
state, they may also be completely neutral vis-à-vis the state (Tostensen et al. 2001). 
In fact, even in the context of informal settlement areas, reliance on civic association 
is an informal survival strategy that takes the place of state-directed development 





Any analysis of non-state provisioning should begin with an assessment of the various 
types of civic association engaged in such functions. A distinction is often made 
between formal and informal organizations – the former adhere to codified rules and 
regulations governing organizational behavior, and gain legal recognition as a 
legitimate actor from state authorities, whereas the latter refers to groups of 
individuals who co-operate in the financial and provisioning of goods and services for 
the benefit of their communities, through reciprocal exchange (Robinson and White 
1997:6).  
The non-state sector, “by virtue of philanthropic, political, religious motivations”, is 
assumed to have greater benefits in delivering services to low-income or socially 
disadvantaged people (Robinson and White 1997:19). Non-state actors’ closeness to 
the communities that they operate in may promote trust between them and their 
members that may be lacking among other service providers whose services are solely 
profit oriented, or self-interested as is the view of state provision by some (ibid). The 
focus of this research is on the informal organizations as these are prevalent in the 
research sites and commonly used by residents to respond to multiple sources of 
adversity and hazard. 
2.5.2.	  The	  dark	  side	  of	  civic	  association	  
Civic associations often come about in response to a goods and services deficit from 
state or the market, though Salamon (1987) warns this is not to suggest that they offer 
a guaranteed return. In fact, civil society organizations have been criticized on 
numerous grounds in relation to their governance role. Much of the criticism relates to 
their organisation and inclusiveness.  
To illustrate this point, I draw on Katsaura (2012) who argues that while community 
governance is desirable, it is also characterised by both coalition and contestation. 
Katsaura concludes that to gain influence, community-based organizations (or in the 
case of this research, civic associations) forge strategic alliances with other nodes – in 
both the private and public sectors. Further, even though civil society organisations 
are renowned as participatory spaces, they are also spaces in which ‘anti-democratic’ 





realm with the state – “a realm of power struggles, control, domination, conflict and 
political partnerships” (Katsaura 2012: 340). 
Hasan (1990), whose research explores the types of community organization that 
develop in low-income communities in five cities in Pakistan, offers another critique 
of civic associations. The smallness and local nature of community organization and 
the fact that they usually organize around specific issues are often seen as weaknesses. 
This criticism stems from the fact that, individually, the community organizations are 
“too weak and their actions, too sectoral to involve them in larger development issues, 
and therefore have no political influence” (ibid: 6).  
There are also challenges regarding who participates. Here, variables such as gender, 
political affiliation, and religion may play an influential role. Based on this, Mitlin 
(2001:157) cautions that “grass root organizations do not necessarily assist in the 
reduction of the symptoms of urban poverty and vulnerability, due to exclusion from 
access to basic services, or in the consolidation of social capital”. Evidence suggests 
that the quality of services provided through civic organisations impacts viability, 
partly because they attempt to spread resources too thinly, but also because of 
technical complexities inherent in certain forms of service provision, which non-
specialist organizations are not well equipped to handle.  
The continued use and prevalence of these organizations suggests that some of the 
weaknesses that Mitlin (2001) highlights have some benefit to these organizations. 
Mitlin’s (ibid) research also reveals some of the ways in which civic associations 
manage internal problems, such as leadership abuse, and discriminate membership. 
While this research does not discount the difficulties and weaknesses within the 
associations, exposing some of these contextual weaknesses is in itself an important 
contribution to the broader understanding of the internal structure of grassroots 
organizations and the areas in which they can be strengthened in line with the causes 
of those weaknesses.  
There remains little documented on the structure and governance role(s) of civic 
associations in poor communities. For example, in South African townships, the use 
of civic associations to escape political oppression was critical in the anti-apartheid 





they are used in the current post-apartheid context, how many of them exist, their 
types and composition, and the ways in which they govern their communities of users. 
This is especially important in poor urban communities in South Africa today where 
the state and the market play a marginal role in providing services that help 
communities to manage the wide range of hazards with which they are confronted 
every day. It is also an area of knowledge to which this research seeks to make a 
contribution. 
Indeed as Castells (2000:693) proposes, “…we need to understand the processes of 
constitution, organization, and change of a new society, probably starting with its 
social structure – the network society”. Castells offers a number of dimensions15 of 
the network society, but perhaps the most useful for this review is “the transformation 
of state-centered society to one which is based on negotiated institutions, in favor of 
value-founded communes” (ibid: 694). This dimension therefore places governance at 
the heart of our understanding of society and its actors’ collective decisions in the 
face of multiple hazards. After all, governance relies on the expression and 
transmission of decisions for a common end. 
2.5.3.	  Civic	  association:	  A	  response	  mechanism	  to	  multiple	  hazards	  
The raison d’être of civic associations is pooling resources amongst a community of 
members to fulfil a predefined need. There are numerous determinants of co-
operation in civic associations. One determining factor is wealth. “Poorer people face 
similar common dilemmas more frequently because they own less productive private 
assets and thus have to access common-pool resources for their subsistence. And, they 
do so with people of similar wealth or social status” (Lindell 2010:134).  
Civic association is also driven by a reciprocity principle amongst members (Horch 
1994). That is, pro-social behaviours of helping others when in need; prayerfulness; 
and other acts of service to fellow members in their time of need are strongly 
manifested (Bowles and Gintis 2002). Lindell (2010) adds that civic association value 
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shared norms and group identity. This helps reduce the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in 
these self-governed associations. This is also acknowledged in the nodal governance 
literature, according to which “a node may use rules or laws, or threats, or social 
pressure, stigma or any other mode of control at its disposal. Nodes directly govern 
the people who are subject to their influence” (Burris et al. 2004:14).  
Civic associations are also acknowledged for their role in enabling participation in 
decision making to adapt to hazards in numerous academic disciplines, such as 
sociology, but most notably in environmental studies (see Ostrom 2010; Agrawal 
2008). For example, the climate change and adaptation literature has increasingly 
interrogated the role of civic association in communities’ ability to respond to climate 
change. According to Adger (2003:4), “although none of their explicit mandates are 
to deal with climate-related risks or adapting to climate change, there is much scope 
for them (civic associations) to be adapted to reduce vulnerability”. As a result, “local 
institutions played a key role, both directly and indirectly, in adaptation to climate 
variability and other shocks” (Vincent 2006:1). 
These member-based organizations, also referred to as non-profits, cooperatives, 
mutual self-help groups, provide basic services to their members on a voluntary basis 
(Jutting 2000). Their size is small to medium, varying between 10 and 500 members. 
The members are usually concentrated in one community, so that they face a similar 
“socio-economic background and the organization operates in a decentralized way” 
(ibid).  
An analysis of civic associations and their governance role also contributes to an 
ongoing theoretical conversation in the disaster literature. Traditionally, local agency 
with the capacity to act in the face of a crisis has been excluded from analysis due to 
the emphasis on external environmental forces or social vulnerability – particularly 
large-scale NGOs and the state (Blaikie et al. 1994; Burton et al. 1978). This view 
presents an incomplete and flawed understanding of community life – particularly in 
poor, urban communities.  
While community vulnerability is important to understand, so too is community 
action. “The reality that communities are complex, undiminished in the face of risk, is 





we have been insufficiently aware of communities as social organisms and “their 
endurance … involves a calculus of risk much more complex and far-reaching than 
that normally deployed on behalf of individuals”. 
More recent efforts have shown the complexity of social vulnerability and promoted 
the role of communities as agents of change in reducing vulnerability. Poor, urban 
communities are dynamic sites embedded in social contexts, representing different, 
intersecting values and levels of vulnerability. How people come together to make 
collective decisions in the face of multiple hazards, and in the context of limited state 
and market-led response mechanisms is the focus of this thesis. 
This analysis cannot be made independently of the role of local institutions in their 
governance role, particularly if these areas of strength lie in places where the state is 
weak. Cultivating or improving a complementary relationship between the state and 
civic associations or within civic associations themselves is an area of theorisation 
still lacking in African literature (Hyden 2006), and one whose teachings can be 
applied in other development challenges in which civil engagement is required such 
as climate change. 
2.6.	  Civic	  society	  association:	  Social	  capital,	  collective	  action	  and	  the	  
local	  provision	  of	  governance	  
The recognition that collective action is important for achieving good governance in 
the absence of the state16 has increased in the analysis of state-society relations. To 
this end, social and cultural factors shape institutions and organizations in various 
ways (Scott 1998). This contextual view of social interaction not only explains the 
ways in which the state is affected by micro-level social interactions but also how the 
state in turn affects these interactions (March and Olsen 1989). Civic associations 
have therefore gained a lot of attention – particularly the ways in which they 
encourage accountability, participation and propagate a ‘democratic culture’ 
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  ‘Governance	  without	   the	   state’	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(Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, Fukuyama 2001). There is also a lot of interest in the ways 
that these associations are organized and function (Rothstein and Stolle 2001). 
In order to achieve good governance, White (1998:4) points to a political culture that 
seeks social cohesion as a crucial characteristic of civic associations. “In a civic-
minded culture citizens expect their leaders to be accountable and can call them to 
account where appropriate; and second, voluntary associations are run according to 
the rules supported by the group”. Accountability, trust and adherence to rules are all 
critical to the composition and function of civic associations.  
The outcomes of civic association and action are therefore closely associated with 
their social capital17. According to authors like Putman and Fukuyama, social capital 
is important in civil associations and building ‘social capital’ in both economic and 
political life has been widely researched and documented (Fukuyama 1995; Putman 
1993). According to Fukuyama (2001), the norms that constitute social capital are 
instantiated by human relationships. In line with this view, trust, networks, and civil 
society, are the added benefits of social capital (Fukuyama 2001). Further, “the shared 
norms should lead to group co-operation and are therefore related to valuable 
interpersonal virtues including keeping of commitments, reciprocity and reliable 
performance of duties (ibid).  
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993:173-4) in Kode (2013:35) name four beneficial 
outcomes of networks that are also critical for the provision of governance: 
• Networks of civic engagement increase the potential costs to a defector in any 
individual transaction. 
• Networks of civic engagement, in the language of game theory, increase the 
iteration and interconnectedness of games. 
• Networks of civic engagement foster robust norms of reciprocity. 
• Networks of civic engagement facilitate communication and improve the flow of 
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  In their seminal study, Making Democracy Work, Putnam et al. defines social capital as the 
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information about the trustworthiness of individuals. 
• Networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can 
serve as a culturally defined template for future collaboration. 
 
Ostrom’s (2008) theory of social capital takes on a broader theoretical 
conceptualization of social capital as a collective asset in which actors invest with an 
expectation of future benefits. Adler and Kwon argue that “[t]hrough investment in 
building their network of external relations, both individual and collective actors can 
augment their social capital and thereby gain benefits in the form of superior access to 
information, power, and solidarity; and by investing in the development of their 
internal relations, collective actors can strengthen their collective identity and 
augment their capacity for collective action” (Adler and Kwon 2002:21 in Kode 
2013:11). Further, like other forms of capital, social capital is ‘convertible’ and can be 
used for other purposes other than the one for which it was created (ibid; cf. Coleman 
1990). 
 
Civic associations also tend to be formed along religious and cultural ties and in this 
sense are viewed as carriers of positive values and morals required for cohesive 
communities – “without the help or intrusion of the state” (Tonstensen, 2001:12). In 
fact, many civic associations are borne out of the frustration with the state’s limited 
engagement and service provision. This also marks the different types of social capital 
that exist in the literature.  
The social capital literature makes a differentiation in co-ordination between bonding, 
bridging and linking. Bonding denotes connections between similar people such as 
family and relatives (Woolcock 2001) and is closely associated with Granovetter’s 
(1973) concept of ‘strong ties’. Bridging refers to the connections with people that are 
demographically different. For example, people in power, such as politicians. 
Bridging therefore denotes individuals’ connections with formal institutions (Putman 
1993). Granovetter (1973) identifies these as ‘weak ties’. Linking refers to 
connections at differing social and economic scales (Field 2003), that is, how social 
capital brings together people from diverse backgrounds, giving it resonance to both 





An appreciation for this differentiation is important for this research because it has 
implications for the theoretical understanding of governance and state-society 
interaction in ALS. For example, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) argue that in the 
OECD context, bonding of social capital may be seen to undermine democratic 
institutions, as strong bonds often result in club goods and can result in society-wide 
negative externalities.  
By contrast, in non-OECD contexts the prevalence of bonding social capital is quite 
high, though it often co-exists with bridging social capital. This means that while on 
one hand there is a strong embrace of social, historical and religious traditions in 
social capital (Rothstein and Stolle 2001, Fukuyama 1996) these exist alongside more 
institutionalized roots of social capital, therefore showing causal relevance between 
social capital and civic culture. 
2.6.1.	  Social	  capital	  and	  state	  institutions	  
According to scholars like Berman 1997, Levi 1996, Skocpol 1996 and Tarrow 1994, 
in order for social capital to flourish, it has to be embedded and linked to formal state 
institutions. According to these scholars, social capital does not exist independently of 
civic society; in fact, government and political institutions influence social capital. 
While it is true that generalised trust is shaped by and can be traced back across 
generations, it is also closely intertwined with other modern-day aspects of civil 
society, such as regional and national institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2011).  
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue that the causal mechanisms of the relationship 
between government institutions and social capital point to a presence of strong, 
dense horizontal, and cross-cutting networks in which the development of cooperative 
values and norms among citizens are shared. While this does not state aspects of 
social interaction that matter in the creation of generalised trust and norms of 
reciprocity, it does acknowledge that not all voluntary organisations are established to 
create trust amongst their members. In fact, some create distrust amongst their 
members because of homogeneity or exclusivity. However, if diversity and co-
operation between people of different backgrounds is to bare cooperative values, the 





In this view, the state is an important player because the state “enables the 
establishment of contracts in that they provide information and monitor laws; they 
enforce rights and rules that sanction lawbreakers, and protect minorities” (Levi 1998: 
85 in Rothstein and Stolle 2001). Here, the individual’s perception of what is fair and 
just is built on a generalized trust in the state, which in turn is used as mirror for 
fellow citizens. This view of course assumes that the state has the capacity to 
“monitor free riding and to punish defection” (Rothstein and Stolle 2001:6).  
Perhaps it is the differences in state capacity that we ought to look to for an 
understanding of regional and national differences in social capital levels. In South 
Africa, the reverse causal logic is more plausible. Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue 
that it is not only detrimental to the view of the government and its governance 
capabilities in this way, people also transfer these views to others in general. The 
character of political institutions therefore plays a critical role in generalized values, 
such as trust and reciprocity upon which social capital is built amongst citizens. 
Assuming that there is generalised trust and trust in political institutions, the logic 
follows that citizens will comply with government demands, such as paying taxes and 
the rule of law (cf. Scholz and Lubell 1998). Citizen’s experiences and of those 
closely related to them, like friends, family and same identified group members 
influence the way they think about others and the trust they choose to assign to them. 
In sum, there are three corresponding variables at play in the relationship between 
social capital and civil culture: the generalized view and trust of the government; the 
generalized behaviour of other citizens; and one’s own or close others’ experiences of 
the government. 
Hardin (1999) challenges this view, citing that it is not possible to trust the 
government because it is impossible to have complete information about such a large 
entity. Therefore, we can only trust individuals that we know because we have/can 
collect the necessary information upon which to make our decisions to entrust them 
with something important. Civil association provides a platform for this intimate 
knowledge, making it a better enabler of collective trust. 
Hardin’s (1999) view is clearly informed by the rational choice theory according to 





procedures that make institutions work, such as political parties, where one supports a 
political party as long as it keeps its promise and opposes the ruling party if it does 
not meet its promises. The experience of state agencies therefore concerns who gets 
what; in other words, questions of redistribution come to the fore. In such debates, we 
often refer to the ‘haves’ and the ‘have not’s’, therefore building a friction between 
those in need of, and who receive government services, and those who do not. This 
friction often coincides with pre-existing divisions, such as gender, income levels and 
race.  
Consequently, it is often the have not’s that loose trust in the government and its 
ability to provide them with goods and services. “As a result, it makes no sense for 
the poor to trust ‘most people’ if they are generally known to cheat, bribe and other 
ways corrupt the impartiality of government institutions in order to extract special 
favors” and makes more sense to rather place trust in those “that are generally known 
to refrain from such forms of behavior” (Rothstein and Stolle 2001:17). How people 
decide that others are worthy of their trust is an important point of interest in the civil 
association literature. 
This research positions itself squarely between the culturalist and institutionalist 
dimensions of social capital. Similar to Granovetter (1973), the research takes the 
view that governance is facilitated by various forms of small- and large-scale 
interaction between and across actors. This theoretical positioning allows me to 
approach the general research puzzle. I therefore make a contribution to an area of the 
literature that has received little attention so far, that is, the view that the poor in civic 
associations are participants and not by-standers in governance solutions because they 
have social capital. This link between social capital and governance outcomes has 
received little attention in the literature on governance in areas of limited statehood 
(Kode 2013). This analysis can give useful insight into the social conditions necessary 
for governance actors to solve collective problems where state and market-led 
governance are limited. 
2.6.2.	  Civic	  association	  and	  the	  role	  of	  (local)	  leadership	  
Civic society associations have a long history in local-level politics in many 





escaping political oppression, in response to the privatization of public goods and 
services and as a vehicle for external assistance at the grassroots level (Enjolras 2000). 
Common examples of civic associations that do not hold a counter position to the 
state can be seen in networks of mutual help such as Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCA). ROSCAs are widely used in poor constituencies in 
developing economies to pool limited resources and spread risks among members. All 
ROSCAs are used amongst informal groups in low-income social structures. In South 
Africa ROSCA are broadly referred to as ‘stokvels’ and they have become a common 
feature in the economic lives of black Africans (Verhoef 2001). 
In the 1980s civic association in South African townships were representatives of 
their communities against the apartheid state. One of their key strategies was building 
a collective identity of township residents or the community. Civic associations took 
on many powers and responsibilities of the local state (Seekings 1996). The role of 
the leadership of these groups was therefore crucial to their effectiveness and 
popularity. It also greatly influenced the composition of these groups.  
Given the interest of this research on the impact of leadership on goods and service 
delivery in informal settlement areas, a contextual understanding of leadership and 
local level politics is important. It is important first because poor communities in 
South Africa have such a long history of civic association. However, the literature on 
post-apartheid urban communities now suggests that informal settlements are highly 
transitory areas and have become sites of fluidity and social fragmentation (Bahre 
2007, Huchzemeyer 2004). In this ever-changing socio-political landscape of informal 
settlement areas, leaders have taken advantage of the fragmented communities and 
their distance from state-led governance. The result has been local- level leadership 
often characterized by abuses of power and patronage (Adler 1994).  
In South Africa local councillors are critical actors in local governance. “Councillors 
serve as the interface between the citizens they represent and the municipal officials 
who design and implement development policies…and to act as a watchdog and 
ensure the municipality implements policies to address the needs of citizens” (Paradza 
et al. 2010:11). The role of councillors in their communities is therefore directly 





delivery and resultant protests in poor communities around South Africa is just one of 
the indicators that suggest that it is community-level officials who cheat the system 
and cause backlogs in service delivery and who influence citizen’s trust in the 
government. This is supported by study findings like the Afrobarometer Round 4 
(2008) that point to key weaknesses in the national performance of local councillors 
in areas including engagement and consultation with local communities, a lack of 
trust in councillors and consequently in the government to provide basic services, and 
the belief that as much as 62 per cent of councillors are involved in corruption. 
The urban literature also suggests that communities’ alienation or distance from the 
state has also opened up spaces for other actors such as NGOs to create what they 
refer to as a ‘deep democracy’, which is another way of building social capital in 
communities that are otherwise fragmented by differences across race, culture and 
politics. In other words, the NGO community can be seen to be ‘bridging social 
capital’. But despite the important role of NGOs in connecting communities to 
external actors – and sometimes the state – their interventions can lead to internal 
conflict (cf. Drivdal 2014). 
An understanding of the underlying social conditions and political life that is 
grounded in civic organization is important to solving this puzzle of governance in 
areas of limited statehood. However the literature, particularly the urban literature 
tends to take cases of successful governance outside the state as an exception instead 
of viewing them as opportunities for further interrogation. The assumption, it seems, 
is that informal settlement areas are inherently informal in their social organization. 
An analytical analysis of civic associations and the processes that make them work is 
an important focus of this thesis and one that is still under-explored in the literature.  
This thesis uses the case of civic associations to contribute to the informal and 
governance theories with a focus on the influence on leadership in community self-
organisation and the social capital built within these organisations for goods and 
services access beyond the state. This contributes to an age-old theoretical debate in 
the social sciences around ‘how social order is possible’ and how we can move away 
from the idealized concept of communities within society as homogeneous groups 





especially where there is little government intervention. At the core of these ongoing 
theoretical debates lie the central and contested questions of what motivates 
individuals to engage in social action and what makes them respect and accept the 
collective outcomes that ensue from these group actions (ibid). In its contribution, the 
thesis highlights not only the regulatory processes of these civic associations but also 
the internal problems that are borne of these processes.  
2.8.	  Theoretical	  framework:	  Institutionalisms	  of	  social	  action	  and	  civic	  
engagement	  
In an effort to better appreciate and make sense of the multiple nodes of governance 
in the research sites, I draw on the new institutionalism framework. The framework 
enables a better analysis of differing institutional logics, their contextual relevance in  
ALS and their usefulness in explaining the poor’s engagement with difference 
institutions (or lack thereof) for governance services. In this section I present the new 
institutionalism framework, its use and appropriateness in the study. 
2.8.1.	  Reflecting	  on	  Rational	  Choice	  and	  preference	  for	  Sociological	  institutionalism	  	  
Civil society and citizen’s participation in African politics has been largely theorized 
as a consequence and response to neo-liberalism and capitalism. This is especially 
true of local politics in informal settlement areas in urban South Africa (Lindell 2010; 
Hansen and Vaa 2004). The failure of neo-liberal policies in South Africa has further 
advanced a desire to seek alternative ways of understanding social movements in 
South Africa.  
In post-apartheid South Africa, the theoretical focus has moved away from social 
movements’ actions toward or against national government. Instead, there has been a 
resurgence of and call for a greater focus on cultural and normative frameworks with 
a focus on what sustains organisations (Scott 1998, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This 
has pulled social capital and culture into the organisational field. There is a greater 
focus on actors’ actions and relations rather than focusing solely on the organisation 
itself (McAdam and Scott 2005). 
In line with these theoretical developments, sociological intuitionalism “focuses on 





practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, scripts, and meaning 
systems that guide human action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’”18 (Schmidt 
2010:13). Sociological institutionalism (See Figure 1) attributes actor behaviour to the 
logic of social-cultural appropriateness of idealised routines and moral cues 
embedded in individual behaviour (Lembani 2013). This is in contrast to rational 
choice institutionalism, which inherently assumes that all actor choices are made 
against perfect information on the attributes and characteristics of the selected 
institutional representative.  
In ALS, this is problematic in that the notion of transaction costs limits government 
power and enforce property rights, thus providing information that will reduce the 
uncertainty and impose penalties for deviance or elite exploitation. However, this 
assumed predictability of actors within and between institutions requires strong 
government regulation to not only enforce the required property rights but for the 








                                                
 
18 According to March and Olsen (1998: 951), the logic of appropriateness is wherein “action 
involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a 







Figure 1 Constitutive elements and assumptions of the three19 Institutionalisms.  
Source: Schmidt (2010:5). 
 
Sociological institutionalism acknowledges that  
…compared to traditional settings, modern urban society is full of frequent 
and rapid changes. These continual changes repeatedly obliterate prior trusted 
schemes for action and require constant and pragmatic accommodation for 
ever-renewing circumstances. Fearful of unknowns and wary of the 
unexpected, modern actors sharpen their rational sensibilities and look for 
means to alleviate uncertainty (Yair 2008:55).  
One way in which actors manage uncertainty is to adopt conformist norms and values 
from their peers. The logic behind such a strategy is that it earns them the respect and 
approval of their peers (ibid). 
Coleman (1990) 20  has shown that in large anonymous groups, people behave 
rationally and egoistically. But in small and personal groups, actors tend to co-operate, 
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  For	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   rational	   choice	   and	  





largely because of trust and moral commitments. More crucially, he has shown that 
over the long run it is these small and solidarity groups, driven by non-rational 
sentiments of loyalty and trust, that tend to prosper (Coleman 1990 in Yair 2003).  
However, sociological institutionalism is not without its criticisms. Thelen (1999) 
posits the dominant criticism against sociological institutionalism, which presumes a 
shared cultural script amongst all actors. While in reality, culture is ever evolving and 
faces contestation, rejection and resistance across generations and contexts of the 
emerging social problems. What is more accurate is that culture is affected by 
contrasting political convictions and an ever-changing status quo (ibid). Also limited 
is our knowledge of how sociological institutionalism regulates social order and 
compels collective choices (Hall and Taylor 1996 in Lembani 2013). 
“In democratic contexts where the rule of law is well established”, it is often the 
shared principles of rights and obligations effected through “political and legal 
debates and decisions” that lead to the internalization of rules of appropriateness. 
Legalization too has a similar impact (March and Olsen 2009:14). Our understanding 
is still very limited on the conditions that make actors more trustful of procedures and 
institutions where there is no shadow of hierarchy (Borzel 2011). In other words, 
trustworthiness becomes an important link between social capital and effectiveness of 
the institutions that members view as legitimate.   
Herrmann, Risse and Brewer (2004 in March and Olsen 2009:14) show that there is 
limited knowledge in the literature about the logics of appropriateness and codes of 
appropriate behaviour in areas of limited statehood where “core political identities are 
not primordial or constant” (ibid) and government-led regulatory sanctions are weak. 
In these contexts, the authors point to the relative importance of belonging to larger 
social categories such as nation, gender, class, race, religion and ethnicity. These 
variables are reviewed in greater detail in chapter 4 as key variables in the governance 
of risk in the research sites because of their influence on members’ participation in 
civic associations and the implications that such participation has on access to goods 
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  Coleman’s	  (1990)	  results	  are	  derived	  from	  a	  test	  on	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  in	  the	  laboratory	  in	  order	  to	  





and services. It seems that a focus on social capital in the context of non-state 
governance, particularly its role in civic associations, is important in understanding 
institutional behaviour in the provision of goods and services in ALS. 
2.9.	  Conclusion:	  Research	  questions	  and	  implications	  for	  theory	  
In this chapter I have tried to draw on the literature to make sense of this conceptual 
puzzle of governance without the state and the market.  
Following Hobbesian theory, the state enforces rules, decisions and provides public 
goods. The theory suggests that human beings are unable to fulfill these functions and 
provide collective goods on their own – without the state (Kode 2013). However 
Hobbesian theory is challenged throughout ALS because the state is limited in its 
ability to provide goods and services and alternative means of provision is established.  
While South Africa as an emerging economy certainly does not qualify as a failing 
state, it presents a good example of limited statehood in a particular policy area, 
namely environmental protection. Flood hazard is a useful lens through which to test 
the contributions of these literatures as well as to challenge some of their provisions. 
Comparing two case studies in townships of Cape Town, South Africa, reveals the 
challenge to mainstream governance literature in explaining how the urban poor 
protect their livelihoods from climate-induced hazard. A comparison of the two cases 
highlights some of the characteristics that affect the poor’s engagement with different 
governance nodes. The ways in which the urban poor engage non-state actors for 
governance functions in ALS – particularly the ways in which the poor engage 
multiple governance nodes to respond to hazards in these governance contexts - is of 
particular interest in the research. 
I started the chapter by framing the research context using the governance in areas of 
limited statehood framework to emphasize the state-society interaction in urban 
governance and its implications for governance in informal settlement areas. By 
framing the informal settlement areas as ALS, the capacity of the community to 
govern is reflected upon in the analysis. Further, governance in ALS acknowledges 
the role of the state (albeit limited) and that of partnerships with external actors to 





landscape in South Africa than that offered by neo-liberal and neo-Marxist 
governance perspectives.  
A major thrust of the chapter is on social capital, particularly in the context of civic 
associations. I draw on the theory of weak and strong societal ties (Granovetter 1985) 
and their influence on individual and institutional behaviour (March and Olsen 1984). 
Through this I contribute to an understanding of actors’ social embededness and how 
it influences their interaction and institutional co-ordination without falling into the 
social trap of collective action (Kode 2013). At a broader level this is useful in 
explaining social co-ordination in the absence of the state.  
The research does not take for granted, however, that non-state institutions are 
without weaknesses. In fact, the research explores both the ways in which civic 
associations empower their community of members as well as how they limit them 
through the rules and norms that guide them (March and Olsen 1984).  This is a 
growing area of knowledge and I make a contribution by drawing on two empirical 
cases from a limited statehood governance perspective. In this way, the research also 
highlights the characteristics that affect the governance contributions of civic 
association. 
My analysis also looks at the ways in which the state-led governance gap opens up 
spaces for a spectrum of non-state actors to provide governance services both with 
and without the participation of the state. This speaks to the importance and value of 
non-state actors in these communities without discarding the fact that the value of the 
state too, remains a valuable and much needed one. Here I adapt Borzel’s (2010) idea 
of a shadow of hierarchy. 
To explain participation in civic associations, I use the sociological institutionalism 
framework that focuses on the institutional environment and its influence on the 
internal organization and systems of order in these associations. By relating this 
framework to the contextual factors, particularly the uncertainty and instability (Ross 
2010) that characterize informal settlements, I am able to both challenge and 
contribute to the literature on informality, which for a long time has framed 
community-led associations as chaotic and disorderly (Whyte 1955; Myers 2011). 





research has largely examined informal contexts as vulnerable spaces and never fully 
understood the ways in which order is negotiated with the limited participation of the 
state in these contexts. 
This research advances an alternative view, also grounded in the civic associations 
literature that depicts civic association as highly regulated institutions (Harris-White 
2003) and that their rules and norms often spill over into individual’s lives outside of 
the association (Kode 2013).  
Sociological institutionalism also makes it possible to analyse not just the outcomes 
of civic associations but rather the internal processes within them and the conditions 
underlying norm creation and governance provision. This is a blinding of the 
organization between the civil society actors. 
I argue that by studying civic associations, researchers can contribute to an 
understanding of a process through which the poor and vulnerable make decisions 
relating to governance. This argument is influenced by the sociological 
institutionalism view that the urban poor make governance decisions not entirely 
following a rational choice logic. Rather, their decisions are driven by cultural and 
context-specific variables, such as shared values, norms and meaning structures. I 
explore how these manifest themselves in the social organization and the individual 
and group behaviours of poor business owners that are confronted by multiple hazards 
in the research sites. 
The literature introduced in this chapter will be expanded upon over four substantive 
chapters of the thesis (chapters 5 – 8) to explore the general puzzle of governance in 
areas of limited statehood. The chapters investigate the ways in which poor business 
owners engage different nodes of governance in an effort to respond to the multiple 
hazards that they face in the informal settlement areas in which they live and operate 
their businesses.  
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between state and non-state institutions and in turn 
how community members engage these institutional settings for governance in areas 
of limited statehood. The thesis makes an empirical contribution to the governance in 
areas of limited statehood framework by showing the extent to which governments 





South Africa is a great site to demonstrate these phenomena, because of the disparity 
in governance that is characteristic of middle-class and low-income communities, 
further illustrating a state characterized by areas of limited statehood.  
The chapter also makes a theoretical contribution by demonstrating the limitations of 
theorizing around the state in developing economies by rational choice 
institutionalism alone. In areas of limited statehood, where governance decisions are 
often in total isolation of the state, rational choice theorization falls short of capturing 
the norms and context-specific variables, such as culture, which influence the poor’s 
governance decisions, especially whether or not to use the available aid and 
government-led relief services (Nunn 2009). This understanding rather calls for a 
sociological logic of governance decision-making and will be discussed in greater 
detail and with examples in chapters 7 and 8. 
Chapter 6 explores the engagement of the poor with the market. The chapter follows 
the governance in areas of limited statehood theorization, according to which, where 
state-driven governance is limited the state has an incentive to provide governance 
services. To problematize this however, the shadow of hierarchy in areas of limited 
statehood is often limited. The chapter draws on the insurance sector as a market actor 
that, notwithstanding a lack of a shadow of hierarchy, provides insurance to low-
income earners. The chapter uses the case of the insurance market to explore the 
implications of this characteristic in governance on the poor’s engagement (or lack 
thereof) with the market.  
The last two chapters explore civic associations as sources of governance in ALS. 
Both chapters explore the structure of civic associations and how they build social 
capital in a context of limited statehood. The chapter makes two broad contributions, 
namely: the uses of civic associations in post-apartheid South Africa, where the state 
is not necessarily the target of resistance; and, to highlight the challenges and 
contextual weaknesses of these associations (Mitlin 2001). In this way, the research 
contributes to a critical analysis of the contributions of civic associations in the 
provision of goods and services in areas of limited statehood. 
In Chapter 7 I draw on savings societies as an instance of civic association and look at 





societies to explore Granovetter’s (1973) theorization of social capital that civic 
associations interact with other nodes, including the state, to achieve their goals and 
further build their social capital. This analysis brings back the focus to the agency 
within poor communities in the absence of the state. 
In Chapter 8 I look at the role of burial societies as a functional equivalent of 
insurance in the formal sector. The principal function of burial societies is to build 
social capital around death. In the chapter, I explore the ‘convertibility’ of their social 
capital in response to shocks other than those around which the savings society is 
built (Adler and Kwon 2002; Coleman 1990). The chapter also contributes to 
theoretical debate on individuals’ motivation to engage in social action and their 
respect and acceptance of collective outcomes (Crawford 1998) based on a logic of 
appropriateness (Schmidt 2010). By drawing on sociological institutionalism, the 
research will contribute to a better of understanding of how social order is regulated 
and compels collective choices without state sanction (Lembani 2013). 
Chapter 9 offers a conclusion by drawing on the subsequent empirical chapters and 






METHODOLOGY:	  MUSINGS	  OF	  MULTI-­‐SECTOR	  ENQUIRY	  AND	  PULLING	  
IT	  ALL	  TOGETHER	  
3.1.	  Introduction	  
This chapter outlines and offers justification for the mixed method approach that I 
have used to generate data to answer the research questions. The study used a largely 
qualitative approach. After all the explicit goal of the research was to describe how 
poor business owners manage hazards in the context of limited statehood. 
Furthermore, qualitative research is able to accommodate contextual issues while 
understanding the meanings and drivers of actors in the social realm (Babbie 2007). 
To this end, I used a descriptive approach in order to capture some of the challenges 
of operating small businesses in informal constituencies, to understand the social 
networks that business owners took part in and how these were not only regulated to 
make them sustainable but also maintain the relationships within them. 
The chapter is presented in 5 sections. Section 3.1 outlines the theoretical views used 
in the study as well as the assumptions of the research. I then discuss the reasons that 
the research took on a largely qualitative approach.  
Section 3.2 outlines the research design and the processes followed in the research. 
One of the most important considerations for the research was the location of the 
research sites. This is mainly because I was exploring areas with poor households that 
are affected by flooding, but there were also safety considerations in the choice of the 
research sites. A flexible research strategy was therefore most suitable and I outline 
this process. Here also I outline how the research sites and the research participants 
were selected. 
Section 3.3 then outlines the strategy of enquiry used in the research, namely the case 
study approach. I outline the reasoning behind this choice of approach and the process 
that I followed in its use.  
Section 3.4 outlines the validity of the research by looking at the methods of data 





Section 3.5 reflects on the ethical considerations in the research in line with the 
requirements of the University of Cape Town Research Ethics committee guidelines. 
The chapter concludes with a reflection on the limitations of the study in section 3.6 
and shows how these were managed. This is followed by a summary of the chapter. 
3.2.	  Research	  approach:	  Epistemology	  and	  Constructivism	  
In light of the numerous and varied qualitative and quantitative methods that I could 
adopt for the research, coupled with the ontological and epistemological sources that I 
could approach the research with, a reflection on my worldview coupled with some of 
the insights that I had on the research sites were well suited for the use of the 
constructivist approach. 
Constructivist approaches of inquiry draw on different influences and research 
approaches that emphasize the constant interaction between existing theory and data 
derived from empirical investigation (Layder 1998; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Here, 
“the investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked 
so that the ‘findings’ are literally created as the investigation proceeds” (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994:111). In other words, the theories are allowed to emerge out of the data 
with the progression of the research. For this reason I elected to draw on adaptive 
theory in the coding and analysis of the data. I expand on this in section 3.4 of this 
chapter. 
Adaptive theory in particular accommodates the view of the world as highly complex 
and varied amongst different actors. This is in line with the theorization of 
governance as nodal as I have presented in Chapter 2. Further, adaptive theory 
demands great flexibility of the researcher undertaking the study (Layder 1998). This 
made the theory consistent with, and fitting for use in the informal settlement areas 
that are characterized by plurality, namely the co-existence of the formal and informal 
systems of governance. 
Constructivism follows the idea that “.reality is socially constructed, shaped by social 
factors such as age, gender, race, class and culture” (Charmaz 2000). Sociologists also 
rely on variables such as status, social roles, norms and values, and group affiliation 
to act towards the things that have meaning to them (Blumer 1986). In my research 





provision. These variables had a significant impact on poor business owners’ response 
to hazards in the business because they influenced the business type and the hazards 
associated with that sector. 
To analyse business owners’ engagement with government departments, the formal 
economy and civic associations, I borrow from Blumer’s (1957) collective action 
theory. According to the collective action theory, the “socially marginalized join 
social movements because they gain important forms of social solidarity from them” 
(Blumer 1986:4). For example, culture is conceived of and defined by traditional a dn 
customary norms as well as shared social norms which are based on what people do 
and how they relate to one another (ibid). 
In other words, “multiple knowledges that can coexist when equally competent (or 
trusted) interpreters agree, and/or depending on social, political, cultural economic, 
ethnic and gender factors that differentiate the interpreters” (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 
116). To capture this variation across different social variables, I highlighted their 
significance to the research question throughout the thesis. The social variables and 
how they relate to the research question are introduced and justified in chapter 4.  
The constructivist paradigm fits most closely with my worldview and acknowledges 
the multi-faceted nature of my research and the multiple realities involved in it. While 
I considered other perspectives, particularly the critical theory perspective, 
constructivism was more fitting because it captured factors in the research sites that 
determined business activity and political participation. For example, the literature on 
informality shows that even though women are often more active than men in 
informal business, it is the men that own the productive assets and arguably hold the 
power (Lindell et al. 2013, Lourenco-Lindell 2010, Khauval et al. 2009, Verhoef 
2001). Only once in the field was I able to see this variation in gender and resource 
ownership. 
A constructivist orientation also made it possible to incorporate the views of the 
research participants in civic association activities while also keeping an eye on the 
institutional design of the associations that they ascribed to as well as those that they 





This is in line with Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) ideas on the social construction of 
reality. 
Similarly, Barley and Tolbert (1997) claim that “institutions are socially constructed 
templates of action, generated and maintained through ongoing interaction, and that 
organizations are formed and informed by these institutions”. For example, I 
examined the rules of burial societies and their influence on norms around 
participation, reciprocity and in-kind assistance to other members. These are largely 
informed by the cultural and religious views of their users. 
Also important in the research is a focus on the interaction between structural factors, 
such as community leadership and access to external institutions and resources, 
because of their influence on the poor’s choice of hazard management strategy.  
3.3.	  Mixed	  methods:	  a	  greater	  influence	  of	  qualitative	  enquiry	  
3.3.1.	  The	  qualitative	  approach	  
The qualitative approach was appropriate for the research because the research 
question focused first on how civic associations fill the gap created by market and 
government failure to provide governance; and second, on the limited utility of formal 
sector insurance amongst poor groups whose lives are confronted with hazard. The 
questions therefore focused on understanding the conditions that influence users’ 
choice in the management of a climate-related hazards. Further, the practices and 
views of business owners were important and needed to be captured within the 
context of limited state and market hazard response. 
A qualitative approach was well suited to answering the research questions because it 
has the capacity to embrace the issues within context without losing the meanings that 
the research participants attach to them. Also, a qualitative approach can make sense 
of the thoughts, views, attitudes and practises of governance actors in the context 
within which the system is embedded (Crossley 2005). The theory therefore largely 
defines these patterns depending on the research question and the data gathered. 
Once in the field and especially after spending some time with research assistants and 
some research participants, I often found that explanations for certain behaviors or 





out, or because the research participants realized my surprise and reactively offered an 
explanation (Creswell 2009). Such depth could not have been captured with a 
quantitative research approach. Further, I was able to gain better insight into the 
complex nature of human interaction by ‘being there’. Another strength of qualitative 
field research is that it places the researcher in the thick of human interaction, which 
in turn provides greater validity in the research. 
Qualitative research covers a variety of methods for collecting empirical materials and 
can produce descriptive analyses of differing meanings in individuals’ lives (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000). Furthermore, it can be used together with quantitative approaches 
characterised by mathematical and statistical data. Because of the spread of 
knowledge that the study sought to engage, using methods such as structured 
interviews and observation were useful in covering the overall contextual basis of the 
study. These methods were useful in outlining the overall intentions of actors in their 
collaborative efforts. 
3.3.2.	  The	  quantitative	  approach	  
The research made use of both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. The 
quantitative approach used survey methods to paint a picture of informal business 
operations in the research sites and to capture the demographic data of the participants 
in this sector. To this end, quantitative data was not in any way meant to fully capture 
the experiences of business owners in the informal sector but rather to position the 
participants against secondary data on the sector.  
The main limitation of quantitative approaches as they relate to this study is that they 
cannot accommodate the complex nature of collaborative efforts, their contexts and 
institutional design. They were therefore deemed unlikely to fully capture the 
experiences (Neuman 2003) of business owners in the informal sector and their 
hazard management practices where state capacities were weak or unavailable. 
The quantitative data generated through the surveys were useful in determining 
‘effects/outcomes’ (Creswell 2009), and bridges the relationship between variables, 
interpretation, and analysis. I found that variables including age, nationality, gender 
and marital status had a significant effect on civil society participation and 





these data in chapter 4 and elaborate on their significance to the research questions in 
the empirical chapters. 
3.4.	  Case	  study:	  Finding	  variation	  across	  two	  cases	  
Case study research includes single and multiple case studies. A multiple or 
comparative case study approach was used in this research because it made it possible 
to observe variation across two cases and tests the influence of different variables 
across cases. Multiple cases also have the distinct advantage that they are considered 
to be more robust and compelling (Yin 2009) and they can be coupled with numerous 
other methods of data collection. 
A comparative case study method was the most appropriate research method because 
it allowed me to explore the relationships between key variables and the relationships 
as they relate to goods and service provision in two areas of limited statehood –for 
that is how the research sites were categorized. This decision was made in line with 
Yin (1994) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) assertions that case studies are most relevant for 
studies that seek to explain present circumstances. Research that seeks to explain why 
or how social phenomena works is therefore often well developed through case 
studies.  
Case studies are also relevant to “questions that require in-depth descriptions of social 
phenomena” (Yin 2009:4). Using the two cases gave insight on the phenomenon, that 
is, they are cases of poor people in informal contexts and how they deal with 
adversity. To this end, I focus on informal business owners as the unit of analysis and 
flooding as a key hazard that threatens their businesses. 
Case studies are best used in “studies that seek to study phenomena in their contexts, 
rather than independent of their context” (Gibbert et al. 2008:1466). It was therefore 
fitting to use the case study method because I wanted to observe the businesses that 
the participants owned and how the complex environments within which their 
businesses were situated and operating affected these. In this study I wanted to 
understand the sources of assistance that business owners use in response to hazards 
to the business, particularly flooding. I especially wanted to explore what influenced 
that decision-making process. For example, I wanted answers to questions such as 





societies? I also wanted to know whether this choice was driven by limited or 
inaccessible response mechanisms in the market or whether it was driven by social or 
cultural preferences. The context here was the informal settlement areas that my 
participants lived and operated their businesses in, both of which were highly 
vulnerable to flooding. 
The main challenge with a multiple case study approach is that it often generates 
more variables than data points, making the data cumbersome (Holley 2010) and 
increasing the risk of a lack of research focus. However, coupled with the adaptive 
theory analysis tools, and constant reference to the literature, theoretical propositions 
from the literature steered the research, data and analysis.  
3.5.	  Methods	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  
A mixed methods approach was used to investigate the ways in which poor business 
owners responded to threats, particularly climate induced threats in their businesses. 
Using an interview schedule, interviews and focus groups were conducted in the 
research sites. The details of these measures are outlined below. By using this data 
collection procedure, I aimed to establish and record how a number of small-scale, 
informal business owners operating in each of the research sites engaged with both 
formal and informal agents of assistance in the face of hazards affecting the business. 
I was particularly interested in the social networks providing help in the event of a 
flood, as well as the business owners’ participation in groups that provided support. 
This two-pronged approach to the sources of assistance was very important because it 
was often the sole source of assistance to many poor business owners – with limited 
access and use of state-led and market-led assistance. 
The choice of data collection methods was also to a great extent informed by my 
familiarity with the methods and that I had some level of skill in using them, 
particularly administering the survey and conducting interviews. The research 
benefited greatly from the use of participant observation methods. some of the data 
presented in this research draws on the observation notes that I took during field visits. 





3.5.2.	  Document	  Analysis	  and	  secondary	  data	  
Given the multi-dimensional sources of data in the study, so too were its sources and 
types of secondary data. Although I collected secondary data throughout the research, 
at the beginning of the research it was especially important because it gave me insight 
into the context settings that I was to work in. 
To gain better insight into the City of Cape Town’s work in the informal settlement 
areas, I drew on documents relating on the City of Cape Town’s flood risk 
management strategies including maps, financial reports, impact assessment review 
documents, press releases and newspaper articles. National plans and legislative 
documents were also very useful, particularly when coupled with departmental annual 
progress reports. This was later used for comparison with residents’ experience of and 
changes in City-level flood management efforts over time. Other government 
publications that I reviewed outlined the regulatory framework within which 
insurance, trading and a range of other (formal and informal) commercial activities 
are conducted. 
Many of the Government reports also outlined the political context within which the 
programs were implemented and information about their development programs. In 
chapter 5 this background was useful in understanding the intentions, make-up and 
operations of the interdepartmental committee overseeing flooding in informal 
settlement areas around the city. 
Colleagues in the Flooding in Cape Town under Climate Risk Research Project 
(FliCRR) project at the University of Cape Town had recently concluded a large 
research study on flooding in the City and through them I had access to secondary 
data in the form of minutes of official and community meetings, and interview 
transcripts with key municipal government department officials represented in the 
City flooding task team. Access to the FLiCRR data was especially helpful when I 
returned to the field in 2014 because since I had left the field in 2012, there had been 
numerous research studies around flooding in the City. I was very wary of stakeholder 
fatigue and indeed the large number of municipal government officials and local 





Reports produced by NGOs working in informal settlement areas around Cape Town 
were also very insightful. For instance in 2009, the CORC21 in partnership with the 
Joe Slovo Task team undertook an enumeration study. Using a survey questionnaire, 
volunteer enumerators in Joe Slovo collected data on 23 variables that included 
household demographic data, employment, disaster history and others. Reports such 
as this one provided statistical data that was more accurate than what I was able to 
find in the national census data. In the case of Philippi, Adlard (2008) compiled a rich 
historical analysis (social, economic, political) of all the various neighborhoods 
within Philippi from the 1800s until 2008 and I drew heavily on his analysis. 
There were reports that captured savings and burial society practices in African 
communities in the urban city. These tended to be longitudinal studies giving 
historical accounts of how civic association was built around these and other societies. 
For example, in Philippi there are numerous reports that give accounts of the use of 
women’s savings associations to build houses as well as build community (cf. 
Huchzermeyer 2006; McEwan 2003; Patel and Mitlin 2002; and Bolnick et al. 2008). 
3.5.3.	  Survey	  
The surveys conducted in both periods of fieldwork elicited fulfilled the qualitative 
data component of the study. Through the use of the survey, the demographic data of 
the business owners, the basic household as well as the business information 
procedures. A total of 15422 surveys were conducted. In both research sites, the initial 
business owners were initially selected randomly. Conducting random interviews did 
not mean that the research was random or lacked direction because I had clearly 
defined questions and probed for issues significant to the study. I tried to make this 
small sample diverse to cover the different business sectors in the informal sector by 
nationality, age, marital status, education and the gender of business owners. An 
                                                
 
21	  Community	  Organisation	  Resource	  Centre	  (CORC)	  is	  a	  non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  that	  supports	  
communities	  prepared	  and	  willing	  to	  help	  themselves.	  CORC	  provides	  support	  to	  networks	  of	  urban	  
and	   rural	   poor	   communities	   who	   mobilize	   themselves	   around	   their	   own	   resources	   and	   capacities	  
(CORC	  2009).	  
22	  The	   surveys	   were	   usually	   conducted	   just	   with	   the	   interviews.	   Consequently,	   there	   are	   an	   equal	  





analysis of this data is presented in Chapter 4. 
3.5.4.	  Interviewing	  
The interviews conducted in the study were consistent with the ethical requirements 
and considerations outlined by the Research Ethics committee at the University of 
Cape Town. I outline details of this under ‘Ethical considerations’ (See Section 3.8 of 
this chapter). The interviews were conducted in several phases with respondents 
representing each of the groups represented in the research, that is insurance 
companies, (relevant) municipal government departments, savings societies and burial 
societies.  
Small	  scale	  business	  owners	  in	  the	  research	  sites	  
The data collection process spanned between 2010 and 2014. The interviews were 
conducted in June – July 2010 (in Victoria Mxenge) and October 2010 to November 
(in Joe Slovo) were interviewed for the study. Numerous follow-up interviews in the 
informal settlements were conducted outside of these time frames. I returned to the 
field again in January – February 2014 and in this time I conducted interviews with 
insurance companies and representatives of municipal government departments in the 
task team.  
Through the interviews I sought to explore how small businesses experiencing a 
general condition of environmental threat due to recurring flooding differed in their 
vulnerability in terms of the response strategies at their disposal. By using open-ended 
research questions, the extent of their community engagement in non-market 
responses, I identified that there were high membership numbers in burial societies 
and savings societies amongst the business owners.  
The interview questions coupled with the survey questions also identified 
considerable differences amongst business owners that took up membership in civil 
associations and those that did not. This prompted me to sample across gender, age 
and nationality.  
The interviews with the business owners were conducted in two phases. First a short 
survey questionnaire was administered with the intention of drawing up the 





section of the survey questionnaire were questions relating to the business owners 
employment and residential information. Interview discussion points that were laid 
out in 4 parts then followed the survey questions.  
In the first part, the interview discussion points elicited information about the business. 
The second part was for participants that were no longer in business. They were asked 
about the businesses that they formerly owned and the reasons for their closure. In 
part three questions were around the business environment, particularly the areas that 
the business owners faced the greatest difficulty with. Lastly, part four of the 
interview elicited information on the business owners’ sources of support and 
assistance in light of the responses obtained in part three about the business 
environment and related difficulties.  
The business owners were encouraged to talk as much as possible and where possible, 
the interviews were very conversational as opposed to being question-and-answer 
interactions. Many business owners picked up points outside of the questions and 
some often got sidetracked but it was never difficult to reel the conversation back to 
cover the discussion points. Therefore even though the discussion points were laid out 
sequentially on the interview sheet, often times the questioning did not follow this 
sequence. 
The length of the interviews varied, with the shortest interview recorded at an hour 
long and the longest took approximately 2 hours. The interviews were often followed 
by a discussion of the data with my research assistant that often extended over another 
two hours. 
The interviews were open-ended in an effort to give participants to elaborate as much 
as possible as this is critical to the qualitative approach. To this end, the interviews 
often opened with participants talking about the types of business that they operate 
and their experiences over the time that they had operated them. Interestingly, almost 
all of the participants often ended up talking about the challenges that they faced in 
their businesses. In spite of the grim circumstances that many of the business owners 
operated their businesses under, many were eager to continue and were open to 
assistance where available, even though they were not prepared to pay for it (I explore 





in the business were asked and these were followed by where/whom they felt 
assistance ought to come from.  
Flood	  Task	  Team	  Participants	  
Another group of research participants was made up of municipal government 
officials. Identifying relevant municipal government officials was made even easier 
by my networks and fellow research colleagues in the FliCCR project. A total of ten 
representative members of the task team23 were approached for interview and I was 
able to secure interviews with just three officials. One represented the Department of 
Informal settlements, another was a ward councilor and the third respondent was the 
head of a local NGO that the City partnered with to distribute food and goods in 
disaster-affected areas around Cape Town. Through FliCCR, I also had access to 
transcripts from interview with officials from the following municipal government 
departments: Roads and Storm water; Environmental Health; and Water and 
Sanitation. 
The interviews with the municipal government officials were around 5 key discussion 
points. First the officials were questioned on theirs and their department’s role in 
disaster management in the city. Respondents were asked how the different roles of 
task team members were coordinated and this preceded discussion point on the 
challenges of synergizing multiple roles from relevant municipal government 
departments. Lastly, the officials were also asked about their engagement with 
disaster-affected communities, how they went about entering these sites and some of 
the challenges they faced once there. 
Formal	  Insurance	  companies	  
Representatives of formal insurance companies were also approached for interview on 
the their companies’ insurance products for lower income earners. I specifically 
targeted the top three largest and most popularly used insurance companies in South 
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  The	  Flood	  task	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  comprises	  approximately	  32	  City	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  Cape	  Town	  municipal	  departments	  and	  a	  





Africa: Old Mutual, Sanlam and Santam. However, I was also able to interview 
representatives from Liberty Life and ABSA. 
The insurance company representatives were asked questions around the following 
discussion points: the insurance products available through the insurance company – 
particularly those specifically targeted at lower income earners; the conditions of 
eligibility for insurance cover; the policies that guide insurance provision to lower 
income earners; the rate of insurance uptake amongst the lower incomes earners; and 
the challenges associated with providing insurance to low income earners. 
3.5.5.	  Focus	  group	  interviews	  
Focus groups are a research technique that collects data through group interaction on 
a predefined topic (Morgan 1996). The use of focus group discussions would give me 
an impression of some of the pervasive hazards and the responses by business owners. 
The focus group discussions would also a useful platform in which to ask participants 
about my observations and to foster a discussion about some of the emerging themes 
from the data that I was collecting. The focus groups therefore complemented the data 
collection techniques used in the study in that they would make it possible to make 
sense of and better understand statements and behaviors of the business owners 
(Macnaghten and Myers 2004). 
I arranged a total of four focus group discussions (two in each research site), with ten 
participants in each discussion group. The discussion points in the focus group 
discussion were as follows: 
• What did you do to protect your shop goods in the recent flood?  
• Please talk to me about the challenges that you experience in business when it 
floods. 
• What losses have you experienced and where did you get help to overcome 
these in a previous flood event? 
• Have you ever gotten help from fellow members of a savings group, burial 
society or your church? If so, how did they help? 
The focus group discussion was held at the home of business owners that I had met in 





participants; many were her friends and neighbors that owned businesses of different 
kinds.  
A total of 6 (5 women and 1 man) business owners participated in the discussion and 
the total discussion time was one hour and thirty minutes. However, getting business 
owners to commit time to focus group discussions and finding suitable venues in 
which to hold the discussion proved challenging. I had planned to conduct 3 focus 
group meetings but I successfully conducted only one because many business owners 
did not want to participate in the focus groups, citing that they took up too much of 
their time. The business owners also complained that they did not get any direct 
benefit from participating in the focus groups. They said in previous meetings of this 
kind, they had spent time helping researchers like myself and received nothing in 
return. 
3.5.6.	  Data	  Analysis	  
The research focused on the data and generated mental concepts that were tested and 
verified through more questioning and engagement with the research participants 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998). My relationship with some research participants and 
research assistants was very helpful in this process because of their ability to interpret 
situations and statements in ways that I would have possibly overlooked.  
The data analysis and theory generation process (Charmaz 2000) started with 
questioning the meanings in the data and picking up the use of words. In this open 
coding process  
(Strauss and Corbin 1998) concepts and their properties emanate from the data. I did 
the coding at the end of the day of interviews when I reviewed interviews, noted 
emanating questions, recorded my observations. Often in this process I also queried 
the data, posing questions to follow up on whether my understanding was correct or 
not. This process was also vital for the saturation of categories (Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). I then verified the emerging themes with the research 
assistant after which we tried to revisit the research participants to test them with new 
research participants.  
The open coding process then gave way to axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) as 





This of course also meant that other categories were either abandoned or became a 
subcategory of a more prevalent category. Through the selective coding phase I 
selected broader categories. The process of associating the selected broad categories 
with subcategories used selective coding (ibid) and until I reached saturation.  
Saturation was reached when these themes were verified in the field and there were 
fewer and fewer new themes generated from the data. However, time was also useful 
in deciding on when to stop the coding process and use the data and theoretical 
categories that I had generated. This cut-off point came after six intense months in the 
field, which was followed by occasional visits thereafter over another six months. 
Transcribing	  and	  TAMS	  Analyser	  
As more and more categories were generated, the data became increasingly 
cumbersome. The interview narrative was transcribed verbatim and thematically 
analyzed using an electronic tool called the TAMS Analyser (TA). TA is specifically 
designed to work with ethnographic material and works by selecting the relevant text 
in a passage and assigning a code consistent with the risk management tools used in 
poor communities. The tool therefore allowed me to extract, analyze and 
systematically save the coded categories (Weinstein 2006). 
With TA I was able to upload interview transcripts onto the programme and add 
observational notes into it and even cluster the data under broader categories. This 
way I was able to analyse not only the responses of the research participants but I 
could add my observations to the analysis as well. Further, TA allowed me to make 
notes on some of the literatures that ‘spoke’ to the emerging data and I was later able 
to easily draw themes against which I wrote the thesis report. This was also useful in 
that I could mitigate a common criticism lodged against computer analysis programs. 
That is, although computer programs allow easy mapping of relationships, there is a 
danger in placing too much emphasis on their analysis as it isolates the researcher’s 
interpretations and does not make provisions for the researcher’s views of the data as 
it emerges (Charmaz 2000; Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
More importantly, with TA, I was able to better streamline data from different actor 
groups in the study and generate further categories from these. For example, 





management in the City of Cape Town highlighted some of the challenges that the 
departments faced in providing services in informal settlement areas. A look at the 
interview data with the business owners often corroborated these data, giving a richer 
perspective of the problem of service delivery in the city’s informal settlement areas.  
I was able to continue using the programme when I was not at the university and 
offline. This choice was particularly made at a time when I thought that I would 
conclude the analysis away from the UCT campus. Indeed, I did end up leaving the 
university while still working on the analysis and continued to use the programme 
without interruptions. 
3.6.	  Site	  identification	  and	  participant	  selection	  
The research sites were selected in line with the governance in areas of limited 
statehood framework, the research sought a better understanding on the services 
available to communities with little or limited state-led governance. Further, I wanted 
to understand what residents of areas with less state-led goods and services did to 
access their equivalent? To this end, a comparison was made between Victoria 
Mxenge, a community under the leadership of a municipal elect ward councilor and 
Joe Slovo, whose leadership was made up of an informally elected task team. 
A housing list was not available at the time of collecting the data from which a 
sample could be drawn. The initial respondents were selected by the type of business 
that they operated, that is, small-scale informal (unregistered) business operating in 
their informal settlement. The research sites were also selected because they are both 
highly vulnerable to flooding because of their location in the Cape Flats – a 
comparison of the two research sites would therefore reveal differences in the 
strategies (if any) that the business owners were using to respond to the impacts of 
flooding on their businesses.  
The main differences between the research sites are the types of leadership (with 
community-based leadership in Joe Slovo and municipal elected leadership in 
Victoria Mxenge); and the housing types (with informal housing in Joe Slovo and a 
combination of built houses and informal housing in Victoria Mxenge). The type of 
leadership it is also a good basis for comparison because it has a direct bearing on the 





South Africa’s history of racial segregation has had a direct impact and implications 
on leadership in the informal settlement areas born of this segregation. For example, 
during apartheid – led by a single party state, local government leaders overseeing the 
informal settlement areas were appointed based on race and their affiliation with the 
state (Cole 1987).  With the democratic dispensation, there were more political 
players vying for leadership roles and competition over these often led to violent 
conflict between leaders and residents at community level, that is in the informal 
settlement areas (see Bahre 2007; Skuse and Cousins 2007).  
These conflicts hampered community-level development in many ways including 
damage to municipal infrastructure and the loss of lives. However, it also pointed to a 
growing community engagement (Lemanski 2008). This is characterised by the 
political organization that was present in many informal settlement areas and which 
often violently defied the apartheid government in the fight for democracy (Desai 
2002).  
The result of this resistance against the state was felt within the communities as well 
and is often associated with fragmentation and a lack of transaprency (Drivdal 2014; 
Zuern 2011). Heller (2003) in Drivdal (2014:16) takes on a more optimistic view of 
this sigmentation as an indicator of “alternative civic movements or “new voices of 
protest”, thus opening up plural channels for participation and governance to poor 
residents of informal settlement areas. 
These governance dynamics and their history have important relevance to the 
dissertation’s overall theoratical considerations in that they identify with the idea of 
multiple governance actors for the urban poor (in contrast with a single movement 
that protested against aoaprtheid) while also acknowledging that these governance 
strategies are not always inclusive nor are they always lawful (Skuse and Cousins 
2007). 
An example of the tensions in leadership is best illustrated by the following events 
that took place in Joe Slovo. The Joe Slovo task team (hereafter referred to as JS task 
team) was formed in response to a lack of services in Joe Slovo and particularly in 
response to a fire in 2006 that burned down 60 shacks (Sosibo 2011). The leadership 





that some of the business owners sampled in the study had worked closely with the 
community leadership on matters relating to their businesses. For example, a local 
businessman24 explained how, on numerous occasions, the City of Cape Town public 
safety officials had warned him to dismantle a bridge over a water channel that he had 
built using old wood. He ignored the Council’s warning because one of the task team 
members had told him not to dismantle the bridge. The task team member said the 
bridge provided a service to the community and made it easy and safe for residents to 
cross the open water way.  
Even though some business owners said that the JS task team leadership was 
accessible to them in matters relating to their businesses, there was no clear link 
between the leadership and business owners’ flood response. However the leadership 
clearly involved itself in peripheral issues, such as in the case of the bridge owner.  
Within this context, the dissertation sought to understand how poor business owners 
in the informal settlement areas negotiate this ‘chaotic’25 leadership space to access 
goods and services, particularly the everyday activities and organisational processes 
through which environmental threats are negotiated and basic goods and services are 
sought. 
The type of housing was also used for comparison because many of the business 
owners operate their businesses from their homes. Therefore the type of housing was 
thought to have a direct correlation to the exposure to flood hazard, its management 
and consequently, the success of the business. 
The comparative research sites were also used to provide a more accurate 
reproduction and in order to observe the similarities and differences between the two 
sites. The variables that I found most significant for the study and within which the 
most differences were found in the research sites were: 
- housing and infrastructure; 
                                                
 
24	  Interview	  with	  bridge	  business	  owner,	  4	  November	  2010,	  Joe	  Slovo.	  
25	  The	  idea	  of	  chaos	  and	  disorder	  is	  recurrent	  in	  urban	  literature	  and	  refutes	  the	  idea	  that	  informality	  
should	   equate	   to	   chaos	   and	   rather	   reveal	   the	   macro-­‐level	   organizational	   structures	   that	   facilitate	  





- community leadership; 
- gender; and 
- age. 
I discuss the significance of these variables to the research question in Chapter 4. 
3.6.1.	  Accessing	  the	  case	  study	  sites	  and	  participants	  
Informal settlement areas are characterized by uncertainty and are highly transient. I 
found that once in the field, I spent a lot of time following up on agreements that were 
made on interview times and follow up visits. This was especially frequent in Joe 
Slovo as some people had begun the relocation process and were either moving to 
new communities or other parts of Joe Slovo. Time spent in the research sites required 
a lot of patience and flexibility on my part. 
One of the main challenges during the period of data collection was finding 
participants, especially for follow up visits. Because of the transitory nature of 
informal settlement areas, some research participants were not always available at the 
times that we had initially agreed to meet.  
The decision on the appropriateness of the research participants in the study was 
determined by the research problem. It was obvious that small-business owners in the 
research sites would be the unit of analysis but within this I tried to have some 
variation along business type, gender, age, level of education and nationality. 
However, I had a hard time gaining access to non-South African business owners in 
the research sites. Three reasons could explain this challenge. 
First, business owners in informal settlement areas are targets of robberies because it 
is assumed that they have large amounts of money at their business premises. Non 
South African owned businesses in the research sites tended to be bigger, therefore 
suggesting that the money they generated was greater than that of smaller (South 
African owned) businesses.  
My identity as a researcher and foreign national working in South Africa influenced 
the research, particularly in interpreting the data. I had to negotiate two considerations 
associated with the use of qualitative data analysis methods. On one hand I had to be 





that mine was just one of many but by no means was a ‘truth’. To do this, I remained 
followed the advice of (Polsky 1967) to be cognizant of my role as a researcher and 
therefore as someone asking people to trust me and share information with me. In 
return, I had to be honest about the research and my own intentions with it. On many 
occasions this was important as research participants wanted to know what I would do 
with the information that I was collecting and whether they would derive any 
immediate benefit from it. To this I often responded that the direct benefit would be 
for me towards earning a PhD degree. 
On the other hand I was aware of- and reflected on even the things that research 
participants did not say. For example, I often felt that foreign-national business 
owners withheld information in the presence of my research assistants. When I felt 
that they were uncomfortable sharing some information, I would often return on my 
one to probe further on the questions that were not answered to my satisfaction. 
Sometimes this yielded more detailed answers, but not all the time. 
Second, in the time that I was collecting data for the research, many non-South 
Africans and their businesses were victims of xenophobic attacks. This was not the 
first time that non-South Africans had been victims of these acts of violence and they 
were understandably suspect of outsiders asking questions about their nationality and 
details of their businesses. This demanded that I prove myself (Marks 2001)26 to these 
business owners. To do this, I often stressed that I did not speak Xhosa, I made 
inferences of my life experiences in my home country, Lesotho. Often I tried to find 
ways to focus the business owners’ attention on my identity as a university student. 
This I did by making reference to the Ethics code of research and the guidelines that 
the University demanded that I follow for my safety and that of my research 
participants.  
Lastly, despite explaining who I was, the intentions of my research and the emphasis 
on being non-South African myself, I was still viewed as a local. Perhaps it is because 
                                                
 
26	  Monique	  Marks’	  experiences	  of	  proving	  oneself	  as	  told	  in	  her	  book,	  Young	  Warriors:	  Youth	  politics,	  
identity	   and	   violence	   in	   South	   Africa,	   provided	   a	   useful	   learning	   for	   me	   on	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  





I was always accompanied by a (South African) community member. Talking to me 
about their businesses in the presence of a known local might have made them feel 
more vulnerable to robbery or xenophobic violence. In the end, nine non-South 
African business owners were interviewed. 
My intention was always to interview an equal number of female and male business 
owners and I feared that this random approach would jeopardise that. Indeed I was 
able to sample more female than male business owners. This was just one of many 
compromises and modifications that I had to make in the face of changing 
circumstances and difficulty in securing participants during the data collection 
process27.  
Cornelius and Lyness (1980) as well as Cameron (1978) reflect on this issue, that 
while careful consideration ought to be given to the methodological and theoretical 
issues around identifying and defining the units of analysis, the researcher is often 
forced to defer to the dictates of resource and participant availability. Also, the 
availability of business owners for interview was also highly reliant on whether they 
knew the research assistants that helped me to approach them for interview. However, 
in every interview that was successfully completed with the business owners, they 
were asked to refer us to neighbors and or friends that also owned businesses. This 
snowball sampling approach (Babbie and Mouton 2001) was very useful in helping 
me identify and secure more business owners for interview.  
 
The sample generated from this approach included entrepreneurs who were no longer 
in business. I was especially interested in business owners whose businesses had been 
destroyed following a climate related event. However, in all cases, it seemed that in 
the end it was financial challenges that had led to the closure of many businesses. 
 
Apart from their suitability, there were considerations made about gaining access to of 
small business owners at times most convenient for them. Browne (1976) adds fun to 
                                                
 
27	  See	   Kulka	   (1982)	   for	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   of	   problems	   frequently	   encountered	   in	   the	   research	   from	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this list. Even though I enjoyed working in the research sites, I had great difficulty 
with asking for people’s time and giving back little to nothing. Many times, 
participants asked very frankly what benefit they would get from participating in the 
research. It was always very uncomfortable for me to explain to them that it might be 
very little, if anything at all. Depending of course on whose hands the dissertation 
landed in. Many participants seemed appeased by this answer despite the amounts of 
time that I was demanding of them. 
The total number of in the research sites was 75 in Joe Slovo and 79 in Victoria 
Mxenge (5 of whom were no longer business owners). The number of business 
owners sampled in the study corresponded with 26 and 30 male and 50 and 48 per 
cent female in Joe Slovo and Victoria Mxenge respectively. 
3.6.2.	  Fieldwork	  hazards	  and	  dangers	  
Security is a big concern for doing research in the informal settlement areas, 
particularly for a foreign national and that does not speak the Xhosa language. Threats 
to personal security were many but the ones I was most vulnerable to were robbery 
and assault. The emergence of such situations is unpredictable and even the locals are 
highly vulnerable, which makes avoiding them difficult. 
Advice from the locals, particularly my research assistants were very helpful but I 
also learned to make decisions with safety as the main determinant of my actions. In 
many situations I decided against interviewing some business owners, even with the 
presence of a research assistant if I felt uncomfortable. This was particularly the case 
when the interviews were to be conducted in the business owners’ home where there 
would be little traffic from customers coming to buy. While visiting business owners 
at their places of work was disruptive, it ensured some amount of safety and also 
allowed me to observe them while they worked. 
In the weeks towards the end of the World Cup games in 2010, safety became an even 
greater concern for me because of the xenophobic attacks that were taking place in 
many informal settlement areas around Cape Town. I had been working in Joe Slovo 
at the time and while there had been no reported attacks in the informal settlement up 
to that time, my research assistant advised that I rather stay away from the field for 





that I was a foreign national and student at UCT. Knowing that she could not protect 
me if anything happened, my research assistant advised that I stay away for some time 
until things were calmer in other townships.  
There was already very little police and community interaction in the settlement so I 
could not count on the police to come to my aid in the event of an emergency. I 
returned to the field later in July 2010. As a precaution I often went into the field later 
in the day when people were out and about and I made sure that I left by 4pm in time 
to avoid the rush of workers coming back into the informal settlements. 
Even though I was not harmed and no threats that I was aware of were targeted at me 
– there were two major events in Joe Slovo that made my time there very 
uncomfortable. In one instance after doing a series of interviews, my research 
assistant and I walked into a mob of residents attacking a community church. The 
police had been called in but were struggling to control the large and angry crowd. 
We later found out that the church Minister had been accused of sexually harassing a 
young female church member. In another instance, a Somali owned spaza shop not far 
from where my research assistant lived, had been robbed at gunpoint in the early 
hours of the morning and one of the shop owners was injured in the gunfire.  
Victoria Mxenge felt somewhat different. Perhaps I had been in the field long enough 
that despite my awareness of the dangers, I started to become more relaxed. Also, in 
Victoria Mxenge I never saw or heard of any violent activity in the area that I was 
working in. However, when I met a community activist and business owners - who 
later assisted me briefly with identifying Somali leather works business owners, I was 
again reminded of the dangers in the informal settlement and the particular 
vulnerability of foreign nationals.  
The research assistant had been running his business out of a shipping container in the 
community of Crossroads and had decided to rent a partitioned section of it to a 
Somali business owner. According him, some community members had warned him 
of rumors in the community of the dissatisfaction of some community members 
around his co-operation with the Somalis. In March 2010, the business owner’s 
shipping container was burned down and when I met him later that year he had lodged 





Two years after our meeting I reached out to this particular research assistant to 
arrange a follow-on research visit and was met with news of his death. According to 
an article in a local newspaper, he had been killed over clashes with a local councilor 
over corrupt housing distribution in the N2 Gateway Housing project.  
It is safe to say that my safety in the field was a function of luck and a high reliance 
on the communities that I worked in, especially my research assistants. They also 
played a very useful ‘security’ role for which I will always be grateful. 
3.7.	  Validity	  of	  the	  data	  and	  field	  relations	  
I developed an especially close relationship with one of the research assistants in Joe 
Slovo. I spent many hours at her home when we were not conducting interviews. 
Many times we talked about life in the settlement but our times together were often 
spent talking about the day’s interviews and scoping what respondents to approach 
next. This is likely to have lent a higher degree of reliability in the information that 
she gave me, often explaining Xhosa customs and practices, particularly in relation to 
the observations that I had made and noted during the course of the day.  
In Philippi I was also introduced to a small business owner, a leather shoes and 
accessories and we became fast friends and he soon became my research assistant. 
The decision to employ this, and subsequent research assistants in the research was 
based on their familiarity with the informal settlement and small business owners 
operating businesses in the settlement. The assistants had to be English and Xhosa (as 
the majority of business owners only spoke Xhosa) speakers. Although I did not base 
my selection of the research assistants on their education level, they had to be able to 
write in English.  
The adaptive theory approach helped me to marry the data generated from different 
participants such as the business owners and the government officials and to establish 





not only enhances the validity of the study, it is also a key method of triangulation28 
(Yin 2003).   
The differences associated with the use of different methods became very apparent 
once in the field. Especially interesting was observing the interaction between 
business owners and their customers and hearing the behaviors that they said they 
practiced within civic associations. While in one setting, their business, they took on 
more of a leadership role, in the associations they allowed themselves to be led, often 
without questioning the leadership of the societies. 
3.8.	  Fieldwork	  ethics	  
In the process of arranging meetings and conducting interviews, I was guided by 
ethical considerations.  
Ethics is intrinsic to the constructivist paradigm because of the inclusion of 
participant values in the inquiry (starting with respondents' existing 
constructions and working toward increased information and sophistication in 
their constructions as well as in the inquirer's construction) (Guba and Lincoln 
1994:115).  
I enjoyed my close relationship with two of the three research assistants that I worked 
with but I was also very aware on many instances that ours was not an equal 
relationship and often felt that they sometimes told me what they thought I ought to 
hear and not what they really felt or wished to express.  
 
One area that was often difficult to negotiate was keeping my personal life out of the 
field but with time that was difficult to hold back because I was being exposed to such 
great detail of their personal lives. I was always very careful however to ensure the 
anonymity and confidentiality of the research assistants, the research participants that 
we visited together and the information shared between us. 
 
                                                
 
28 	  Triangulation	   involves	   using	   more	   than	   one	   method	   to	   gather	   data,	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   interviews,	  
observations,	   questionnaires,	   and	   documents	   (Denzin	   2005).	   It	   is	   a	   method	   of	   crosschecking	   data	  





The research interviews were conducted in line with the guidelines and clearance that 
I had been granted by the University of Cape Town’s Research Ethics committee. 
Before conducting the interviews, research participants were given an information 
sheet outlining the research and its aims. The information sheet was available in both 
English and Xhosa and depending on the language that the participants were 
confortable reading; they were left with a copy in their preferred language. However, 
I also made sure I discussed the information sheet with the research participants prior 
to the interviews. This was not only to clarify the points on the information sheet but 
it was also in an effort to accommodate illiterate participants. In these discussions, I 
emphasized anonymity and confidentiality. Potential participants were also made to 
understand that their participation was not only voluntary, but also that they would 
not be financially compensated for it.  
When participants agreed to take part in the study, I presented them with a consent 
form, which they signed and kept a signed copy of. The information and consent 
forms provided details of the intended use of the data as well as the precautions taken 
for confidentiality and anonymity of the research participant. The forms also provided 
the contact information of the Research Ethics officer at the University of Cape Town 
and those of my supervisor.  
The problem with though was that I had very little control over the research assistants’ 
confidentiality of the information shared by the research participants. Realising that 
this was not something that I could control, I often spoke to the research assistants 
about the importance of their job helping me and how much the success of my 
research rested on them keeping the information heard in the interviews confidential. 
By the time I left the field, I had had no complaints from the research participants 
about breach of confidentiality.  
 
3.9.	  Conclusion	  
This chapter has outlined the methodological procedures followed in this thesis. I 
have tried to demonstrate the appropriateness of the chosen research methods for 





As highlighted in the chapter, using adaptive theory systematically, particularly the 
constant comparison between the cases and the verification with the research 
participants, highlighted intricate details between the cases and helped to explain 
covert phenomena. Through adaptive theory I was also able to draw relationships 
between variables such as age, gender, nationality with the broader data relating to the 
research questions such as their impact on access to state-led services or influence of 
business owners’ participation in the informal sector. This adds depth to the thesis, 
allowing it to test theoretical claims, particularly around the actions of the formal and 
informal markets in the absence of state action. 
The chapter has also explained how challenges were overcome in the research sites. 
Access to respondents presented the main challenge in this research. It was overcome 
by a more flexible approach and asking respondents for referrals though the 
snowballing method. Another grave challenge was around safety and this was 
overcome by building relationships with the research assistants and following their 
advice, particularly research assistants and through limiting the time spent in the field 
everyday. This had its limitations but it proved an effective safety measure. Lastly, 
the chapter has pointed to the ethical considerations that were taken in the study and 
how these were approached. 
In the following chapter I present some background to the cases and offers context to 
the research problem and demonstrate the relevance of the data categories generated 









THE	  STUDY	  AREA:	  LIVELIHOODS	  AND	  ASSOCIATED	  CHALLENGES	  
4.1.	  Introduction	  
This chapter is a presentation of the two case study sites. Within these communities I 
specifically focused on small-scale, informal business owners and the conditions 
under which they conducted business, as well as the ways in which they engaged the 
different actors to respond to flooding. The actors responding to flooding were 
identified as the state, the formal insurance sector and civil society associations, 
namely burial societies. 
The research sites in this study, Victoria Mxenge informal settlement in Philippi 
Township and Joe Slovo informal settlement in Langa Township, like many informal 
settlement areas in the City of Cape Town, are highly vulnerable to flooding in the 
winter months (May – July). The main characteristic of informal settlements is the 
housing structures; the “shelter [is] usually constructed with unconventional building 
materials… [they are] unauthorized settlements with shacks on legal services sites” 
(Huchzermeyer 2008:2). As a result of the fragile housing structures and the poor 
infrastructure in these communities, the impact of flooding is of a much higher 
magnitude than in other more formal built communities of the city.  
The availability of basic services is also an important characteristic of informal 
settlement areas. Some informal settlement areas do not have basic services, such as 
water, sanitation services, electricity, gravel roads and drainage systems. These services 
are often unavailable in privately owned, high-density areas (Desportes 2014). Adlard 
2009 found that in Joe Slovo, the most urgent needs were electricity, water and toilets 
while in Philippi, residents’ needs included public infrastructure. 
The preventative flood responses of the City tend to be ineffective because of limited 
infrastructure, such as a lack of drainage systems, and, where they do exist, they are 





climate change such as heavy rain occur, these communities’ “capacities to withstand 
or recover” from them is often difficult (Vedeld 2015:289). Herein lies the link 
between the governance challenge and its contributions to communties’ weakened 
resilience. Further, the poor in informal settlement areas are even more vulnerable to 
flooding because of limited financial resources to buy durable structural materials and 
monetary protection against flooding, such as insurance. 
The research sites are also confronted with other social risks, including high levels of 
crime and violence, unemployment and the prevalence of HIV. According to Bahre 
(2012), for the poor in the urban townships of Cape Town, high rates of death cause 
income loss and households often accrue significant debt because of costs associated 
with burying their loved ones. How these hazards impact a typical business owner’s 
flood response mechanisms is a key focus of the research. 
To better appreciate the complex social and environmental conditions in which poor, 
small business owners do business, this chapter provides some context in five sections. 
The first section introduces the two research sites. The second section presents and 
draws comparative variables between the main characteristics of the two research 
sites. In the third section a brief overview of the business owners sampled in the 
research is presented, along with the types of business they operate. In the fourth 
section I present the hazards that the businesses face. Lastly, I present the strategies 
that business owners use to overcome the named challenges.  
4.2.	  Introducing	  the	  research	  sites	  and	  their	  key	  characteristics	  
There is increasing attention in the African urban literature on informal settlement 
areas in cities of the South, yet small scale, informal businesses operating within 
informal settlement areas remain under-explored (Lund and Skinner 2004). In the 
City of Cape Town survey, data about informal trade is outdated – the last available 
survey data was from a 2002 study (Fleming 2013). Also, it is limited to the city 
centre and not peripheral areas, such as informal settlement areas. The data presented 






4.2.1.	  Joe	  Slovo	  informal	  settlement,	  Langa	  Township	  
 
 
Fig. 2: Location Map outlining research sites in City of Cape Town. Source: 
http://www.heksie.com/photos/CapeShackMap.PNG 
The Joe Slovo informal settlement was established in the early 1990s by former 
occupants of Langa hostels29 and backyard dwellers. The proximity of the settlement 
to the Cape Town central business district (CBD) and the commuter train network 
provided settlers with easy access to work in the city as well as neighbouring areas, 
such as Epping, Langa and Pinelands (Phuhlisani 2009). 
                                                
 
29	  Designated	  barracks	  originally	  built	  for	  male	  migrant	  workers	  living	  in	  the	  city	  and	  enforced	  under	  
apartheid	   legislation.	   Hostels	   tended	   to	   be	   underserviced	   and	   overcrowded	   –	   often	   with	  migrants	  





Joe Slovo is situated 10 km east of the Cape Town CBD on vacant land along the N2 
highway (CORC 2009). According to the City of Cape Town (2000, 2004 and 2005), 
the dwelling count in Joe Slovo was 1,195 informal homes in 1996. By 1998, the 
number had increased to 2,153 and by 2000 the figure stood at 4,300 dwellings. By 
2003 there were 5,431 dwellings in the informal settlement. The rapid population rise 
in the settlement was coupled with several risks, namely fires and flooding as a result 
of insufficient storm water drainage (Phuhlisani 2009). Since 2000, the City of Cape 
Town has provided more services, particularly standpipes and toilets, but 
environmental and health hazards continue to plague the settlement (City of Cape 
Town IDP 2004/5). 
Initially, the community of Joe Slovo was made up of only shack structures, but in 
recent years there have been huge changes in the settlement. The most significant of 
which has been an urban housing project called the N2 Gateway, whose aim was to 
provide rental-housing stock for the poor and to enable in-situ upgrades. The project 
has proceeded despite contestation from the community and has resulted in large-
scale relocations. 
When I first visited Joe Slovo in 2010, the dwellings were mostly shacks, except for 
the newly developed RDP houses and the ‘flats’30. There were a few signs of state 
infrastructure and service provision in the settlement: all the toilets and water points 
in Joe Slovo were communal and the City oversaw their waste management. There is 
also the tarred road that divides the formal housing area and the informal settlement 
area. The roads within the settlement itself were all dirt roads. There were no water 
channels along the dirt roads to divert waste, consequently, when it rained, the water 
often flowed into the shacks close to the road.  The water flowing downstream of the 
main tarred road and through the community eventually found its way into the open 
water diversion channel built by the City at the periphery of the settlement.  
                                                
 
30	  High-­‐density,	  multi-­‐story	  blocks	  of	   apartments	  built	   for	   the	  poor.	   These	  were	  originally	  meant	   to	  
house	   migrants	   working	   in	   the	   city	   but	   with	   high	   urban	   migration	   rates,	   these	   one-­‐person	  
accommodations	  were	  often	  shared	  by	  many	  (Huchzemeyer	  2010).	  Business	  owners	  in	  the	  flats	  and	  






The poor infrastructure in the settlement is caused by a lack of planning and can be 
traced back to apartheid spatial planning practices that have resulted in inefficiencies, 
such as “unequal access to economic and social opportunities, poorly located lower- 
incomes settlements, and insufficient public transport” (du Plessis 2014: 70; 
Tostensten et al. 2001; Stren 1998). Coupled with ever increasing rates of 
urbanization, workers coming to the city in search of employment continue to resort 
to these accommodations because of their accessibility and low cost (Swilling 2010; 
Huchzemeyer 2010). 
One of the key differentiating characteristics between the two settlements was their 
respective type of leadership. The Victoria Mxenge community was under the 
leadership of a municipal, elected ward councillor, whereas in Joe Slovo, the 
leadership was made up of an informally elected task team. The leadership type in the 
research sites is important for the research question. To understand the sources of 
business owners’ vulnerability, it is important to understand the sources of assistance 
available to them for hazard response.  
4.2.2.	  Victoria	  Mxenge	  informal	  settlement,	  Philippi	  Township	  
Philippi was originally a dune area and was later used for grazing by the farmers in 
the area in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the area developed into a residential area as a 
result of apartheid policies. Consequently, people from the former homelands of 
Ciskei and Transkei, as well as those from surrounding communities such as Nyanga, 
Langa and Gugulethu, began to settle there. Another reason for the growth of Philippi 
was the closure of farming areas in nearby Mitchells Plain and the former labourers 
having to settle in areas that fell under the category of the apartheid government’s 
housing relocation laws (Adlard 2009).  
Philippi is a large, diverse area with different housing types, population groups and 
businesses. There is a large number of Xhosa speakers in Victoria Mxenge informal 
settlement. 31  Many of these Xhosa speakers are in-migrants from the former 
                                                
 
31	  The	  main	   languages	   spoken	   in	   the	  Western	   Cape	   province	   are	   Afrikaans	   (55,3per	   cent),	   isiXhosa	  
(23,7per	   cent)	   and	   English	   (19,3per	   cent)	   (Statistics	   South	   Africa	   2006).	   In	   the	   two	   research	   sites,	  





homelands of the Eastern Cape Province that come to Cape Town in search of jobs 
and better services (Robins 2010). The variation found within the community of 
Victoria Mxenge makes it particularly interesting. One area of Victoria Mxenge is 
made up predominantly of formal houses and has some basic infrastructure, such as 
tarred roads, water channels and street lighting. The adjoining community of Phola 
Park also falls under Victoria Mxenge, but is made up of shack structures with no 
water management infrastructure. In Phola Park, community members have to make 
use of communal taps and toilets, but it was unclear whether the electricity 
connections in business owners’ homes and businesses was legal or not. 
Victoria Mxenge falls under the ward leadership of a female councillor member of the 
ANC. As a member of the City Ward Council, the councillor represents her 
constituency at the highest representative government in the City. This also means 
that the constituency has direct access to City resources for goods and service 
provision within the ward. 
The two business owners in Victoria Mxenge that did talk about their community 
leader mentioned her in the context of her political affiliation. One business owner, a 
young shoe repairman, mentioned that he would have liked to approach the local 
councillor for assistance with his business. However, he had decided against 
approaching her because of rumours in the community that she was not a nice 
person.32 Another respondent, a shebeen owner said that he did not know the local 
councillor, but he had heard that she discriminated against non-ANC political party 
members and he was a member of the COPE political party.33 
The way in which financial resources are funnelled into the informal settlement areas 
is largely through the ward councillors who have access to the City Council, which 
disburses the funds against the needs of the communities. The leadership in a 
community therefore has a direct impact on the communities’ access to municipal 
funds for infrastructure development and service delivery. 
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Waste collection was another visible service in the research sites. In Victoria Mxenge, 
residents said there were no waste collection services. While in Joe Slovo I saw waste 
being collected on numerous occasions. Residents did not know whether the City was 
collecting the waste itself or whether the service was being provided through a private 
company.  
A key characteristic of informal settlement areas is the type of housing and the 
infrastructure (such as roads, water channels, toilets, access to water) within them. A 
comparison between the housing and infrastructure in Joe Slovo and Victoria Mxenge 
points to limitations in the availability of basic services, particularly toilets, water 
access points, waste collection and built roads. Joe Slovo has municipal public toilets 
shared amongst the households, and it has communal water taps. In Victoria Mxenge, 
some formal houses have individual toilets and water. But, with just 33 per cent of 
Victoria Mxenge residents living in formal housing, this is a very small portion of the 






Photo 1. Photo showing type of ‘spaza shop’. Shop owner (right) and research 
asssistant (left). Source: Author. 
Across Lansdowne Road, 34 the large arterial road that connects Philippi to the 
Southern Suburbs of Cape Town, lies Phola Park. Phola Park falls under Victoria 
Mxenge, a community made up almost completely of shacks, no built roads and no 
drainage system.  
                                                
 






Photo 2: Communal toilets and waste dumping in Joe Slovo. Source: Author. 
While these characteristics on their own are not surprising, I expected a noticeable 
difference in the availability of services in the two research sites. I thought that Phola 
Park would be better serviced than Joe Slovo. The reason for this is that Phola Park 
falls under the leadership of a ward councillor therefore the area is eligible for 
government and municipal infrastructure development funds. I especially thought that 
waste collection in the communal toilets in Victoria Mxenge would be better than it 
was in Joe Slovo, but for the most part their situations were similar.  
In many other parts of the City, waste collection is a task taken on by the local 
municipality and given that the leadership of Victoria Mxenge is led by a municipal, 
elected representative, I expected  this and other municipal-led services to be 
available here and less so in Joe Slovo (see Photo 2). Yet, there is no waste 
management in Victoria Mxenge. Many business owners said that they had never 
thought of approaching the local Councillor about the waste site and looking into 





4.3.	  Characterising	  business	  and	  business	  owners	  in	  the	  research	  sites	  
The data presented in this section is aimed at giving comparative observations of the 
business owners sampled in the study.  
The population in the informal settlement areas is predominantly African. They are 
mainly of Xhosa descent and have migrated from the Eastern Cape Province. The 
research sites also have a high unemployment rate because the “[a]bsorption capacity 
in the formal sector is not adequate to mitigate the level of unemployment in Cape 
Town, and the informal trading sector plays an important role in providing 
employment to a significant number of people” (City of Cape Town 2013:10). 
The discussions in this chapter are based on data collected through the use of my 
survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The number of respondents covered in 
the survey was 75 in Joe Slovo and 79 in Victoria Mxenge. The sample included five 
former business owners and nine foreign nationals (see Fig. 3). Also, there are a 
greater number of female business owners than males sampled in both research sites. 








Female 48 50 
Male 30 26 
Nationality 
Non-South African 9 0 
South African 70 75 
Age Group 
16 – 25 24 4 
26 – 34 18 37 
35 – 44 13 26 
45 – 54 24 8 
Marital Status Married/ Living as married 18 34 
Previously married 11 7 
Single 50 34 
Average monthly 
income  
<R399.00 3 6 





700-1199 7 3 
1200-1999 0 1 
2000+ 2 1 
Educational level 
attained 
Primary School 4 6 
High School 12 9 
Post- Matric 1 2 
University 0 1 
 
There were noticeable patterns in the age of business owners sampled in the research 
sites (see Fig.3). In both research sites the business owners were concentrated in the 
26-34 age-group. However, Victoria Mxenge also had a sizeable number of both older 
(45-54) and younger (16-25) business owners than Joe Slovo. 
4.4.	  Business	  type	  by	  sector	  
There was a division along gender and business sector in the research sites (see Fig. 
4). Male business owners owned all the fruit and vegetable businesses, while the 
cooked food business owners were all female. The fruit and vegetable sellers all sold 
away from their homes (or at least not in the home) while the female business owners 
selling, cooked food sold both outside and in the home. Women tend to be more 
concentrated in businesses that allow them to stay in the home whereas the men 
always worked outside the home. While on one hand this is advantageous because the 
women are less exposed to environmental hazards of operating in open, unsheltered 
areas (as many men sold their produce on pavements) – the women’s limited mobility 
also suggests that they are limited in their income-generating potential.  
Business owners, particularly males trading from unsheltered, outdoor premises in 
both research sites mentioned that when it rained, they did not go to work because 
there tended to be fewer customers and because the rain damaged their merchandise. 






Some women ventured away from home. A middle-aged lady selling stiff, cornmeal- 
based porridge, called ‘pap’,35 with sour milk at the Victoria Mxenge taxi rank 
described her choice of business premises as follows: “It’s a good place because it’s 
the only place that was available…I have worked from the same premises for 10 
years”. The taxi rank is a high-density area with many commuters throughout the day, 
but it is an open space with no protection from the harsh winter rain, cold and wind. 
Table 2: Detailed analysis of business type by sector 
Service Sector Business type Research site 
Victoria Mxenge Joe Slovo 
Service Phone	  shops,	  
recycling,	  car	  wash,	  
selling	  shacks	  and	  
Hair	  salons 
24 18 









Total	   79 75 
 
                                                
 





In both research sites, most business owners said that the location of their businesses 
was based on ease of access to customers and areas with the most traffic. This was in 
fact true for some, but there were many other businesses tucked away in the 
settlement, particularly businesses operated from home.  
All the businesses sampled in the research sites were individually owned with no paid 
employees. However, in discussions with respondents it was clear that family 
members were very helpful in the business for in-kind and financial assistance in the 
businesses. I present this data in greater length later in this chapter.  
4.5.	  Business	  hazard	  exposure	  and	  vulnerability	  	  
In order to understand the areas in which vulnerability is experienced in the business 
and the strategies used to respond to it, the respondents were asked to name the areas 
of business that presented the most significant challenges to them. The areas that 
businesses are most vulnerable fit into four broad categories, namely: environmental, 
financial, market and legal challenges. These areas of vulnerability are presented in 
Table 3 according to their importance, as expressed by the business owners. 
All 154 business owners sampled in both research sites pointed to environmental and 
economic difficulty as the most significant challenges in their business, while legal 
challenges were the least cited. There was a close correlation between environmental 
hazards and the financial vulnerability of the business, with rain and heat most cited 
as triggers to financial vulnerability. I elaborate on this point later in this chapter in a 
discussion on financial vulnerability. I now turn to a discussion of the challenges as 
they affect the business owners.  
Table 3: Business challenges in Joe Slovo and Victoria Mxenge  
 Joe Slovo Victoria Mxenge  
Environmental 
Rain 17 15 
Heat  5 7 
Unsafe physical environment (e.g. rodents) 2 7 
Financial 





Low profit  13 7 
Other financial (irregular income, household demand) 8 7 
Market 
Competition  8 3 
Low business knowledge  2 7 
No business marketing/advertising skills 2 3 
Legal 
Municipality 8 3 
Conflict with private land owner 0 7 
Social 
Crime 2 10 
4.5.1.	  Environmental	  hazard:	  Flood	  hazard	  exposure	  and	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  poor,	  
urban	  business	  owner	  
In the semi-structured interviews, business owners were asked to explain how climate 
related impacts affected their business.36 Rain and extreme heat were cited as the most 
destructive weather elements; the heat was associated most with rotting merchandise 
and rain was associated with damaging the buildings and sometimes leading to the 
closure of businesses.  
With the help of a translator, I was always very careful to ask the respondents to 
explain what they meant when making reference to rain. This was in an effort not 
only to making sure that it was flooding that they were referring to, but also to avoid 
misrepresentation of the respondents, as this could have had significant implications 
for the results. In response, many business owners described flooding as heavy rain, 
often extending over a number of days and especially common in the winter months.  
The winter months are a period of heavy flooding. Flooding is especially common in 
the informal settlement areas where storm water drains tend to be blocked by garbage 
and soil runoff. Added to that, the location of informal settlement areas in low-lying 
                                                
 





areas increases their vulnerability to flooding (Bouchard et al. 2007; Ziervogel and 
Mukheiber 2007). Many of the business owners in the study sites were very vocal 
about their experiences of living in and operating a business from a shack and these 
grievances were often coupled with drain blockages and shack-structure leakages. 
Rain was associated with two particular problems. The first was related to its effect on 
mobility. Consequently, the rainy winter months were often significantly lower in 
profit because there were many rainy days during which business owners were unable 
to go to work or make sales. In Bamu and Theron’s study (2012), the fear of illness 
because of rain was also associated with rainy days. The second was related to the 
shack structures. Here, there was differentiation between business sector type and 
vulnerability. Business owners operating out of a shack structure complained the most 
about the rain. For example, a fruit and vegetable business owner37 also selling small 
food items said that the business shack from which he operated was unsafe because of 
the leaks in the roof. When it rained, items such as salt and spices were damaged. The 
wood and aluminium sheets that kept the structure up also had many holes in them, 
letting in a lot of moisture. Even if the water was not seeping through the roof, the salt 
would still be damaged from ground moisture, because the shack floor was not 
covered. 
A fresh meat seller38 also experienced damage from heavy rain and flooding in Joe 
Slovo. Her ox-meat sales business operates from her shack. The shack had been 
flooded before and then been fixed. However, when it rained there were numerous 
problems because, as she described it, the place that she sells from is “a shack, not a 
house”. She said that when it rains “there is a leak in the roof and water also comes 
through the front door. I dig a channel outside to divert the water on to the street. In 
the shack there is a pole which pushes the roof up so that the water is tilted towards 
the edges of the shack and not drip inside”. Although there was no damage to her 
meat during the heavy rains, she was afraid that the water flowing into her shack 
through the bottom of the door might damage the deep freezer in which the meat was 
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stored. She said that when it rained she constantly wiped the shack floor to ensure that 
it remained dry. 
Many business owners were using heavy plastic film for insulation. There were a few 
other visible measures being taken by the business owners to better insulate their 
businesses from the rain. This was especially surprising to find in Joe Slovo, because 
during and before the time that this study was conducted, the leadership of the 
community task team and a local NGO named CORC (Community Organisation 
Resource Centre ) had been working on a re-blocking39 project to upgrade shacks 
vulnerable to hazards, including fire and flooding. I anticipated that many shack 
owners in the settlement would be more aware of and using different methods of 
protecting their shacks from flooding, such as putting slabs around their shack to 
elevate the doorway. 
Many of the business owners that cited rain as a hazard in Victoria Mxenge were 
residents in Phola Park, where the business owners lived and traded in shacks and the 
road was not tarred. I also noticed that in the area of formal houses in Victoria Mxenge 
the flooding problem was different. Many of the roads here were tarred and there were 
storm water drains, but many of these drains were blocked with waste. So, despite the 
water drainage infrastructure in the settlement, formal houses were still vulnerable to 
flooding. 
In one case, a spaza shop owner living in a formal house in Victoria Mxenge said that 
she had to change the composition of her shop stock because of rain. She explained 
that fresh chicken always made a lot of money but when it rained, it was difficult to 
slaughter the chickens, so they sold more frozen chicken instead. The profit margin 
for the frozen chickens was not as high as that of the fresh chickens but they could at 
least be bought in bulk and stored in a freezer. 
                                                
 
39	  Reblocking	   is	   a	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   based	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Much like the business owners in Joe Slovo, business owners in Victoria Mxenge cited 
roof leakages in their shacks as a big problem. In response to this problem, shack 
dwellers in Victoria Mxenge used plastic sheeting to insulate the shack roofs and, 
despite the example of a shebeen owner who used sand bags when it rained, I found no 
other evidence of sandbag use. The shebeen owner explained his use of sandbags: 
I put sand bags at the back of the shack to control the water. I also had 
a tarred road at the front of the shack. The tar helps to fill up the small 
ponds that had formed because of the holes on the road. The tar is 
good…it levels the road so that the water can flow away from the 
shack.40 
Other common methods of protecting shacks from flooding were raising and/or 
supporting the base of the shacks. Often an extra layer of wood was mounted onto the 
edge of the shack to make it thicker and at other times, crates were placed at the front 
of the shack door and the level of the door raised when it rained. 
The heat was also mentioned as a business hazard in the summer months. High 
temperatures especially affect fresh fruit and vegetable sellers. The problem was 
especially common in businesses that operated outside the home because they did not 
have electricity to refrigerate their food. The problem with heat was experienced in 
much the same way in Joe Slovo as it was in Victoria Mxenge. 
A fresh fruit and vegetable seller in Victoria Mxenge presented the challenge that heat 
presents to his business and his community. When I met the young male business 
owner, he was outside his shack displaying some of the produce that he had just 
purchased from the market in Philippi. The fruit and vegetables were displayed on 
raised wooden crates and carefully laid out on clean plastic sheeting. He mentioned 
that this was to attract customers. I imagined that the location of his table might repel 
customers because it was in front of a ditch with dirty water flowing from a 
communal tap where women were washing clothes. Behind his table were communal 
                                                
 





pit latrines and waste heaps where the community disposed of its waste. In response 
to the greatest challenge in the business he said: 
The big problem is with rats. They eat the produce…They [rats] eat goods 
of about the value of R20.00 per day. They [rats] come at night. They 
come into the house, not the stand.41 
According to the fruit and vegetable business owner, the problem with rats was 
especially bad in the summer months. The rats had found refuge in the waste pit 
and food selling businesses were easy targets for their scavenging. This was one 
of two refuse points that I noticed in Victoria Mxenge and in both waste sites, 
nearby business owners complained that there was a rat problem caused by the 
refuse sites. The other refuse site was located in the part of Victoria Mxenge with 
the formal houses. The spaza shop owner ran his business out of one of the rooms 
in his home – a brick building with iron sheeting as roofing. He explained the 
problem in the following way:  
The building is well suited for trading but I have a problem with rats. 
The mice come from the nearby open field, which has running water 
and ditches. The mice eat bread and maize meal the most…the 
damage to the stock could amount to about R200.00 per month.42 
Given that the spaza shop owner said that his profits were approximately R400.00 
per month, the damage to his stock was about half of his monthly earnings.  
Only one Joe Slovo business owner mentioned rats as a problem. One of the 
smaller dumping sites was situated close to a fruit and vegetable business whose 
owner also complained of a loss of profits due to rats and excessive rotting in the 
summer months. This was the only business owner that complained of rats as a 
problem in his business in Joe Slovo.  
The pit latrines that line the streets of Joe Slovo could harbour many rats, but on 
many occasions on my visit there I noticed a waste collection truck collecting 
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waste. My research assistant said that the truck came once a week, on a Monday, 
and that was not enough because many people shared the latrines.  
There were areas in Joe Slovo that were clearly open, waste-dumping areas. 
Especially on hot days a pungent smell lingered in many parts of the informal 
settlement. This did not seem to disrupt business despite being very unpleasant. 
The issue of waste (management) brings state-led service provision into focus and 
demonstrated the variation between the two sites. 
4.5.2.	  Financial	  vulnerability	  
The main streets of Victoria Mxenge and Joe Slovo are lined with small (informal) 
businesses. Despite their numbers, there is not much variation in the types of 
merchandise that is sold in them, particularly the spaza shops that stock basic food 
items, such as bread, oil, sugar, tea and eggs. As mentioned in the previous section, 
the types of businesses sampled for this research fall into three categories: retail, 
services and production. For instance, in Joe Slovo, three spaza shops – barely meters 
apart – sold the same products. 
None of the South African business owners were happy about the financial health of 
their businesses and I will now present the data as it relates to the financial 
vulnerability of their businesses. Four broad categories of financial vulnerability 
emerged from the data. Listed in the order of their importance they are: competition, 














Photo 3: Picture showing merchandise in spaza shop. Source: Author. 
Spaza shop owners especially complained that foreign-owned businesses in the area 
were the reason that they were experiencing such significant declines in their 
customer base(s). Somali-owned spaza shops are thought to be cheaper because it is 
claimed that the Somali business owners buy their products in bulk for several 
businesses at a time. They are therefore able to sell their products at a slightly lower 
price than some of the South African business owners who buy smaller amounts of 
stock and do so individually (Sadouni 2009). 






If I was still in business I think I wouldn’t be doing well because the 
Somalis have really cheap prices and I wouldn’t be able to compete. I 
don’t know why they are so much cheaper.43 
In Victoria Mxenge another business owner offered a slightly different view on the 
causes of low profit, saying: “The biggest challenge with the current business is also 
financial, but it is largely so because there are a lot of shops in the area” The 
respondent added that “…the difference that the (newly opened) shops has made is 
big because when there were only two shops before, I made a good profit but now I 
see very little profit”.44 
In a different business sector, the live chicken business in Victoria Mxenge, chicken 
sellers were concentrated in one particular patch of Lansdowne Road. A former 
chicken seller in Victoria Mxenge45 said that initially the high concentration of similar 
businesses in one area ensured that the chicken prices were regulated. However, more 
and more sellers were moving into Philippi and particularly this area on Lansdowne 
Road to sell their chickens. The new-comers dropped their prices to attract customers, 
making it difficult to not only regulate this market but for others to make a profit. 
“The chicken cost R35.00 and the ‘Rock’46 was R50.00. When the competition came 
the chicken price dropped to R28.00 and the rock dropped to R40.00.”  She said that 
this put significant strain on her household of four. 
A hair salon owner in Victoria Mxenge also complained about business competition, 
saying: “I don’t have as many clients as I had before. Instead of having 5 customers, 
maybe I get only 2 [per day]. Everyone seems to want to go into the hair salon 
business.”47 
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  Interview	  with	  former	  spaza	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  Interview	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  Interview	  with	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46	  ‘Rock’	  refers	  to	  chickens	  that	  are	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  after	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  been	  reared	  for	  egg	  hatching.	  According	  to	  the	  
respondent,	  consumers	  prefer	  rock	  meat	  because	   it	   is	  tougher	  and	  more	  flavourful.	   ‘Chickens’	  refer	  
to	  frozen	  chickens,	  often	  bought	  directly	  from	  the	  large	  chicken	  producers	  or	  supermarkets.	  





Another source of competition is supermarkets. A fruit and vegetable seller in Joe 
Slovo said that when the prices of produce increase at the market, he had to pass on 
the costs to the customers. The problem, he said, is that “customers panic and go to 
Shoprite because it will be cheaper.”48 Similarly, in Victoria Mxenge small business 
owners often made reference to the nearby Shoprite supermarket as their chief 
competitor. 
 
When asked whether they would consider moving their businesses to different 
locations, only two business owners said that they had considered it in the past, but 
had never actually moved. 
It is not surprising that business owners in both research sites complained about low 
profits because of competition and their close proximity to bigger businesses and 
smaller businesses owned by foreign nationals, particularly Somalian nationals.49 Yet 
there was no effective response, such as institutions or groups set up amongst 
community members to bulk buy their products at lower prices. Also, in Philippi a 
small business support hub, called ‘The Business Place’, provides information, 
referrals, training, workshops, networking and business opportunities (The Business 
Place 2013). The Business Place branch in Cape Town is a short walk from Victoria 
Mxenge, yet none of the business owners sampled in the research in Victoria Mxenge 
mentioned being members of that forum or ever using the resource centre, even 
though it is freely available.  
Giving	  and	  seeking	  credit	  
In response to the stiff market competition, many business owners gave their 
customers credit. Paradoxically, poor debt repayment was also cited as a contributor 
to financial challenges in the business. 
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Despite citing outstanding payments as one of the biggest business challenges, 
business owners in the research sites did not seem to be very adamant that their 
customers pay at the time of purchase. Instead, they readily gave credit. Default rates 
tended to be high and business owners’ response to dealing with defaulters was 
informal, as opposed to seeking resolve through formal channels such as the police.  
A meat seller in Joe Slovo explained why she did not approach the police when her 
customers did not pay: “I am afraid of going to the police because the business is 
illegal – I don’t have a license.” 50  She said she felt especially uncomfortable 
approaching male customers for repayment and on numerous occasions she decided to 
write off the debts instead of approaching the police to intervene. She also said that 
she thought that if she did not sell on credit, people would not buy from her. “When 
people need meat during the week they know that I can assist, so, if I did not sell on 
credit, my business wouldn’t be successful”. See Box 1 (further below) for how 
business owners deal with defaulters. 
Lindell et al. (2013) find a similar pattern in their study on gender differences in the 
African business environment. The authors found that South African female 
entrepreneurs had slightly varying conflict management styles than their male 
counterparts. Female business owners tended to make use of ‘an integrating’ style of 
conflict management, with greater co-operation, avoidance and less assertion. The 
authors conclude that this style of conflict management is non-constructive and does 
not benefit anyone. In other words, this may make the business owner more 
vulnerable because she compromises profits in the name of making peace with the 
defaulter. 
Business owners in Joe Slovo also demonstrated a willingness to give credit to their 
customers despite the high risk of non-payment. Many of the business owners said 
that they would continue to sell their merchandise on credit as long as the customer 
made the repayment in the agreed time. A shoe and clothing business owner 
participating in the focus group discussion explained this risk taking by saying: “If I 
                                                
 





know you and where you stay, I have to give you [shoes] so that if you don’t want to 
pay, I can follow you. But if you just come and say: ‘I want this’; I can’t give it to you” 
(emphasis added).51 That is, she felt more at ease giving credit to people she could 
locate in the event that they did not pay at the agreed time.  
A shebeen owner in Victoria Mxenge said that he used a similar strategy to keep his 
customers. He explained: “People don’t always get in to buy the stuff. They don’t 
have money sometimes. To deal with the problem, I just let them so that they can 
keep coming back. Most of the customers are from Mxenge (across the road). There 
aren’t many from this area (Phola Park).”52 
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In the focus group with business owners in Joe Slovo, business owners agreed that if 
they did not offer credit to their customers, their businesses would not make any 
money. Members of the group went on to indicate that in the past they had extended 
credit even to people that do not live in their neighbourhood. They acknowledged the 
risk in doing so, but quickly said that sometimes the people around them preferred 
seeking services from people that were not in their immediate vicinity. For example, a 
hair salon owner mentioned that up to half of her regular customers, to whom she was 
also extending credit, lived in neighbouring townships. She said that she had 
customers from Philippi, Langa, Delft and Khayelitsha. A shack builder in Philippi 
also said that his customer network extended to places such as Fish Hoek, Khayelitsha, 
Dealing with defaulters and debt repayment 
Sitting in front of her shack, the owner of a fresh meat selling business explained to 
me why defaulters were a problem in her business and how she got them to pay their 
debts. 
“ … in a month, about 1 or 2 people don’t pay. The problem is adding up because in a 
month about 2 people will not pay and in the following month another 2 don’t pay. 
The money becomes a lot…I have never thought of taking them to the police. ” 
In response to my question about what she has done in the past when faced with the 
problem of defaulter, she answers by telling a story. 
The story is of a customer that owed her money for over 2 years – since 2004. In 
2006, she went to get the money and the defaulter still would not pay her. She then 
took the defaulter’s bag and brought it home with her. The defaulter reported her to 
the police. When the police arrived they asked her not to take the law into her own 
hands and return the bag and ordered the defaulter to pay. The defaulter still did not 
pay and she eventually wrote off the debt. This incident made her feel as though the 
police could not help her. 
In another interview, a 20-something saving’s group treasurer had this to say on how 
they deal with defaulters:  
Box 1 Defaulter and debt repayment. Excerpts from interview with meat seller, Joe 





Stellenbosch and Gugulethu, but they did not allow customers from these distant areas 
to purchase merchandise on credit.53  
The focus group members also agreed that some of their neighbours preferred to 
support foreign-owned businesses rather than those of the local owners. Some of the 
focus group members felt that repayment was not a matter of not having enough 
money, but rather a fear of some business owners but not others. A food seller gave 
the example of some of the people in her neighbourhood: 
…some other time they can buy. But it will be few people not all of 
them. And if the other people from the other area come selling door to 
door, like the foreigners, they will buy from them even if something 
costs R500, they will buy from them. But you who are living here with 
them selling that for only R250, they won’t buy. Even if you give them 
2 months to pay on credit. They won’t...And they won’t be scared to 
pay those people but for you, you have to run after them and if you 
don’t run after them you won’t get your money. I can promise you that. 
So sometimes you need to say please, I need the money. Asseblief54!55 
In Victoria Mxenge, a former business owner said that her former customers 
supported her not because of her relationship with them but rather because her 
business was closer (in distance) to them. As she explained: “People did not support 
my business because of our relationships, it was simply because I was closer to 
them.”56 She also mentioned that, when her business was still open she offered credit 
to her customers and it is possible that some of her customers bought from her 
because she offered credit. I later found out that many foreign national business 
owners reported defaulters to the police and this may be the reason that creditors are 
likely to repay them timelier than they do South African business owners.  
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Business owners in Joe Slovo seemed to have less of a problem with outstanding 
debts. Only three business owners cited this as a problem. However, the story of one 
business owner suggests that the local leadership made itself available for dispute 
resolution around debt repayment. A bridge owner mentioned that, even though there 
were people who used the bridge and refused to pay after crossing, he did not have 
too much of a problem with payment because the people in the community knew that 
he had close ties with the community task team:57 “They [customers] really respect the 
task team so they don’t give me a hard time.”58  
Similarly, a crafts seller in Joe Slovo mentioned that she was on very good terms with 
the members of the task team and that when people had problems in their businesses 
they could talk to the task team members. Members of the task team also engaged in 
issues involving community members and the municipal government on illegal shack 
building and demolition.  
When asked whether they bought shop stock on credit, many business owners in both 
Joe Slovo and Victoria Mxenge said they would be uncomfortable doing this. For 
example, a food business owner in Joe Slovo said: 
I don’t want to borrow money, it is going to stress me and I don’t work 
so I would not be able to pay back the loan. Other places ask to see a 
pay slip and I don’t have one because I don’t work.59 
In Victoria Mxenge, a former spaza shop owner said: “I wouldn’t borrow money to 
re-open the business because I wouldn’t be able to repay the loan”.60  
Some business owners also seemed to base their decision not to get loans from other 
institutions, such as banks, on the fact that their customers are unreliable in making 
payments and that this would possibly affect their ability to service their own loans. A 
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food business owner61 in Joe Slovo mentioned that she would not be able to get a loan 
from the bank, not only because she did not have a pay slip, but also because she was 
too scared of taking out a loan because she had no guarantee that her customers would 
pay her on time. She said there was no guarantee that she would be able to service the 
loan within the time frames that the creditors demanded. 
A particular service area that did not tolerate creditors and overdue payments was 
burial societies. In Victoria Mxenge, a burial society committee member explained 
that in cases such as loss of income, members were given a grace period of up to three 
months to pay their burial society contributions. She seemed less patient with others 
who could not or would not explain their reasons for late payment to the burial society 
leadership. According to her, members generally paid their contributions in the burial 
society, but her unsympathetic position was based on past experiences with some 
burial society members. She went as far as stating, “As a secretary I must be very 
careful because people are crooks.”62 
Similar to other local businesses, burial societies deal with defaulting members by 
making them repay the amounts of money that they owe as opposed to handing them 
over to the police for fraud or legally sanctioning the payments. The burial society 
executive mentioned that the members who had been caught had repaid the money to 
the burial society – suggesting that the burial society had been effective at retrieving 
the payments from their members. 
In this section I have tried to demonstrate that, despite the risk of defaulting, giving 
credit to customers remains a common business strategy. Despite easy access to 
police mediation in both research sites and the community leadership in the case of 
Joe Slovo, business owners preferred to deal with defaulters on their own. The choice 
to manage defaulters by taking their valuables is illegal and it puts the business owner 
at risk of revenge by the defaulter. In places characterized by high rates of violence 
such as these, I expected the mediation role of the police to be visible. This points to a 
disassociation with the state-based institution.  
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By comparison, the situation in Joe Slovo also suggests greater service provision by 
the community-led leadership. There was a similar discomfort towards market 
responses, especially bank-sought loans. Many business owners expressed fear that 
they might struggle to service the loans. Unlike their small businesses, the banks 
would in fact call on the state to deal with defaulting, either through the police or 
through the courts. There is a demonstrable discomfort amongst business owners 
interacting with the state and market when dealing with challenges in their businesses, 
particularly the challenge of financial vulnerability. This finding is important to the 
research question, particularly as it relates to drivers of hazard response. These issues 
are developed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively.  
Business	  failure	  
The research sample included five former business owners. The reasons for the 
collapse of their businesses varied and so were reasons given against rebuilding them. 
A young businesswoman selling fresh chicken in Victoria Mxenge attributed the 
closure of her business to harassment from officials from the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). She said that SPCA officials often 
approached her and fellow fresh chicken sellers on routine checks about the treatment 
of the chickens. Even though the chickens were well fed, given water and protected 
from weather elements, the officials often confiscated them and insisted that the 
sellers pay a fine for neglect. On many occasions she claimed she was unable to pay 
the fines and could not get her chickens back. She experienced great profit losses 
because of this. This was but one of the pressures that led to the eventual closure of 
her business. Other contributors to the business closure were competition at the sale 
site and with the surrounding communities.  
In Philippi, a businessman from Zimbabwe told me of his first business, selling fruit 
and vegetables in Delft. He explained that he had been selling the fruit and vegetables 
on the side of a road under a stand. When it rained his stand was flooded and in the 
summer when it got very hot, the produce would rot. After numerous attempts at 
rebuilding the business, it was flooded once more and he decided to try his hand at 





In Joe Slovo, a middle-aged, male spaza shop owner said the business was not going 
well at the time of the interview. He complained of financial stress. Some weeks later 
the shack from which his business was operating was closed and I later learned that he 
had been very ill and had left for the Eastern Cape to be close to his family. He had 
passed away some months later. Another one of the five cases of failed businesses, 
that of a former spaza shop owner at the Philippi business centre, was the only 
business where failure was not the result of climate hazards or financial strain. The 
former spaza shop owner said that she made the decision to close her business to 
make time to participate in a self-help housing building project. Since then she had 
not worked or re-opened the business and she and her children relied on her mother’s 
old-age government grant.  
In sum, low profits and customer debt were the biggest contributors to financial 
difficulty in businesses. These causal factors were closely linked to environmental 
hazard, particularly flooding resulting from heavy rain.  
4.5.3.	  Social	  vulnerability	  
Crime was an ever-present threat in the research sites. In many cases, business owners 
did not explicitly express their concerns about crime, but these were often inferred or 
expressed in their behaviours. For example, in Joe Slovo, a fruit and vegetable shop 
owner explained that he took some of his merchandise home with him at the end of 
the day just in case the shop was burgled in the course of the night.  
 
Also in Joe Slovo, a young shop owner63 explained that at the end of every day she 
too packed up her shop contents and took them to her shack, which included a small 
gas stove, a 9-kilogram gas tank and the bowls in which she mixed her dough. The 
reason for this she said was that the shack was built with very old material and she 
was afraid that thieves would find it easy to break in and take some of her equipment. 
Indeed, this was not an unfounded fear, because not far from her business, another 
                                                
 





business owner selling meat64 told me how her shack had been burgled. She said that 
the thieves had come in through her old corrugated iron roof and stole some of the 
meat in her freezer and some household items. Heavy rains had further weakened the 
already fragile shack structures. The business owners, unable to mend them, lived 
with the risk of more than just damage due to flooding.  
 
In Joe Slovo, I heard stories of people being attacked and their money stolen while on 
their way to work and there were many stories of robberies of Somali shops. On one 
occasion, I arrived in Joe Slovo to find that the previous night a Somali-owned spaza 
shop had been burgled. One of the shop owners had been shot while sleeping at the 
back of the shop and the robbers had gotten away with some money. There was a 
heavy police presence and the shop was closed for a few days, but later re-opened.  
 
The threat of crime towards foreign-owned shops such as the Somali-owned spaza 
shop, compared to shops whose owners were South African (especially Xhosa 
speaking), was very visible. The recently robbed Somali-owned spaza shop was 
operating out of a shipping container on one of the main streets. The doors and 
windows of the shop were reinforced with metal bars. Several attendants, all of whom 
were male, always staffed the shop. I approached this Somali shop owner for 
interview and he declined. 
 
A hair salon owner in Victoria Mxenge talked about a robbery at her shop in an un-
emotive way. She described her experience(s) of crime at both her shops in the 
following way: 
The theft is the biggest challenge for the business...theft has always 
been the biggest challenge – since 2001. I think that other businesses in 
the area also have a problem with theft. The households around here 
don’t seem to have so much of a problem with break-ins, only the 
businesses. The [hair salon] business was burnt down in 2006. I think 
                                                
 





it was on purpose. It took 2 weeks to rebuild the business. The 2 weeks 
was a short time. ‘If I don’t have business, I don’t have income so I 
have to push it...I have to show the enemy (the person who did it) that I 
have power again’. I had money at the time so it was quicker to rebuild. 
It [the shop premises] is not suitable because it can easily be broken 
into (both businesses). The salon has been broken into approximately 
2-3 times a year. The phone shop has been broken into about 5 times in 
2006.65 
Both shops have burglar bars and latch locks for padlocks. The hair salon owner said 
she had given up on replacing the padlocks, because “they always break in”. “When 
they break in, I just look at what they took and buy it again. I am just risking now. I 
had a plan (fitting locks in the doors) but it didn’t work so I’ll see. I don’t have any 
plans.” 
 
When asked whether she had filed cases of theft and arson at the local police station 
after these incidents, the businesswoman said that she had told the street committee. 
In fact, she had received the call that her business was burning from a member of the 
street committee. “They (the street committee) are always watching,” 66 she added.  
The hair salon owner’s cases had never been resolved, but she still believed that the 
street committee was more effective at dealing with crime in her community than the 
police would be.  
 
The effectiveness of the street committee in keeping the community safe is difficult to 
establish, but they may have been effective enough to make me feel somewhat 
comfortable while working in that community. I felt most unsafe while in Joe Slovo. I 
believe that to a large extent this was because of the stories that I heard from my 
research assistant and her insistence that I keep the car doors locked and windows 
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closed while driving through the township. I have reflected on some of these 
experiences in chapter three. 
4.6.	  Hazard	  management	  and	  sources	  of	  assistance	  
The risks identified by the respondents in Table 3 were analysed in relation to the 
preventative strategies used to respond to them. Respondents were asked what sources 
of help they use and five categories emerged from the data: family, friends, 
community organization (namely, burial and savings associations), government, and 
NGOs. Table 4 summarises the results.   
Table 4: Business owners’ sources of assistance 
 Joe Slovo Victoria Mxenge 
Family 64 53 
Friends 31 25 












Government 0 10 
NGO 3 4 
Other 2 0 
Self - No external assistance 29 36 
 
Who ought to help? 
  
Government 6 10 
Private sector 0 8 
Self 4 6 
Anyone 6 0 





Community 4 0 
Don’t Know 3 4 
 
Family members were the biggest source of assistance to the business owners. In Joe 
Slovo, 64 business owners sought assistance from their family67  (mostly in the form 
of loans) and 53 in Victoria Mxenge. Even though friends were cited as a source of 
assistance, these were at significantly lower rates than those of families, with 31 and 
25 business owners in Joe Slovo and Philippi, respectively. Many of the business 
owners that had borrowed money to respond to hazard in their business were women.  
Business owners whose family members lived in close proximity to them tended to 
receive in-kind support. Female business owners in particular had family members 
looking after the shop while they attended to other tasks, such as buying stock. Age 
was a significant variable in the assistance-seeking behaviours of the business owners. 
I found that amongst young business owners, parents played an especially helpful role. 
For a hair salon and fresh produce business owner in Joe Slovo, it was a loan of 
R200.00 from his father that saved his fresh produce business from closure. He 
mentioned also that to start the fresh produce business, a friend in the community had 
given him a loan of R300.00.  
In Victoria Mxenge, a shoe repair business owner said that his mother had been very 
helpful in his business. The young businessman had previously operated the same 
business in Delft, but when his mother (also a small business owner) advised him of a 
shipping container closer to their home, he moved his business, using the shipping 
container free of charge, because it was under his mother’s care. He mentioned also 
that his mother also gave him loans from time to time to support his business.68  
The case of a former fresh chicken business owner pointed more towards generational 
continuity in some of the small businesses. The young chicken seller had taken over 
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the business from her ailing mother who had built the business using a loan from her 
former employer. Asked whether she receives any help from family, she said that her 
mother had a terminal illness and could not help her. Her siblings were still too young 
and her extended family members lived very far (in a place called Worcester outside 
Cape Town) and she could not travel that far to seek assistance.69  
Older business owners tended to rely more on both their family members as well as 
neighbours for assistance. For instance, an arts and crafts business owner70 in Joe 
Slovo said that when she needed assistance in the business, it was always her sister, 
who also lived in the neighbourhood that gave her a loan. Even though her husband 
had a regular income job, she said that he never contributed to the business in any 
way. Also, because of her role in the local community task force, she attended 
meetings at the community hall and when these duties fell within work hours, it was 
her two neighbours, also in the arts and crafts business, that kept an eye on the 
business and made sales to the tourists that came past while on township tours 
through Langa. 
A common way that family members support business owners is through working at 
their businesses. There is a growing body of literature on the role of family in small 
African business (Khavul et al. 2009; Meagher 2005; Chen 1994). Informal 
businesses in Africa tend to be reliant on family and community labour. Even though 
this labour is a vital resource, it can also be a hindrance to the business. Despite the 
varying strength of ties in African businesses, “….the expectations and obligations to 
extended families run deep” (Khavul et al. 2009:1223). This is because for a long 
time, families were the sole source of support and an important base for kinship ties. 
According to the Khavul et al. (2009), the responsibility to care for and provide for 
the extended family seems to fall disproportionately on members who take on a 
greater initiative for economic growth.  
Despite the clear link between flooding and business vulnerability, none of the 
business owners linked the assistance that they received from their family members 
                                                
 
69	  Former	  business	  owner,	  19	  July	  2010,	  Victoria	  Mxenge	  





and friends to a flood event or to damage associated with a flood event. This was very 
surprising, especially because there are no state- and market-led responses to flooding 
in both research sites. There was, however, a very strong reliance on the friends and 
family, though this assistance was not being used as a flood-risk response. Instead, 
business owners used the assistance from friends and family to respond to other areas 
of vulnerability in the business – some of which were associated with flooding, such 
as borrowing money in the winter months when sales were low. There was no direct 
response to a flood event or flood-related damage using the help of friends and family. 
Financial mutuals: Informal savings and burial societies have a long history in 
African communities. In South Africa, as in many countries in developing economies 
financial mutuals are still very popular. Anthropological studies in different parts of 
the world find high user rates amongst different user groups, and particularly the poor 
in different parts of the world. Examples include ROSCAs in parts of Africa, Asia, the 
Middle East and Early Europe (see Bouman 1977); amongst women (Ardener and 
Burman 1995); and among immigrant groups in developed countries (see Srinivasan 
1995). 
Financial mutuals are an instance of civic association. Business owners were asked 
about their civil society membership as a measure of social participation in non-
market spaces, that is, outside of state and market provision. The responses to this 
question, summarised in Table 5, revealed further risk mitigation mechanisms of 





Table 5 Membership in financial mutuals  
Financial mutuals Member characteristics Victoria 
Mxenge  
Joe Slovo  
Burial Female 24 30 
Male 18 0 
Savings Female 26 7 
Male 0 1 
	  
The most common mutuals in the research sites were savings and burial societies. 
Some business owners also had formal insurance policies. Savings societies differed 
in their mission, though many of them were rotational societies in which members 
contributed a set amount of money every month and gave that to one member in turns. 
What was common in both research sites was that female business owners joined 
savings societies in higher numbers than male business owners. Many savings 
societies shared cash at predetermined times or at the end of the year and members 
could use the moneys any way they wished.  
Of the 16 savings societies (11 in Victoria Mxenge and five in Joe Slovo) sampled in 
the study, three were set up with the aim of alleviating the flood and fire hazards in 
vulnerable communities.71 Similar to the other savings societies sampled in the 
research sites, member households contributed a set amount of money every month 
and once they had accumulated the agreed amount, building materials were purchased 
and construction ensued. 
The case of these three savings societies was also interesting because of the role that a 
partner NGOs played in brokering engagement with the City. Further, the savings 
societies were providing “a means of reconstructing the social relations that exist 
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within a community as they bring people together to collectively manage their finance” 
(Baumann et al. 2002:13).  
Given the nature of hazards to business as cited by business owners in the research 
sites – that is, environmental and financial hazards, the high rates of membership in 
savings societies in the research sites were not surprising. This is because savings 
societies make it possible for business owners to borrow money in times of financial 
strain and or pay for repairs to damage incurred as a result of environmental hazards. 
Burial societies are another collective group, in which money is saved to ensure a 
proper funeral (Thomson and Posel 2002). Like savings societies, these financial 
mutuals are developed largely among people that know one another – typically 
neighbours, friends or family members (Bahre 2007). At their inception, migrant 
workers created burial societies in urban communities to ensure a proper burial in the 
members’ homeland (Thompson and Posel 2002; Verhoef 2002; Kritzinger 1996), 
ensuring that their users’ funerals followed shared cultural norms of the group. Today, 
burial societies are still very common in African urban communities.  
 
Given this very particular motivation of burial societies, their high membership rates 
in the research sites – even higher than savings societies - presented an interesting 
puzzle. An even greater surprise was that business owners said that they did not 
receive help to respond to flooding from the burial societies of which that they were 
members of. This is a significant and critical finding in the research, because burial 
societies are a functional equivalent of formal life insurance. The significance of these 
high membership rates in burial societies to flood management are discussed in 
chapter 8.  
4.7.	  Formal	  insurance	  
According to Lloyd’s (2009), South Africa has one of the highest insurance 
penetration rates in the world. Yet, low-income groups still find it difficult to access 
formal insurance. Further, climate-induced losses have grown faster than insurance 
penetration in developing countries (Mills 2004 in Santam 2013), putting low income 





Nine business owners had formal insurance cover – eight of these were for life cover 
and one was bursary insurance. Again the data presented a surprise - none of the 
business owners had insurance aimed at responding to the main threats to the named 
business hazards, namely environmental and financial hazards.  
The data suggested that death was a prominent event in the lives of the business 
owners and garnered greater financial commitment than key threats to their livelihood, 
their businesses. I probe this further in chapter 6. 
4.8.	  Conclusion	  
This chapter has presented contextual data of the research sites, particularly the 
small-scale, informal business owners in them. I have noted similarities and 
differences in the research sites. These characteristics of the research sites are 
used in subsequent chapters to analyse the findings in line with the research 
questions outlined in chapter two. 
The following chapter picks up on the theme of leadership, as I explore the 
government-led hazard responses available to business owners in their research 







BUSINESS	  OWNERS’	  ACCESS	  TO	  GOVERNMENT-­‐LED	  SERVICES:	  
ENGAGING	  THE	  NODAL	  ASSEMBLAGE	  
5.1.	  Introduction	  	  
This chapter introduces the actors in flood governance in the City of Cape Town 
(CoCT) as well as how informal business owners access and experience flooding 
services from this multi-actor governance platform. In so doing, the discussion will 
explain the reasons why these government-led flood management interventions have 
fallen short of meeting some of their intended targets in informal settlement areas and 
in turn, why they have not been popular response strategies amongst the business 
owners in this study.  
Here, I explore a key part of the research puzzle as it seeks to address the following 
sub-research question: What flood management resources are available from the 
state and its collaborative partners in responding to flooding in areas of limited 
statehood. What I mean here is that although the city provides services to many parts 
of the city, informal settlement areas are often beyond the reach of the state, making 
them areas of limited statehood. 
This chapter lays the foundation for subsequent chapters in which I discuss the areas 
of alternative service provision through and, outside of the government and the 
market. In accomplishing this, the chapter focuses on understanding the extent of the 
governance available from the government. 
Based on interviews, government reports and secondary data on government 
responses, the discussion acknowledges first that the government does in fact provide 
some services to informal settlement areas at high risk of flooding. Second, an 
understanding of the drivers of communities’ decision to use or not to use the 
available services is important because it points to the appropriateness and 
responsiveness of the available services to their needs. Lastly, the analysis also makes 
a useful contribution to our understanding of collaborative governance approaches in 





associated with limited state and market goods and service provisioning and the 
challenges associated with this type of governance arrangement. 
Given the comparative nature of the study, there was a strong focus on community 
leadership between the research sites, because, ward councillors are supposed to be 
the gateway to government goods and services, while informal leadership structures 
are viewed as having less access to government and therefore make less flood 
governance contributions. 
The discussion in this chapter is laid out in two main sections. The first section 
outlines the nodal framework within which flooding is governed in the CoCT. Here I 
outline the services provided by the CoCT to respond to flooding in low income, 
informal settlement areas, particularly the nine informal settlements that the city has 
identified as high risk areas – two of which are my research sites.  
The second section of this chapter focuses on communities’ knowledge and use of 
government-led services available in the city. Here, the data on community members’ 
knowledge and experience of government-led flood relief is analysed. The discussion 
reflects on three overlapping variables: community member’s awareness of the flood 
response efforts of the City, their access to the available services, and their views on 
the effectiveness and appropriateness of the available responses. The aim of the 
discussions in this chapter is to highlight the services that the City provides in high-
risk flood communities, how it does so and the limitations of its efforts. 
5.2.	  The	  Governance	  Context:	  Multiple	  actors	  in	  flood	  governance	  in	  
the	  City	  of	  Cape	  Town	  
This section introduces the main actors working for the City of Cape Town. They are: 
the Flooding and Storms Emergency Planning Task Team (hereafter referred to as the 
Flood Task Team or the Task Team), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that 
partner with the CoCT on their flood management strategy, and local politicians 
(ward councillors) in the research sites.  
Small-scale informal business owners were also interviewed on their experiences and 
exposure to flood risk in informal settlements, their experiences engaging with their 





flooding, and the challenges associated with access to the flood management 
responses available from the government. 
The question that this chapter addresses is: How do small scale, informal business 
owners in the informal settlement areas access government services to respond to 
flooding? 
To make sense of the data in addressing the question, I draw on a nodal governance 
conceptual framework. Through the framework I identify the different actors (nodes) 
in flood governance in the City of Cape Town’s informal settlements and the 
challenges that they face in their response(s) to flooding.  
In this section, I outline the City’s governance actors in flood management and their 
respective roles in the Flood Task Team, based on data collected in interviews with 
representatives of the key Task Team members. This is coupled with reviews on 
legislation guidelines and City flooding reports. The analysis gives insight into the 
governance of flooding in the City of Cape Town and the services available to the 
flood-prone communities in the informal settlement areas. I will discuss the 
challenges that the actors face in their service provision within the flood Task Team 
as the discussion progresses. 
5.2.1.	  The	  Flood	  Task	  Team	  
The main actor in the governance of flooding in the CoCT is the Task Team.  
In Cape Town, the DRMC oversees the Municipal Disaster Risk Management Plan 
through an interdepartmental platform called the Flood and Storms Task Team  
 that “coordinates the Flood Task Team before and during the winter flooding season” 
(DRMC 2009:13).  
The aim of the Flood Task Team is to reduce flood risk associated with annual winter 
storms. The Task Team “provides a structure for 22 departments in COCT aimed at   
integrating preparedness and response activities based on the Winter Preparedness 
Strategy and Flood and Storms Plan” (DRMC 2009 in Waddell and Ziervogel 
2014:10). The represented departments include: The Department of Environmental 





Waste Management; and Water and Sanitation. Also represented in the Flood Task 
Team are a ward councillor and NGOs (Waddell and Ziervogel 2014).  
The South African Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 guides the activities of the 
Disaster Risk Management Centre (DRMC). The local government plays a key role in 
implementing the Act in each metropolitan and district municipality. “As part of the 
winter 2012 planning, the task team identified 9 high-risk informal settlements for 
prioritization” (Kopele 2012:3). The objectives of the Winter 2012 Preparedness 
Strategy72 include: 
• To reduce or mitigate the risk that the severe winter storms and their effects 
may have on the community within the municipal areas of the City of Cape 
Town; and 
• To raise awareness of the risk of flooding and how the community can assist 
the Disciplines73 involved in mitigation, preparedness and response efforts and 
the need to communicate on an ongoing basis (DRM Flooding and Storms 
Plan Rev. 3 in Kopele 2012:8). 
These DRMC targets are short-term, reactive interventions that include site visits and 
ongoing inspections over the winter period. Medium-term key focus areas, in full or 
in part, include infrastructure improvement and settlement relocation. Also, the 
DRMC distributes blankets and foodstuffs after flood events and this is done in 
partnership with numerous NGOs, including the Red Cross and the Mustadafin 
Foundation (discussed below). 
A key determinant to the Flooding Task Team’s provision of services is the legality of 
the informal settlement, as well as whether it has been ear-marked as a high-risk flood 
area. Informal settlements located on private land receive limited City-led services. 
Mitlin (2014) explains that often the local government’s unwillingness to provide 
                                                
 
72	  The	  plan	  guides	  how	  government	  departments	  involved	  with	  flood	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  in	  the	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  will	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  season	  (CoCT	  2012).	  	  
73	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   in	  the	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  to	  refer	  to	  the	  different	  





services in informal settlement areas is linked to concerns that this will legitimize land 
occupation.  
The CoCT is bound by national human rights laws to provide services to all South 
Africans. Key services, such as sanitation and water, are often offered on City-owned 
land, such as sidewalks and along roads. However, in the event of an emergency such 
as a flood, the City has to provide relief services to affected communities, irrespective 
of whether they are located on City- or privately owned land. 
For example, when the community of Sweet Home informal settlement in Philippi 
initially settled on private land, the City of Cape Town did not provide services within 
the settlement, but rather at its periphery. A local community group leader explained: 
When the land is private, the City sometimes put toilets on City land i.e. 
sidewalks…before that when land is owned by the City they put services: 
waste collection, water, toilets. By law they cannot put in the services when 
land is private. They do not know the owner of the site.74  
In some instances, the City also buys the settled land, if possible. A Task Team 
member from the Department of Informal Settlements explained how this had 
happened in the Sweet Home informal settlement. She said: 
[The City] bought that owner out… who is somewhere abroad. And they sold 
their land to the City knowing that their land is now occupied by informal 
settlers. And it’s actually a waste for them to hold on to it. So they sold their 
land to the City. Which means the City can now do things for those people on 
a more permanent basis.75 
5.2.2.	  NGOs	  –	  The	  Mustadafin	  Foundation	  
When a flood affects a community, the CoCT reaches out to its partner agencies to 
disburse flood relief packages. One of the City’s main relief partners is the 
                                                
 
74Department	   of	   Informal	   Settlements,	   Cape	   Town,	   03	   February	   2014.	   Interviewed	   by	   Joy	  Waddell	  
and	  Isabelle	  Desportes	  (FLICCR	  project	  UCT).	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  Department	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Mustadafin Foundation, “a non-profit organization providing education, poverty 
eradication, health, disaster relief and community development” (Mustadafin 
Foundation 2014). The Foundation works with the City to raise awareness on flood 
prevention and on promoting healthy lifestyles in flood-prone communities. After a 
flooding event, the Foundation is called in through the DRMC to provide food and 
hygiene care packs to affected communities. An official at the Mustadafin Foundation 
explained their role in flood relief as follows: 
Okay, after a flood incident for example, we’ll provide hot meals and 
breakfast, we’ll provide breakfast for whoever is affected. We will provide 
them with blankets and we will provide them with a cooked supper...a cooked 
meal...so its two meals a day and then the sanitary packs which they are 
provided with - either female or male. So in the sanitary packs is the 
requirement required for women or the sanitary packs that is required for men. 
There are additional sanitary packs required for women, which would just be 
the sanitary pad that would be included in that. Because it included the soap 
and the toothbrush. So you are secured in the sense of a blanket individually, 
food whether it is cooked food or packed food and your sanitary pack. And 
babies are most secured for the baby formula and that sort of thing. So the 
whole family gets catered for so it’s your nappies, your formulas and your 
Nestum76 or the Purity77 that the baby would require with Vaseline78 and those 
things. The additional things that the organization as Mustadafin would do is 
the clothing, crockery, the cutlery which comes in would be going to the 
community or to rebuild their homes.79  
The Foundation official explained that the food, blankets and care kits are disbursed 
through a distribution point set up by the DRMC with the help of the ward councillor. 
                                                
 
76Nestum	   is	   a	   baby	   food	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   to	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   to	   baby	   food	   including	   porridges	   and	  
preserves.	  
77	  A	  brand	  of	  baby	  food.	  
78	  A	  cosmetics	  brans.	  





5.2.3.	  Local	  politicians:	  The	  ward	  councillor	  
One of the key determinants of access to government-led services is the local ward 
councillor and his/her activity in the vulnerable communities and in the council. The 
role of the councillor is a useful variable to analyse because it is directly related to 
resource and infrastructure access from the government.  
A ward councillor in Grassy Park80 indicated that municipal ward councils are 
represented by ward councillors who are members of the City Council. At the City 
Council, ward councillors can request infrastructure support and resources that can be 
used towards protecting the informal settlement communities in their jurisdiction 
against flooding and other hazards.  
Ward councillors are key actors in the flood management landscape of CoCT. The 
role of the councillor in the community is very important, because, through them, 
community concerns are brought to the attention of the mayor and relevant 
government departments. Also, resources are often sought from the sub-council and 
awarded to the community through the councillor. This is especially important in the 
context of flooding, and city-level “planning, budgeting and infrastructure 
replacement schedules” (Moser et al. 2010: 22027) in the informal settlement areas 
that fall within the jurisdiction of the respective ward councillors. 
A ward councillor in Grassy Park summed up his tasks as follows: 
…He (the ward councillor) has a very easy job...he has to see that there is 
enough; that the people have access to clean water and access to electricity. 
He must see that the streets is… not pot-holed… but quality streets. And then 
the fourth thing is... the sewerage… so water and sanitation is important. He 
must see, that they’ve (the community) got access to toilets and all of that 
(emphasis added).81 
                                                
 
80	  Grassy	  Park	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  research	  sties	  but	  the	  ward	  councillor	  for	  the	  area	  was	  interviewed	  in	  
the	  study	  because	  he	  is	  represented	  in	  the	  Flood	  Task	  Team.	  
81Ward	   Councillor	   Grassy	   Park,	   07	   June	   2013.	   Interviewed	   by	   Joy	   Waddell	   and	   Isabelle	   Desportes	  





When there are informal settlement areas within a ward, such as is the case in the 
jurisdiction of the ward councillor of Grassy Park82, they often have to deal with flood 
management as one of the service needs of informal settlement dwellers. The ward 
councillors of these areas therefore have to contact the relevant government 
departments for flood relief assistance if residents in their constituency are affected.  
Another important role that the ward councillor plays is to direct the resources 
allocated to their wards. Ward councillors are members of the City Council: “The 
city’s council is its highest decision making body and is responsible for the passing of 
legislation (by-laws), approval of the council budget, the imposition of rates, taxes 
and levies and the approval and amendment of the 5 Year Plan” (City of Cape Town 
2014). It is at these council meetings that councillors can request funds for use 
towards infrastructure clean up and development in their constituencies. In the 
Council meeting the ward councillor presents to the Council what challenges are of 
greatest importance and urgency in their constituencies and the funding that they 
require. 
Despite their important role in their communities, ward councillors were also 
criticized (the business owners in the research) in a few instances for using their 
leadership role to pursue their own agendas, which gets in the way of their job of 
ensuring the community’s safe practice against flooding. For example, there were 
claims that some councillors were using their leadership positions to advance their 
political interests and garner more support for their respective political parties. One 
Task Team member described it as follows: 
And in our settlements, if they ANC supporters, they’re going to want to 
sabotage the DA… I don’t know if it’s propaganda or the truth… where they 
say that the ANC will make life for the DA so difficult here. And we see it 
boiling out in our settlements. Where everything that the City plans to do that 
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  Victoria	   Mxenge	   does	   not	   fall	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   Grassy	   Park.	   The	   ward	   councilor	   of	   Grassy	   Park	   was	  
interviewed	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   Task	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is good for the communities... they will just want to sabotage, or want to… 
because the ANC wants Western Cape so badly… so they get into the minds 
of the poor.83  
The Task Team member said that one of the ways that the political parties tried to 
sabotage each other was by turning a blind eye to big business dumping in their 
communities and blaming it on the other party representatives or giving relief services 
only to people that are members of their political party. 
The National and City governance structures do not recognize informal, community-
led leadership. Because its members are not elected in local elections, their leadership 
cannot directly seek government resources for the benefit of the community. While 
this paints a bleak picture for the JS Task Team and the community of Joe Slovo, the 
community members seemed confident in the ability of the Task Team (hereafter 
referred to as the JS task team) to resolve conflict and represent them in engagement 
with the City. 
In many other communities similar to Joe Slovo, the informal community leadership 
works very closely with the ward councillor, though this is often an informal 
arrangement and is not recognized by the City. Orangio (2012) found this to be the 
case in Graveyard Pond in Philippi township, where a community activist and leader 
and the ward councillor worked together. I did not find evidence of this in Joe Slovo; 
instead I found a different type of partnership – with an NGO.  
Even though informal leadership structures are not directly represented in the Council 
they can form partnerships with other influential non-government actors.84 This was 
the case in the community of Joe Slovo. When I first visited Joe Slovo in March 2009, 
it was after a fire had burnt down about 512 shacks, leaving 1,500 residents without 
homes (Centre of Criminology 2009). The JS task team, together with Ikhayalami 
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  Department	   of	   Informal	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   Cape	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84	  In	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embarked on a community re-blocking exercise. This drew the attention of the City’s 
Informal Settlements Department who then came on board, supplying a fire kit to help 
the affected residents to rebuild their homes. There was no involvement of the ward 
councillor in these activities. This demonstrated the resourcefulness of the task team 
to seek out partnerships in the private or civil society sector, thus leveraging the 
bargaining power of one node (the state) through partnerships with a non-state node, 
in this case the NGO, iKhayalami. 
In another instance in Joe Slovo, I realized how the local leadership influenced the 
behaviour of business owners in the area to the disadvantage of the municipal-led 
laws. In this instance, a business owner had been advised by the City’s Department of 
Roads and Storm Water to tear down the bridge (makeshift bridge he had built with 
some wooden planks) that he had built linking the informal settlement to the nearby 
community of Mitchell’s Plain, where residents had access to a big supermarket and a 
clinic. The bridge was deemed insecure, particularly in the winter months when there 
were heavy rains – there was concern that it could obstruct the flow of floodwater or 
people could fall into it. Unwilling to tear down the bridge and loose his source of 
income, he approached the JS task team to intervene. He explained his decision not to 
follow the orders of the City: 
I have not followed municipal instructions because I was told by the local 
leadership [JS task team member’s name] not to follow those orders. He [JS 
task team member] said that it helps the people of Joe Slovo and so they 
should leave it. He also said that it is for the community and that if they 
[municipal officials] come back I must call him.85 
On a subsequent visit to Joe Slovo in February 2014, I noticed that the bridge had 
been torn down to make way for the formal housing development in the community. 
However, the bridge owner had recovered some of the structure and people were still 
using the bridge to get to the neighbouring community. The bridge owner said that the 
bridge indeed had been damaged by high-water flow in the channel over which it was 
                                                
 





built, but that after the rains he had rebuilt it. However, the City had recently 
demolished it like it threatened to do back in 2010. A significant observation in my 
visit to Joe Slovo was that members of the JS task team had since been relocated to 
formal housing not far from the informal settlement and I suspected that, since they 
were no longer physically present in the settlement, their influence had decreased. 
When asked about this, the bridge owner agreed, saying: “They now live in the formal 
houses so they don’t care about us anymore”. Unfortunately I was unable to interview 
of any of the JS task team members to find out whether this sentiment was true; that 
their leadership activity had waned since their relocation. 
These two instances are among a handful that demonstrated the involvement and 
influence of the JS task team on the residents of Joe Slovo in decision-making around 
their businesses and decisions impacting their response to flooding. In the second 
example of the bridge owner, it was clear that the bridge was unsafe and was 
obstructing the flow of water in a storm water channel, the latter’s purpose being to 
channel water away from the shacks. This suggests that both the residents and the 
community leadership did not understand or see the value of the City’s adaptation 
(storm water infrastructure) actions. Another signal of these divergent views can be 
found in the resident’s disposal of waste, which often ended up in the same storm 
water channels that were meant to keep the water flowing away from the community.  
 
Figure 3: City of Cape Town local governance structure.  





In Victoria Mxenge I expected to see greater flood management activity at the 
community-level. I also expected more leadership actions in the management of 
flooding. This was based on the assumption that greater access to flood management 
services and funds through the City would translate into better access to services to 
safeguard this community from flooding. With Victoria Mxenge directly represented 
in the City Council because it has a ward councillor, I hoped that this would be a 
useful point of comparison to analyse the impact of leadership on flood management 
strategies. 
In Cape Town, the three most common sources of flooding are: water ponding, which 
is common in communal spaces and inside shacks built on low lying ground; rain 
water seepage, which is the result of water seeping through cracks in the roofs and 
walls of badly constructed shacks; and greywater overflow, which is caused by an 
overflow in the storm water drainage systems. The greywater then flows into nearby 
houses that are built below the prescribed building and road levels (Waddell and 
Ziervogel 2014). 
Because of the nature of flooding in Philippi, and in the Phola Park area in particular, 
the City’s focus on flood response here seemed to be directed more at insulating the 
shacks.  This could be because the type of flooding that occurs in this community, 
particularly in Phola Park, is seepage from groundwater, and in Joe Slovo it is caused 
localised drainage flooding. Like Joe Slovo, the community of Phola Park within 
Victoria Mxenge is made up predominantly of shacks and the City has built storm 
water drains around the settlement. Moreover, in this area there was little waste in 
these water channels. The reason for this could be because there was a big dumping 
area within the settlement used by a lot of households to get rid their waste.  
Some residents used simple water management technologies on their own to protect 
their homes from flooding. For example, a shebeen owner in Phola Park placed sand 
bags around the structure to protect it from water damage. Also, the small road in 
front of his shack was filled with large rocks to absorb the water and block the 
puddles of water that often settled in the potholes. This was a very common strategy 





the ground water. However, these mitigative actions were all done independently of 
the City and the local leadership.  
In Victoria Mxenge residents did not complain about waste collection being a 
problem. Instead there was a recycling drive led by young boys in the community. 
The young boys were members of a youth empowerment group whose focus was on 
making young residents of the community more aware of their immediate 
environment and to take care of it. The members of Beyond Expectation 
Environmental Project (BEEP)86 had a community garden project in a nearby school 
and they collected glass and plastic materials in the community and took them to a 
recycling depot.  
The youth in BEEP worked with an elderly man in the community whose job was to 
clear the storm water drains in exchange for the recyclable material. The youth had 
approached the ward councillor for financial support when this project begun but had 
not received any. Unfortunately, I could not confirm this or find out why the 
councillor had not been supportive, because she was not available for interview.  
5.3.	  City-­‐led	  flooding	  interventions	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  use	  in	  the	  
research	  sites.	  
Now that the flood governance actors in the City of Cape Town have been introduced, 
this section explores what they do, that is, the services available to business owners in 
flood affected informal settlement areas, before turning to business owners’ 
experience of the available services.  
City flood awareness initiatives that target flood-prone communities can be divided 
into two main categories. First, the City supports residents’ physical and mental well-
being after a disaster. There is information on where to seek medical assistance and 
food following a flood event. Secondly, the City supports structural initiatives to 
protect households from further damage in the flood event (Desportes 2014). These 
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include information on, and the provision of, sand bags and storm water pumps that 
discharge the water into a retention pond, where possible.  
5.3.1.	  The	  flood	  awareness	  campaigns	  
I sought to find out why business owners were not using the available flood response 
interventions – was it because of a lack of knowledge about the services available to 
them or was it by choice? Asked whether they are aware of the City’s flood risk 
response and how they can use these services, many business owners said that they 
did not know where or how to access assistance.  
The business owners’ response came as a surprise because during my time in Joe 
Slovo and in Phola Park, I noticed a lot of information flyers posted on electricity 
poles, peoples’ shacks and the doors of public toilets with information on the causes 
of flooding and advising community members what they could do to curb the flooding 
problem in their community. These information stickers often had phone numbers to 
call in an emergency. Based on this observation, my impression was that the Flood 
Task Team was in fact very proactive in this particular flood management 
intervention, i.e. educational campaigns. Yet, despite this proactive campaigning, it 
seemed that the message was not reaching its intended audience.  
There are several mediums through which the CoCT raises awareness about flooding 
in high-risk informal settlement areas. The focus of these communications is varied 
and led by different government departments. For example, hygiene is one of the 
focus areas of the Department of Environmental Health, as it tries to make 
communities more conscious of the importance of hygienic sanitation and facilities, 
their maintenance, unblocking drains and maintaining sanitary facilities (See Figure 4 
further below). 
Many of the Task Team department representatives and business owners in the 
research sites cite blocked drains as the main culprit for flooding. It was not surprising 
that a lot of the flood awareness and information flyers were focused on storm water 
cleaning and preventing people from using these for dumping. A representative of the 
Department of Informal Settlements also believed that this was the biggest contributor 
to flooding in the informal settlements, but showed little confidence in the way that 





water drain clearing. In her view, a longer-term educational approach with 
contributions from all the departments in the City working on flooding was needed. 
But the thing is… it boils down to education, for me. Education where 
departments come together and run an intensive sort of … umm…  exercise 
where they go in and have workshops…If they have a Task Team that goes 
out to an informal settlement and they decide ok, listen we’re going to teach 
these people how to live safer. So I would say the way forward, for me, is 
have an established Task Team in every region that is responsible. And they 
will have to have programs. And then you need to monitor what are these 8 
people doing. And give them a sort of incentive, because this is now becoming 
a job for you, to educate your community. And then you know your target for 
the 12 month period has been reached effectively, because you’ve done this 
from the City, you’ve created an employment component...to take that 
community further.87  
The informal settlements official also advocated for an inter-departmental approach to 
flooding in the informal settlement. She also voiced the view that the current 
approach to flooding in the City was being reactive. In her  words: “But now we’re 
being reactive. Not proactive. Reactive. Let’s wait until 50 houses are flooded. And 
let’s wait when there’s a death ... to go in and see why, what happened….”88 She 
admitted that this was not a cheaper approach for the City but rather associated it with 
City officials not doing their job adequately, particularly because they are not being 
monitored. 
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Figure 4 Flood Protection pamphlet  
Source: DRMC 2014 
It is the role of the DRMC to oversee these awareness campaigns, and which was 
explained by an official from the Department of Informal Settlements as follows: 
The DRMC is there every day, they do education on behalf of the 





emergency number to call when there is a fire or flood, that is, 107. People 
are also encouraged to report vandalized city property such as water taps 
and toilet doors, which often get stolen and sold. Often the vandalism is 
not done by the people that live there.89 
The City’s flood management partners, such as the Mustadfin Foundation, have also 
developed communication materials to raise flood risk awareness. According to 
Desportes (2014), these awareness-raising campaigns were ranked high in 
effectiveness among the government departments. A member of the Task Team 
explained that the information pamphlets were written in Afrikaans, English and 
Xhosa and in areas where one language was predominantly spoken, pamphlets in that 
language were distributed.  
In her research in Sweet Home informal settlement, Waddell (forthcoming) found 
similar flood information pamphlets being distributed in preparation for the flooding 
season. “The problem was that they were written in Afrikaans and being distributed in 
a predominantly Xhosa speaking community.”90 Consequently, many community 
members went unaware of the precautions that they could take to respond to flooding.  
5.3.2.	  The	  flood	  relief	  handouts	  	  
Where reblocking of housing areas is in progress, the Task Team’s response is usually 
confined to temporary relocation for the affected households. While temporarily 
relocated, families are provided with food and other necessities, including blankets 
and sanitary products. 
In Joe Slovo, a local community leader said that he did not think that the DRMC and 
its partner agencies were useful after a flood. He explained his dissatisfaction based 
on his past experience: 
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Disaster Management sometimes brings us warm soup and grey blankets. Can 
that help my situation? When my home is flooded and they call me to the 
community hall. How will that help me?91 
A member of a Task Team echoed the community leader’s concerns. Even though he 
felt the City was doing good work in providing safety and services to affected 
communities, he was concerned about whether the City’s partners, particularly the 
Mustadafin Foundation, were keeping their end of their agreement with the City. He 
pulled out two photographs that he had taken after a fire in one community and after a 
flood event in another community.  
In one photograph an elderly lady was sitting near her burned down shack and 
guarding a refrigerator that she had saved from the fire. The Task Team member 
explained the photograph saying: “In a situation like that, she [the old lady] can be 
sitting there for days with no place to bath and sometimes no sanitary materials.” 
In the case of that particular lady, the official said that she had asked him for a 
comb. “She wanted to simply comb her hair … These are things that are supposed 
to be provided by the partner institutions but sometimes they are not provided.”92 
A second photograph featured a young family with two toddlers and a baby. He 
pointed out that the food that was provided for families often does not accommodate 
the dietary needs of those affected. So even though mxushu is an attempt to meet food 
preferences of the affected,93 it is often hard and difficult for the old and young to 
chew. “For a lactating mother like this one (he pointed to the woman in the 
photograph), the food does not provide adequate nutrition for her to produce enough 
milk for her baby. The mxushu is also not sufficient for the energy needs of the two 
school-going children that she has.” He explained further that sometimes the baby is 
not catered for because no formula is provided. “All of these are considerations that 
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ought to be taken seriously in order to make the services of the partner organizations 
more effective and targeted.”94 
When asked about the food provided to affected communities and whether the 
considerations raised by the Task Team member were taken into account, the 
representative from Mustadafin Foundation indicated that these choices were made 
with communities’ cultural and religious preferences in mind. Further, they were 
driven by budgetary constraints and discussed with the City.  
As she explained it:  
…people would request food from here [Mustadafin foundation] because we 
have that particular aspect of food - eating habits and the diet and taking in 
consideration that samp and beans in another community will not be a 
specialty but in a different community... I mean like we were doing in 
Valhalla Park, we had to cook for extra pot - a 60 litre pot for the Rastafarians 
who don’t eat meat. So you must know the communities that you work in.  
As I have already pointed out earlier in this chapter, the Mustadafin Foundation 
official said that special attention was also paid to the needs of babies and that they 
too were specially catered for. It was difficult to decipher who is to be believed in this 
instance but this account illustrates one of  the challenges between the City’s flood 
response partners and the communities that they serve. 
5.3.4.	  The	  flood	  relief	  kit	  
After a flood event every affected household is given a kit containing rebuilding 
materials to improve their shack structures - the kit contains nails, plastic sheets and 
wooden poles. According to Desportes (2014:67), “a TRS95 official assessed the costs 
of CoCT hand-outs (approximately half a million ZAR for plastic sheets to reactively 
cover shack roofs only) as low in comparison to other running costs.” I sought 
confirmation of these figures from the head of the Task Team but he was not prepared 
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to share exact figures. Despite this commitment by the City to the flood rebuilding kit, 
research participants and officials alike criticized its effectiveness. 
An official from the Department of Informal Settlements questioned the flood kits’ 
effectiveness on the following grounds: 
… the current flood relief is comprised of nails and a piece of plastic that 
are certified as a building kit…Flooding is not about a roof in disrepair but 
99 per cent of people take the plastic and cover the roof of their shacks 
with it. The amount of money that the city spends on this kit is in the 
millions. The correct amount can be sought from the head of DRMC.96 
A crèche owner in Joe Slovo explained how she and many members of her 
community used the flood kit: 
I have tried to use sand and stones to control the water. The rats also cause 
problems because they make holes in the shack and the water comes 
through there. But all of that did not help so when the DRMC gave us 
plastic for our roof, we put it on the floor to block the water.97 
Another criticism was leveraged against sand bags, an official from the 
Department of Informal Settlements saying: “Sand bags are not effective. What 
will be more effective is educating people to elevate their structures but money is 
an issue for that to happen.”98 I asked a member of the Task Team how effective 
he though the City’s initiatives were. While he agreed that education and changing 
behaviours were important, he expressed his frustration at community members’ 
slow behavioural change. He explained: 
Remember education is part of being proactive but now these houses that 
is prone to flooding is built below the water line or the watermark. It’s 
built next to a river or a canal, right. And however they are trying to speak 
to people saying, you must move to higher ground. You know these people 
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is used to staying where they are and they just refused to move away from 
the wetlands like the N2 wetlands, they are staying there and every year 
it’s the same thing. Floods and floods and floods. And the Disaster Risk 
Management have done everything that’s in their power to persuade the 
people and inform them of how dangerous it is and also tell them next year 
you will again be flooded out but it don’t seems that they want to listen 
because you know, people is people. They want to stay next to my friend 
or in the surroundings where I feel safe as a person and it’s very difficult 
for them to move.99 
A local community leader in Joe Slovo said that he thought that the City is unable to 
offer effective solutions to flooding, because the solutions that it had come up with 
were being made without community consultation: 
You [the City] can’t speak about me, let us [the community] speak about 
us…Sometimes you think that people need a house but because you are not 
planning with me you don’t know the kind of house that I need. That’s 
why we are happy to plan with a developer that is not in the City (referring 
to past partnerships with NGOs and individuals from the public).100 
5.3.5.	  The	  community	  relocation	  interventions	  
Relocation is a common flood management strategy in the City of Cape Town. In 
areas that the City deems high risk and where structural initiatives such as rebuilding 
and sand bags are not effective, residents’ temporary and long-term relocation is a 
considered option. In theory relocation is done in an effort to protect communities 
from future flood exposure and harm, therefore it is a time-sensitive process that must 
be undertaken before the next period of flood exposure, usually the winter. In practice, 
most of the informal settlements that are heavily flooded are simply put on a 
relocation waiting list where they remain for several years. The reasons for this reality 
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are varied and include communities’ protest against relocation and the municipal 
governments’ difficulty in finding vacant land for relocation of affected communities.  
In a flood event, the DRMC often set up temporary relocation centers, such as 
community halls, while the flood affected areas are cleared of debris, drained of flood 
water and rebuilt. Relocation is managed by the Department of Informal Settlements 
and the DRMC but has received significant resistance. A department official 
explained: 
The biggest challenge in our work is the reluctance of people to relocate. The 
reasons for this hesitation include family ties, they are unfamiliar with the 
location where the land is available. For example, Delft was identified as a 
relocation site for Langa residents... it is twenty minutes away from Langa. 
People refused to go.  
Another problem associated with relocation was the vexed question of who needs to 
be relocated and who can stay in the community. According to the official, the ward 
councillor compiles a list of affected homes and, based on their vulnerability, the 
DRMC and Department of Informal Settlements can relocate them to a temporary 
residence area (TRA) or permanently to another community. But this exercise is often 
crippled by community politics. He made the example of a community in Guguletu: 
After relocating an affected community the people complained, saying that the 
wrong people had been relocated. The people also complained that people in 
the TRA’s were getting better quality housing. How can you tell us we took 
the wrong people? You compiled the list yourselves! 
The official was however quick to explain that he sympathized with community 
members’ resistance to relocation: “Temporary can be a very long time. It’s not about 
how long you are on the waiting list, it’s about the surrounding area. We cannot move 
people from one vulnerable area to another.”101 He explained that land on which to 
relocate vulnerable communities was a problem, because the City itself did not own 
much land and had to buy private land. Buying private land is common in the City of 
                                                
 





Cape Town, but it too is often a lengthy and costly process - making it an 
unsustainable practice. 
Relocation was a real threat to many residents in Joe Slovo, but by the time I started 
research in the community, they had won a case against the City of Cape Town that 
had initially sought to relocate some residents of the informal settlement to Delft. In 
the end, many residents received formal housing in the N2 Housing Gateway project. 
However, when I went back to Joe Slovo in February 2014 it soon became evident 
that the threat of relocation had once again become real, this time posing an even 
greater threat to the community members whose leaders had ‘left’ and found housing 
in the formal houses and were no longer championing the cause of housing. 
When I revisited a fruit and vegetable seller that I had initially met in June 2010 in 
Joe Slovo, he explained his fear of being relocated, saying: 
Those JS task team people, they are now in their formal houses over there, 
they forgot about us. When we call them now they tell us they are busy putting 
people in the [formal] houses and can’t listen to us. If the City comes here and 
ask me to leave, what can I say – I will go. 
In another instance, an elderly spaza shop owner told a harrowing story about how 
she had been awarded a formal house in the N2 Housing Gateway project but was 
unable to move into the house because she had lost the official documents that 
indicated that she had indeed been awarded the house. She said: “My neighbours, they 
tried to talk to the government and tell them I have been living here for a long time 
and tell them that my shack burned, but they don’t listen.”102 She feared that the next 
time the land in her section was cleared to make way for the formal housing, the 
Department of Housing would put her on yet another waiting list – where she would 
have to wait for many years – and in the interim relocate her to another community. 
She feared the loss of her spaza shop, which supported her and her three 
grandchildren. 
                                                
 





There were also many cases of business owners, particularly those affected by 
flooding that actually wanted to be relocated from the settlement. Many were long-
term residents of Joe Slovo that were still awaiting formal houses. Two things 
immediately struck me about the ways in which these particular business owners 
expressed their willingness to be relocated. For one, they wanted to be relocated to 
‘upgraded’ areas and second, many of them held the view that they deserved to be 
relocated because the government had not prepared the settlements for them to a 
habitable standard before they lived there. 
In the midst of residents wanting to be granted formal houses and many not even 
wanting to entertain the idea of relocation, this subset of business owners that were 
open to relocation to ‘upgraded’ areas stood out. Also, the use of the language was 
quite unusual. Asked what they meant by an upgraded area, many business owners 
associated it with the following services: ‘flush toilets’, ‘running water’, ‘tarred roads’, 
‘street lights’, ‘waste collection’. I then asked whether these services were to be 
provided in a formal housing area or the informal settlement and the responses 
became more interesting. 
A spaza shop and food seller said: “We have been complaining to our municipality 
about this situation and they have been telling us that they haven’t found space that 
we can move into, so for now we are stuck here.”103  Another business owner, a tavern 
owner said, “…the government must get us another place to stay where we won’t 
have flooding”. In both instances there was a willingness to move to another place 
and away from their current settlement. Asked whether they would want to be 
relocated to a particular place, the tavern owner replied: “…wherever there is no 
floodings.”104 
The word ‘upgrading’ brought in-situ upgrading to my mind. In-situ upgrading is also 
used in high-risk flood communities in an effort to make the area safer from future 
flood (or fire) events. Though in-situ upgrading is less drastic than the relocation of 
whole communities, it is not without its problems. First, it requires a lot of pre-
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planning of space, it requires very careful consideration of the families that will be 
relocated and those that will be included in the upgrade (in line with the housing 
waiting list) and, on the part of the City departments, it requires the contributions of 
several departments for services, including environmental assessments, engineering 
services, storm water planning and electricity services. An official in the Department 
of Informal Settlements added that there is also a community engagement process that 
needs to take place and this too often takes time. 
5.4.	  Business	  owners’	  experience	  of	  flooding	  
In the previous section I have shown who the governance actors are in the 
management of flooding in the CoCT, the services they offer, as well as business 
owners’ experiences of engagement with them. In this section I turn squarely to the 
business owners’ to gain a better sense of the incidence of flooding in the research 
sites and the business owners’ response to it. The business owners in the research sites 
were asked about their and their family or friends’ past exposure to flooding or other 
climate related hazard (see Table 6). This questioning revealed a relationship between 
the experience of flooding and community leadership, infrastructure availability and 
housing structures in their communities. 
Table 6: Past experience of flood events 
 Joe Slovo Victoria Mxenge 




No experience of flood 10 18 
Experience other hazard 
(fire) 
1 4 






Twenty five per cent of the respondents cited heavy rain leading to flooding as a 
significant threat to their businesses. There were also a surprisingly high number of 
business owners that had never been directly affected by flooding. The most 
significant observation, however, was that of 32 per cent of the business owners that 
had experienced flooding in the past, 25 per cent were residents of Joe Slovo informal 
settlement and 7 per cent lived in Victoria Mxenge. 
5.4.1.	  Flooding	  experience	  and	  storm	  water	  infrastructure	  
Both business owners and officials alike cite storm water drainage blocking as the 
biggest contributor of flooding in the informal settlement areas. The sewerage and 
storm water pipes are the only way in which the water levels can be kept low and 
flash flooding minimized. However, they are often blocked by residents’ waste and 
dumping in the community and when the rains arrive, the water floods the streets. 
A member of the flood Task Team said that the biggest culprits of blocked drains 
were not only the community residents, but the City itself. He explained how the two 
contribute to the problem: 
…You know people (community members)… when you go to them… we tell 
them, listen here, please clean before your gate or before your property. Then 
they do it. But they sweep all the things into the drain. Then I get a 
complaint… Where there’s fishmongers105 he cleans them and he throws the 
intestines and the guts into the drains. And that is… the reason why... umm... 
there’s also flooding of the roads. Because people, they sweep the dirt into the 
drains.”106 
On the part of the City he explained that the drains have to be cleaned by the City, in 
fact it is the mandate of the Roads and Storm Water Department to do so in line with 
a quarterly plan. However, there is a lack of clarity on who is responsible for the 
storm water system cleaning, particularly when green water seeps into the drains. 
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After speaking to several departments in the City, a researcher in the FliCCR project 
summed up the incoherence on tasks as follows:  
I’ve spoken to some people about it. And the Storm Water Department says no, 
it’s solid waste, so the Solid Waste Department needs to clean it. And because 
it’s sewerage, the Sanitation Department needs to deal with it. And then the 
Sanitation say no, it’s solid waste in a storm water system so it’s the Solid 
Waste Department and Storm Water Department who need to be responsible. 
And Solid Waste say it’s not their job.107 
Another problem is the use of contractors. The responsible department does not clean 
the drains itself; it outsources the work to a contractor.  
And you see that is also another problem with the outsourced contractor. 
Because there’s no project manager who signs off the job. So his job is 
supposed to be, if they are there to clean the drains, they then must go and 
look at each and every drain to go and see, was the job well done, or 
satisfactorily done. Then he [the project manager] needs to sign it off. And 
then he [the contractor] needs to be paid. Now things has happened here on 
the opposite. They first pay the contractor… and give them the money, and 
say thank you for doing a good job. But then the job did not even start yet.108 
There were other stories of contractors manipulating the City’s management systems 
and getting away with getting paid without doing the job. An official in the 
Department of Informal Settlement was highly critical of the City’s use of 
contractors; she said: 
So for me, personally, and I’ve said it many platforms already… that 
contractors don’t work for this environment … But at the moment, contractors, 
they take the City’s money. They there, and also never there. So if you’ve got 
to come and collect it three times a week, you only come once… because you 
know why? There’s no monitoring. My thing is, what the City needs to do… if 
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they put in a contractor, they should have a department that monitors. And if 
the City sees, no wait, wait, wait. Here’s an alarm… why are we paying out so 
much money for that particular area. They shouldn’t be coming down to 
contractor.109 
Business owners also cited storm water blockages as the source of flooding in their 
communities. What was interesting, however, was that none of the business owners 
cited residents as the culprits of the dumping, but they all felt that it was the 
responsibility of the City to see to it that the drains are unblocked, cleaned and 
repaired timeously. A food seller said that when they approached the Council to 
report the drains, the officials said to them “… it is your fault, you were not even 
supposed to be living in that space.”110  
Not all business owners had complaints against the City around blocked drains. A 
tailor acknowledged that flooding was a problem in her community and that the heavy 
winter rains made it worse, however her experience of flooding was different. As she 
explained: “Lucky for me, my husband was working for the City of Cape Town so 
whenever there is flooding, I just call their office and they always attend quickly 
whenever there is flooding or drain problems.”111  
The tailor’s experience is of course an exception, but it suggested that human 
resources were not the cause of the problem of delayed drainage repairs and 
unattended repair complaints. The problem is rather that there isn’t a systematic way 
of addressing the complaints as they are received, making it possible for City repair 
personnel to attend to queries based on who they know as opposed to who presented a 
query first. Also, it suggests that there is a regulatory deficit in the City. 
5.4.2.	  The	  experience	  of	  flooding	  and	  housing	  infrastructure	  link	  
Many business owners in Joe Slovo complained of rainwater seepage – where heavy 
rain was seeping through the roofs of their shacks and leaving the floors wet. For 
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example, a crèche owner complained about the recurring damage to her shack due to 
heavy rains, she said: “My house is a shack – a shack, you fix it today and when it 
rains, it leaks. When its windy the wind blows it and then when it rains again it leaks 
again.”112 
A meat business owner in Joe Slovo also expressed frustration that when the heavy 
rainwater leaked through her shack roof, she had to elevate electrical appliances and 
plugs to avoid electric shock because the floors often remained wet for a period of 
time after the flooding. There was also water coming in through her door and into the 
shack. She explained how she diverted the water away from her shack: 
When there are heavy rains it is hard to even walk out of the house. The water 
level is very high so the children have to wear their gumboots and some 
people put crates to raise their things from the flood so that they do not get 
damaged by the water.113  
This type of flooding could be a symptom of greywater overflow. 
The data suggests that there is higher experience of flooding in shack structures than 
there is in built houses, as a result more business owners in Joe Slovo had experienced 
a flood than those in Victoria Mxenge (see Table 6 above). Joe Slovo informal 
settlement is made up solely of shack structures, while in Victoria Mxenge, the homes 
were predominantly constructed using bricks and mortar, though Phola Park had 
informal houses. Also, in Joe Slovo there was no road or drainage infrastructure 
within the settlement. Rather, the only water drainage infrastructure was at the 
borders of the settlement – on one side lies the built area of Langa and on the other 
side the N2 highway, a tarred arterial road connecting the Cape Town International 
airport with the City. Along this road were large water drainage systems. The lack of 
drainage to channel the water away from the houses resulted in water ponding – with 
water settling, often for months, and flowing into the houses and business premises. 
                                                
 
112Crèche	  owner,	  20	  0ctober	  2010,	  Joe	  Slovo.	  





To prevent the water ponding of grey water overflow in Joe Slovo, business owners 
often tried to dig their own trenches to divert the water away from their businesses, 
but this was a big source of conflict with some neighbours. A crèche owner said that 
because of the close proximity of the shacks and the threat of the roof collapse, they 
often had to tilt their roofs. He explained: 
One of the biggest causes of conflict in the informal settlement is when a 
neighbour changes their roof because some people build their shacks with 
their roofs leaning into the neighbour’s yard and causes the water to flow into 
the other one’s yard. It’s a big fight when people change their roofs in the 
informal settlement.114 
By contrast, in Victoria Mxenge, the business owners that had experienced flooding 
in the past were either operating their businesses in a shelter (an open-sided shelter 
with a roof) or were operating from an exposed pavement. For them, it was the lack of 
a shelter that made them and their shop products vulnerable to water damage, though 
they were not necessarily flooded. Of the business owners affected by flooding in 
Victoria Mxenge, only one operated his business from a shack and similar to the 
business owners in Joe Slovo, he experienced rainwater seeping as a result of roof 
leakages and excessive water flow that seeped through the door of his shack. 
5.4.3.	  Business	  owners’	  awareness	  and	  experience	  of	  government-­‐led	  flood	  
response	  
With the data pointing to different sources of flooding in the respective communities, 
I then wanted to investigate business owners’ awareness of, and experience of the 
City department flood relief initiatives. This is because all three common sources of 
flooding in the research sites are symptomatic of a regulatory deficit, that is, people 
are highly exposed because their houses are built in low lying areas, and unsuitable 
for habitation. Furthermore, the housing structures that community members are 
building are badly constructed and they are not in accordance with building standards, 
such as building at or above the road-level (Waddell and Ziervogel 2014).   
                                                
 





The following themes emerged from the data: 
- No experience of government-led assistance; 
- No knowledge of where to seek government-led assistance; and 
- No confidence in government-led hazard response and/or goods and service 
delivery in general; 
- Perception that government-led responses are not well targeted. 
The following Table 7 provides the results of the question posed in the data collection 
process:  





Joe Slovo Victoria Mxenge 
Govt. assistance    







Don’t know how to 
get it 
18 12 
Never though of it 8 10 
Don’t need it 2 3 
 59 45 
 
Fifty of the 154 business owners had neither been affected by flooding nor knew 
people that had been affected. However, many of the research participants expressed 
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disappointment in past experiences with government departments or had heard stories 
of unpleasant experiences and this tainted their confidence in the government’s ability 
to provide flood response in their communities. 
A young fast-food seller in Joe Slovo expressed her dissatisfaction with government 
departments: 
The government doesn’t care, I don’t even bother to go to the government 
departments and ask for help because they don’t listen and they don’t do 
anything after you tell them the problem anyway. I have heard from other 
people that the government doesn’t do anything about their problems.116 
Asked exactly which department his friends had visited, he explained that it was the 
Department of Home Affairs, where they were trying to get legal residence status to 
live and work in South Africa. There was also a lot of anxiety by non-South African 
business owners about their legal status and entitlement to services as non-South 
Africans. A Zimbabwean national business owner in Philippi said: “I have never 
received help from the government because I don’t have a South African identity 
document (ID)… nobody cares – it is the survival of the fittest.”117 
The view that the government does not care was often likened to experiences with a 
range of government departments (not just those involved in the management of 
flooding). For example, a money-lending business owner in Joe Slovo mentioned that 
because she did not trust the police, she had never turned to them when she had 
defaulters. Instead, she got her husband, a community-housing activist, involved. She 
said that people respect her husband because of his role in the community and 
because if he found out that they were giving her a hard time, he would never go to 
their homes again. Simply put, her husband would never assist those households and 
defend them with whatever problems they had with the ward councillor or the City 
authorities, as he often did with many other members of the community. This seemed 
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a high price to pay for defaulting on a loan but it was effective, therefore suggesting 
that community members really valued the assistance of the local community leader.  
Similarly, a young barber shop owner said that there was a lot of politically-based 
tension in Victoria Mxenge between ANC and COPE party members. Because of 
political favouritism, he was of the view that the youth entrepreneurs do not receive 
council funding or support like other youth in neighbouring communities and that he 
was afraid to approach the councillor about such funding. He explained: “I can’t go to 
the councillor, I am afraid of her.”118 
A young crafts seller, also in Victoria Mxenge, said: “I don’t even know the 
councillor here…the reason why I am lazy to approach the councillor is that they 
don’t take us seriously. Everything is a long process.”119 
There were a lot of misconceptions about the (national and) municipal-level 
government and their service delivery responsibilities amongst participants in both 
research sites. For example, the view that a person cannot receive services because of 
their nationality and citizenship status in South Africa is of course incorrect, yet it was 
a recurring response amongst non-South African participants. In a flood event 
especially, the ward councillor as well as the flood response team may not 
discriminate against members of the community on the basis of their citizenship or 
nationality. A ward councillor explained the expectation of the local councillor to his 
constituency as follows: 
Wards are represented by ward councillors elected by registered voters in the 
community. The ward councillor must look after the interests of all the 
residents in the community regardless of the political party they support even 
if they did not vote or are not South African citizens.120 
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Even amongst South African nationals in the research sites, there was a sentiment that 
some people do not receive services because of their political affiliation, with those 
belonging to the councillor’s political party given preferential access to flood relief. 
Asked how this was possible, the Task Team member’s response suggested that 
discrimination on the basis of political party affiliation did in fact happen. 
The experience of many business owners in the research sites - many of who 
associated councillors with national politics - was of clientelism and the abuse of 
political office. Hilgers (2011:568) in Mitlin (2011) defines clientelism as “an 
exchange in which individuals maximize their interests, clientelism involves 
longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality. That is, it is a lasting 
personal relationship between individuals of unequal sociopolitical status”. In the 
research sites, municipal elect councillors were often said to use their power and 
access to employment, goods and services in exchange for votes.  
What they [councillors] are advised to do, is basically, what they do is just to 
get the people safe in one point and when the disaster risk management come 
on the scene, first of all they always take a list of the people that is affected 
and to ask is there any other people affected. You see. The problem is when 
they start leaving people from that list because of their political party.121 
Researchers in the FliCCR project at UCT had also come across similar complaints in 
their research in Sweet Home informal settlement in Philippi. For example, a FliCCR  
researchers’ interview with a Lotus River ward councillor in other flood prone wards 
in the sub council pointed to political favouritism of the councillors in those wards. 
Consequently community members were very unhappy with the leadership. To 
demonstrate how the problem plays out, he made an example of a ward councillor in 
Philippi (one of my research sites).  
[A]nd all the people want is, ‘please organize for us the dirt bins and the 
cleaning of the dirt bins’.. that’s all that they want. But he don’t want to come 
to them and speak to them. And take them through the process. You see, 
                                                
 





people want to be taken through a process. But unfortunately he’s got too 
many other things to do. And in that areas… what I’ve discovered was… the 
politicians [say]… ‘ah, that’s not my VD (voter district)… you don’t vote so 
much for me... I got only 20 per cent of your vote, so you’re not important. 
I’m more worried about 80 per cent of the vote’ (emphasis added).122 
The example of the ward councillors providing flood relief based on party affiliation 
might explain why many other research participants said that had been affected by 
flooding in the past had never received flooding assistance from the City. It also 
points to a lack of communication about municipal plans by the councillor to the 
affected communities. 
A young fast-food business owner in Joe Slovo also expressed the feeling of 
exclusion from City plans and what happened after her business had been damaged in 
a flood event. According to her, officials from a government department (whose name 
she could no longer remember) had visited her community and asked affected 
residents what types of service delivery they would like to see improving and support 
of, in order to make their community more resilient to future flooding. She said that 
after that incident, she had never seen the officials again and there was no follow up 
on the community’s recommendations.  
A spaza shop owner in Joe Slovo proudly said that his home had been flooded in the 
past but that he had rebuilt it using money borrowed from his family. “I never 
received help from the government…but I am worried…I don’t know how to protect 
my business if I get flooded again.”123 Asked why he had opted to rather borrow 
money than get government assistance to rebuild his home, he responded that he did 
not think the government would help and if so, he suspected that the help would be 
insufficient. All of this was based on presumption; he had never actually approached 
any of the relevant departments to find out what help he could receive. 
Desportes (2013) found that some councillors themselves felt that their political party 
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affiliation affected their budget allocations. Similarly, the community’s views of the 
councillors and the City’s efforts were not very high either. This was in large part the 
result of a lack of communication of city-level plans to communities by the 
councillors and the perceptions of the councillors on the ways that things should be 
done and what was a priority. Consequently, community members were often 
excluded from consultations and where it was not transparent what resources were 
available to the community and how they could take advantage of them, some 
councillors neglected their duties, while others used their position to gain a greater 
political influence and following.  
 
Many business owners in the study said they felt that politically based favouritism 
also played out in other service delivery areas and not just in relation to access to 
flood relief. For example, a young barbershop owner in Victoria Mxenge related it to 
access to jobs for young people in his community. Others expressed frustration at the 
lack of support for business development.  
 
5.5.	  Discussion	  
The aim of this chapter has been to reflect on the City of Cape Town’s efforts to 
manage flooding in the City’s informal settlement areas and how business owners, as 
agents responding to flooding, react to the available assistance. 
The City has made a clear plan to deal with flooding in its informal settlement areas 
under the Disaster Management Plan, through the following actions: 
1. Creating flood awareness; 
2. Delivering disaster aid through its partners; 
3. Improved waste collection; and 
4. Improved infrastructure – particularly cleaning storm water drains. 
Graham (2006) attributes the challenges that CoCT faces around flooding to what he 
calls contradictions in the local government’s informal settlement upgrading 
programme. The first contradiction is associated with political will and continuity in 





ruling party, the ANC, leads the City of Cape Town. The DA forms the majority of 
the Council, meaning that the bulk of councillors in the City are DA members. As 
mentioned above, party affiliation was identified as a key barrier to access to city-led 
flood initiatives. Here, political affiliation is the principal reason why flood response 
in the City is weakened. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) cite the concentration of power 
in the hands of a group of people and their extractive behaviours as the key source of 
weakness of governance, particularly in ALS, where this is quite common. 
The second contradiction is around the City’s engagement with communities. The 
City’s response to problems in informal settlement areas tends to be short-term and 
top-down, because of the view that these settlements will eventually be eradicated or 
absorbed into the formal leadership structures. An illustration of this is the exclusion 
of informal leadership from City local government structures and community 
members’ view that there is no meaningful engagement between them and the City. 
These contradictions point to an urban resilience challenge. As Alberti et al. 2003, 
point out, resilience in the urban environment is the degree to which cities are able to 
reorganise around structures and processes that meet both ecosystem and human 
functions. In the City’s case, it seems that both needs are not adequately met. 
Informality extends beyond just the structure of the settlement. It also affects the 
community’s ability to self-govern. In the research sites, the community was clearly 
fragmented in its response to flooding, with community members often acting alone. 
In other words, the social capital required for the community to respond more 
effectively to the flooding problem was lacking. 
This resonates with Rothstein and Stolle’s (2011) theorization on generalized trust; 
society’s trust in the government is not solely informed by their experience of the 
government but rather influenced by the experience of those around them - friends, 
family, fellow society members. This so-called mirroring against fellow citizens was 
prevalent amongst both South African and non-South African nationals in the study.  
While amongst South African nationals, the lack of trust was especially targeted at 
political parties and their representative community leaders, amongst non-South 
Africans it was more channelled at government departments and their 





the role of the state as the provider and disrupts the process of rule-making and 
following in the informal settlements. Here, the representatives of the state, who are 
normatively understood to be formal, are seen as acting informally (Chabal 2002). 
In both instances, citizens felt isolated from the government, which led to their lack of 
confidence in its ability to play a governance function. Nunn (2010) finds a similar 
pattern amongst governments in the Pacific Islands that use available funds for the 
development of sustainable solutions to climate change to support impractical needs. 
Nunn concludes that this is because decision-makers remain ignorant of the nature of 
climate change, its potential future impacts and the range of possibly suitable 
adaptation options available to them. 
Thirdly, there is contradiction between City officials and politicians’ view of 
appropriate interventions, with politicians often enacting plans without consulting 
officials on the viability of projects. Officials in turn often resist the implementation 
of national-level plans that they do not view as viable. The result of these 
contradictions is that plans either take longer than they were intended to or they are 
abandoned before they are completed. Effective collaboration needs to be 
representative of the community and the formal leadership alike (Joubert 2013). 
Nodal governance is built on this very premise. However, the findings in the research 
sites suggest that in ALS, the application of this concept is still foreign (Lindell 2008).   
Another significant challenge that hampers the work of the Task Team lies with the 
community members’ and Task Team’s understanding of the flooding, and the 
appropriate response in the informal settlements. On the one hand, there seems to be 
no community level regulation of how residents dispose of wastewater and solid 
waste. It is a sign of a more prevalent governance problem that is common to areas of 
limited statehood, being a lack of basic services, including waste management.  
The behaviours of the residents could also be the result of a lack of understanding and 
awareness of the causal relationship between poor waste management and flooding in 
the community, and therefore they have no incentive to seek preventative waste 
management strategies. On the other hand, agents of the state themselves are unable 






The focus of this chapter has been to discuss how poor, small-scale business owners 
in informal settlement areas relate to the flood governance context in the CoCT to 
access goods and services to manage flooding. Flood governance in the City takes on 
a collaborative arrangement, with engagement across various nodes. These nodes and 
the services they offer are introduced in the first part of the chapter. In the second part 
of the chapter I discuss the business owners’ knowledge and perception of the 
available service.  
The study finds that while the CoCT has made significant efforts in the governance of 
flooding within the City’s informal settlement areas, these efforts fall short in key 
areas. First, I acknowledge the importance of ward councillors as a key gateway to 
communities’ access to flood management resources from the City Council. However, 
I am cautious not to overstate the role of ward councillors. After all, the study shows 
that municipality–community interaction is highly dependent on ward councillors, 
creating an over-reliance on them to broker the relationship between the two. 
However, many councillors have used this position to advance political agendas. 
Consequently, many business owners’ experience of ward councillors has been one of 
a highly politicized leadership environment in which favouritism along political 
affiliation is common at not only the community level but also at the local 
government level. 
It is unclear why the CoCT itself has not found ways of directly engaging with the 
communities within which they work. This begs the question why ward councillors 
remain the gateway to the community when they are clearly unable to fulfil this role.   
By contrast, the informal leaders have played a greater role than the ward councillor 
in helping their community to access flood management goods and services. This is 
an important finding in the research, because the informal community leadership is 
not a recognised actor in the City’s flood governance framework. And yet, using their 
own non-state collaborative networks, local community leaders have been able to 
provide services that the ward councillor have either not been able to provide or have 





Second, even though the CoCT has taken a proactive approach to flood management 
in its informal settlement areas, its interventions still fall short of creating resilience 
and rather seem to be more of temporary coping mechanisms. Business owners and 
officials alike have lodged this criticism against the CoCT, with some going as far as 
calling the current interventions ineffective and wrongly targeted.  
Lastly, this analysis exposes the different and often conflicting views and agendas of 
those involved in the governance of flooding in the City. In order for collaborative 
governance to be effective, the agendas and view(s) around the problem have to be 
shared by the governance actors. But as the analysis has shown, this has not been the 
case amongst the nodes in the research sites. Consequently, preventative information 
cannot be shared with the affected communities to ensure a more streamlined 
approach and response to the flooding in the informal settlement areas of the City. 
The significance of these findings to the broad research question is that the City of 
Cape Town does in fact provide certain goods and services for flood management on 
one hand, but undermines them on another because of weak nodal co-ordination and 
leadership. This governance deficit is symptomatic of areas of limited statehood and 







RESPONSE	  TO	  HAZARD	  AND	  VULNERABILITY:	  THE	  REGULATORY	  ROLE	  
OF	  FORMAL	  INSURANCE	  
“By definition, risk must be tackled not only by addressing the hazards and 
vulnerabilities, but also by increasing capacities to respond and recover. Such a 
comprehensive approach is crucial if sustainable risk reduction is to be achieved. 
This demonstrates the potential role of risk financing mechanisms” 
(Wamsler and Lawson 2010:201). 
	  
6.1.	  Introduction	  
The focus of this chapter is on short-term insurance as a ‘security system’ for the poor, 
living in risky environments and vulnerable to flood hazards. In this chapter I explore 
business owners’ use of formal insurance, particularly in response to the main threats 
to their businesses outlined in Chapter 4, namely: environmental and economic 
stressors. 
This chapter tackles another part of the research puzzle, that is, the governance role of 
the market. The sub-research question that I address in this chapter is with limited 
state-led flood response mechanisms, what insurance services are available to the 
poor in an area of limited statehood? I particularly explore the regulatory role of 
insurance in managing floods. Here, I use the case of formal insurance to explore the 
implications of this characteristic in governance on engagement with the market for 
flood insurance by the poor business owners. 
The sub-research question is informed by the literature on governance (without 
government)124 and the market’s role in the provision of goods and services, such as 
insurance (Borzel 2010). This is in line with the theoretical perspectives on the role of 
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the state as outlined in chapter 2, most notably nodal governance theory (cf. Johnston 
and Shearing; Shearing and Wood 2003) and the shadow of hierarchy in areas of 
limited statehood (Borzel 2010; Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). 
The chapter is presented in two broad sections. Section one reflects on the insurance 
landscape in South Africa and analyses low-income people’s access to insurance 
within this regulatory landscape. The literature and empirical studies on the South 
African market suggests that the market is limited in its provision to the poor and that 
there is space to better penetrate this consumer base (Bahre 2011; Schoombee 2004).  
In section two of the chapter I investigate the insurance industry’s attempts to insure 
low-income earners in South Africa and the associated challenges. I discuss poor 
business owners’ response to commercial insurance and the reasons for the 
consumption patterns amongst these business owners. The analysis draws on the 
interviews with insurance company representatives, business owners in the research 
sites and grey literature to address this sub-research question.   
6.2.	  Insurance	  membership	  amongst	  business	  owners	  in	  the	  research	  sites	  
Business owners sampled in the study were asked whether they had any insurance 
policies with formal insurance companies, see Table 8. Those with insurance policies 
were probed on the type of policy and the expected benefit. Those without insurance 
were probed on the reasons why they did not have it and if at all they were interested 
in buying a policy. 
The aim of this questioning was to test business owners’ engagement with the market 
to respond to hazards affecting their businesses. Only the data dealing with the 
hazards that business owners cited as most threatening to their businesses was 
analysed. The data revealed that business owners cited environmental and economic 
stressors as the most threatening to their businesses (see chapter 4). 






Ten business owners had formal insurance policies in the research sites, most of 
which were for funeral cover125. Three of the business owners were outliers and 
warranted closer investigation because of the types of insurance that they held, that is, 
education, car and property insurance. A closer look at these business owners 
revealed that two were male and both males had bank accounts. While the female did 
not have her own bank account, she paid her insurance premiums through her son’s 
bank account. The male business owners both had eceived help from 
individuals/organizations in the formal sector to access insurance. 
For example, the businessman with car insurance said: “To get the car insurance I 
went to a website with a former colleague and phoned the insurance company.”126 He 
explained that, despite living in a township, the insurance company agreed to cover 
him but charged higher premiums because he had not had a license for very long. 
                                                
 
125	  Funeral	  cover	  gives	  a	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  when	  the	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  the	  cost	  of	  burial.	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   is	   different	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   cover,	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   a	   payout	   against	   damage	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   the	   business	  
infrastructure	  or	  operations.	  
126	  Interview	  with	  tailoring	  business	  owners,	  Joe	  Slovo,	  3	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  2014.	  




Joe Slovo Victoria Mxenge 
Education Old Mutual 1 0 
Car Unity  1 0 
Property  Sanlam 0 1 
Funeral Old Mutual 2 1 
 Clientele 1  
 First National Bank 
(FNB) 
0 1 
 Nedbank 0 1 





Also, his car is not parked in a garage127. This was interesting because his residence in 
an informal settlement area was not an inhibitor in gaining insurance, but rather 
affected his premiums. 
The coffee shop owner with property insurance through Sanlam, too, had received 
help from a business development company. He explained that a customer had 
introduced him to an NGO that supported small businesses and through the NGO his 
business was later registered, and he opened a bank account and bought insurance 
cover. However, the coffee shop owner complained that the property insurance was 
too expensive and that he and his business partners were considering cancelling it. 
This sub-sample of business owners with formal insurance is too small to make 
generalizations, but it is interesting that both were able to purchase asset insurance 
despite being residents of informal settlements. 
In light of the hazards cited as most threatening to businesses, the data was surprising. 
Not only were there just a handful of business owners with insurance cover, the cover 
was in areas unrelated to their businesses. A look at this data alongside the insurance 
literature and market trends in developing economies reveal common recurring 
themes. The literature on commercial insurers and their service to the poor is vast. 
Amongst the challenges that are highlighted are distribution costs, product design, 
insurers’ perception of the poor and the poor’s perception of the insurance (Mutal et 
al. 2010; Clark and Dercon 2009; Churchill 2007). 
I now discuss the challenges to insurance access and use amongst the poor business 
owners. 
6.3.	  Demand	  side:	  Barriers	  to	  risk	  finance	  use	  and	  exploitation	  in	  poor	  
informal	  communities	  
The data has shown that 10 of the 154 business owners sampled in the study had 
formal insurance while the other 144 did not have cover for various reasons. I wanted 
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  Insurance	   companies	   in	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   Africa	   view	   townships	   and	   the	   informal	   settlement	   areas	   within	  
them	  as	  high-­‐risk	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to know how the all business owners, sampled in the study, had experienced the 
formal insurance market and the reasons for the low formal insurance membership 
rates. The data can be thematically summed up in two main categories: affordability 
and understandability. 
6.3.1.	  Affordability:	  Formal	  insurance	  is	  too	  expensive	  
One hundred and forty-four business owners (75 in Joe Slovo and 69 in Victoria 
Mxenge) in the research sites did not have any formal insurance products (including 
funeral cover). Of these, six said they were not aware of formal insurance or had 
never thought of buying cover. For example, a business owner in Joe Slovo briefly 
explained: “I [also] do not know about insurance–I have never thought of getting 
it.”128 This leaves 138 business owners that were aware of the formal insurance 
products in the formal market, but chose not to purchase them. 
Eighty-three business owners cited the cost of insurance premiums as an inhibitor. 
Within this cohort, one of the main concerns was whether they would be able to make 
timely premium payments for insurance cover and thus the risk of default was a major 
inhibitor to taking up membership. For example, a chicken seller in Joe Slovo said 
this about getting insurance cover: “I could approach the bank but my husband would 
not like it because he will not be able to make the payments. I can go to the bank 
myself but I do not have a pay slip129 because I do not have a job.”130 Despite owning a 
business, she made reference to herself as being ‘unemployed’. This was not 
uncommon amongst the business owners.  
When participants were questioned further on the actual costs of insurance premiums, 
many did not know how much insurance products in the formal sector actually cost. 
For example, a spaza shop owner in Joe Slovo had this to say about the cost of formal 
insurance products: 
I don’t have insurance cover because [until recently] I was living in the 
Eastern Cape and there you don’t need it. I arrived in Cape Town in 2010 to 
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  Interview	  with	  hair	  salon	  owner,	  24	  January	  2014,	  Joe	  Slovo.	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  A	  pay	  slip	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  official	  documents	  required	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  insurance	  cover.	  





join my husband. I have not been to the bank to find out about insurance 
cover…I don’t know the price but it is a lot of money.131  
 Two other business owners stated the following on the subject: 
I don’t have formal insurance, it’s a waste of money and when something 
happens to the family members that are insured it is going to be a long process 
before you get the money. For example, you have to sign papers.132  
“I don’t want that insurance cover, it just eats the money.”133  
Business owners demonstrated little knowledge of the cost of formal insurance 
premiums, yet many held the view that formal insurance was wasteful and that they 
would not get their money’s worth. As such, business owners’ perception of 
affordability is an important determinant variable in the purchase of insurance 
products134. This was echoed by an insurer who said, “[a]ffordability is a major 
variable in terms of buying products. Some of the products would make more sense 
for certain income brackets, obviously the value of the cover will be determined, 
amongst other variables, by the premium one affords to pay.”135 
Interestingly, the time demands on policyholders are what differentiate formal and 
informal insurance. Unlike civic organizations, formal insurance membership 
demands less time commitment because the insurer does not require constant physical 
contact with the policyholder. Informal insurance institutions, however, often hold 
fortnightly or monthly meetings (as in the case of burial societies, for example) and 
make other demands on members’ time, such as funeral and prayer attendance.  
It struck me that many business owners viewed the value of ‘time spent’ on ‘others’, 
as in the case of burial societies, as something worthwhile – an investment, while time 
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  Interview	  with	  spaza	  shop	  owner,	  Joe	  Slovo,	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132	  Interview	  with	  baby	  products	  business	  owner,	  Victoria	  Mxenge,	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  January	  2014.	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  Interview	  with	  spaza	  shop	  owner,	  Joe	  Slovo,	  24	  January	  2014.	  
134	  There	  are	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  important	  determinant	  variables	  to	  the	  purchase	  of	  insurance	  but	  here	  I	  report	  on	  
those	  emanating	  from	  the	  data.	  





spent on the ‘faceless’ formal insurance is viewed as wasteful. I reflect on this further 
in the chapter 7. 
6.3.2.	  Understandability:	  Formal	  insurance	  rules	  and	  regulations	  are	  too	  
complicated	  
An understanding of the requirements of formal insurance membership was also an 
inhibitor of insurance uptake amongst the business owners. A respondent from Old 
Mutual insurance explained this, based on the company’s years of experience and 
repeated attempts to expand their business into the lower-income sector. 
The trend is caused by low education levels amongst the residents of informal 
settlements. The poor normally go for simplified investments that can be 
explained easily. They also go for conservative products that have explicit 
guarantees. Most of LSM 1-5 households are happy with small returns, but 
they do not want to take a risk of any capital losses.136  
The insurance products that Old Mutual offers to low-income households are funeral 
insurance and education policies – it does not provide asset insurance or asset damage 
insurance against natural events. 
The data also suggests that business owners have little experience with formal 
insurance institutions and products. For example, many business owners were 
concerned about ‘time’, often giving reasons such as: ‘I don’t have time for that’137 
(formal insurance). A businesswoman in Victoria Mxenge gave this as a response to 
further questioning on the conditions of formal insurance membership of formal 
insurance: “I do not know how much insurance cover costs but I will not have the 
money every month, also I have no time to attend the meetings.”138 
Communication seemed another possible barrier to purchasing formal insurance and 
an understanding of how it works. For example Liberty Life offers its policy 
documents in eight of the 11 official South African languages. However, they are 
                                                
 
136	  Interview	  with	  Old	  Mutual	  Business	  Development	  executive,	  January	  17,	  2014,	  Johannesburg.	  
137	  In	  South	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written only in English and Afrikaans, and even “Afrikaans is difficult to write for 
contracts because of the technical terms involved.”139 
Once the member has undertaken the policy there are further communication barriers. 
The financial advisor at Liberty Life explained: “Policy statements are sent out every 
month via email and post to box… Without a postal address there cannot be a policy.” 
He added that this was an improvement from previous membership requirements that 
required members to present utility bills as proof of address. Although that had 
changed, members still needed a post box, which is something that many residents in 
informal settlement areas do not have access to. 
In Joe Slovo, a Somali business owner cited language as a barrier to insurance access. 
He said: “Somali guys don’t know good English so they don’t get any insurance.”140 
Further probing revealed that another reason that Somali business owners did not seek 
formal insurance was because they too do not have much of a culture of insurance use. 
When asked whether a similar small–scale business would be insured in his home 
country, he said it would not because it would be too costly. He added: “people just 
don’t do that in my home country” [emphasis added].141  
In Philippi, a business owner selling bags said that he had life cover insurance from 
ABSA. He heard about ABSA through an ABSA consultant when the bank did a 
promotion outside the bank. He was especially interested in the bank’s policy that 
ABSA bank account holders could qualify for a loan. However, when I asked him 
about the details of the insurance and the terms of loan, the business owner said he did 
not know and had not yet taken a loan with the bank.142  
Similarly, a business owner in Joe Slovo had insurance cover through First National 
Bank (FNB).143 He quickly acknowledged that he did not know the benefits of the 
type of policy that he owned despite it having been explained to him when he opened 
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the account. He said that he was given documents outlining the terms of the policy, 
but had not made time to read the documents.  
A local community leader in Joe Slovo enumerated the reasons that many of the 
members of his community (and many informal settlement areas) did not buy formal 
insurance products in the following way:  
 A lot of people in the community do not buy insurance because: 
- They are not working; 
- Few people understand anything about insurance; 
- I’m not sure whether insurance will cover you if you are living in a shack; and 
- Some people think their belongings are not very valuable.144 
In sum, the data suggests that there is a link between the demand for insurance from 
uninsured business owners in the research sites and affordability and 
understandability of the insurance market and policies. Even the handful of business 
owners that buy insurance in the formal market do not understand the terms of the 
insurance policies that they have contracted. In the following section I outline the 
reasons that insurance companies find it difficult to provide insurance to the urban 
poor. 
 
6.4.	  Supply-­‐side:	  Insurance	  and	  barriers	  to	  effective	  insurance	  
provision	  
Insurance company officials cited numerous challenges in the provision of insurance 
to low-income earners. Some are similar to those identified in the literature. In the 
following section I present these challenges as cited by insurers and how business 
owners respond to them. 
My own observations in the research sites confirmed those of the insurers, that is that 
business owners had insurable assets. Business owners owned flat-screen televisions, 
large electric appliances, such as stoves and microwaves in their homes and some 
                                                
 





business owners owned cars. In some instances these assets were used in the business. 
For example, many food sellers prepared the food in their homes on electric stoves – 
making those stoves a business asset. Whether for business or domestic use, many 
business owners had insurable assets. 
“So, if the majority of South Africans have insurable assets, why isn’t the market 
giving greater cover to this consumer base?”, I asked. The review of insurance 
regulations outlined in this chapter shows that the formal insurance market should in 
fact provide asset insurance to low-income earners. To better appreciate the access 
standards and their future impact, I asked insurers about the reasons associated with 
limitations in the insurance industry’s supply of insurance to low-income earners.  
Three main reasons for this further pointed to the insurance market’s limited 
knowledge of low-income consumers. But they also highlighted the market’s 
unwillingness to work with low-income groups. 
6.4.1.	  Lack	  of	  adequate	  legislation	  	  
The lack of adequate legislation to sanction inaction amongst insurers to provide 
insurance to low-income clients was cited as a challenge associated with insuring 
low-income earners. The paradox in this was that the government did not enforce 
existing risk-reduction regulations; consequently many potential clients in the low-
income sector were deemed high risk. Without legislation and services such as 
housing in low risk areas, the poor continued to settle in risky locations where they 
either do not qualify for property insurance or it is unaffordable(Wasler and Lawson 
2010).  
Representatives of the insurerance companies sampled in the research reacted with 
mixed sentiment to this regulation deficit and the government’s attempts to rectify it 
through the access standards on access to short-term insurance. Some insurers 
welcomed the new regulations and said that they were a good opportunity for the 
insurance industry to partner with government to create access in what they thought 
was an underserviced area. One insurer explained it by saying:  
[So] it makes sense from a business point of view and more importantly, from 





that all its citizens are protected. Those previously excluded from the 
insurance net, which is the low-income sector, when a catastrophe hits, they 
suffer ten times more than that one with affluence…The government has to 
enforce access and the insurance industry has to shift from the high income, 
affluent market to the low income market.145  
The views of this insurer are clearly driven by a social justice rationale for 
collaboration. 
A funeral insurer from Old Mutual was also happy about the legislation. He said: 
“The uninsured market requires a very specific focus with a very focused product 
because they are doing insurance already … we don’t want to change them, let’s just 
make it legal.”146 The recognition that the poor often have other means of insurance 
was very common among insurers and is also common in the literature (Awortwi 
2014; Rahmato et al 2008; Cerritelli et al. 2008). 
The views of other insurers were financially motivated. For example, an insurer at 
ABSA said: ‘We our role first and foremost – to collaborate with government around 
service delivery – People’s service delivery. Because everything hinges – the 
profitability of any organization – hinges on how effective local governments are.”147 
Other insurers were less optimistic about the regulatory changes and thought that 
regulation of insurance was best left to the market. An insurer at Sanlam expressed 
this view saying: “To Gazette is great but without someone to facilitate it, it’s 
useless…we need an independent body … The only reason that we are going into 
low-income is because we are forced to.”148 The insurer further said that he did not 
have much confidence in the regulatory ability of the government. He felt that this 
should be a role played by an independent authority. 
An insurer at Santam explained some insurers’ displeasure with the new regulation:  
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…many of the insurance companies have been caught off guard because they 
almost feel they have been forced by government to bring these products to 
bear... to create access. Some of them don’t have the understanding. They 
have got pre-conceived ideas and use old models. So there is a lot of 
reluctance. But, those who see this as an opportunity begin to see this entry 
level market as an opportunity for the distribution of insurance products.149 
Another insurer at Santam highlighted another view on the legislative deficit. He 
pointed to the regulatory deficit within municipalities, which he viewed as 
burdensome to the insurance industry. In his view, municipalities had a greater role to 
play in upholding building laws. This, he said, was the problem, and if this was solved, 
the insurance sector would automatically begin to offer insurance to low-income 
earners because they would no longer view them as high-risk customers. He 
explained: 
We should have this interaction with these guys up front and they should say – 
sorry, stuff the insurance policy – you are not allowed to build there. But what 
happens, they build within these flood-lines, like at the Vaal or somewhere in 
Gauteng. Every year these guys have losses. They actually are in 
contravention with the local authorities or whatever they are and we’re paying 
because our policy does not exclude losses due to the fact that people are in 
contravention of local authority regulations.150 
The view of this insurer was refreshing and came as a surprise because all other 
insurers did not seem to problematize the fact that municipalities were struggling to 
enforce regulations on legal settlements around the city, which contributed to the 
growth of informal settlement areas. It seems insurance companies are prepared (or 
forced to insure low income earners under the recent regulations) to continue to pay 
policy holders but would not address the source of the problem, that is unenforced 
regulation that allow policy holders to continue to live in vulnerable areas. This is 
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especially common in areas of limited statehood where the state is unwilling or unable 
to enforce rules.  
6.4.2.	  Organisational	  philosophies	  and	  working	  approaches:	  financial	  sustainability	  
and	  consumer	  knowledge	  
Many insurers pointed out that, for a long time, the insurance market in South Africa 
was dominated by and targeted at providing services for the country’s white minority. 
Consequently, the insurers knew very little about Black, low-income consumers and 
this was a critical challenge in their business. According to some insurers some 
insurance companies still present this bias in their product offerings and how they 
interact with low income earners. For example, an insurer at Sanlam said that they 
insure predominantly white Afrikaans, older males and that of late, there are a few 
young Black consumers buying policies. He added: “It’s a fallacy to think that people 
in the townships don’t have assets and they are not prepared to pay for them” 
(emphasis added).151 
An insurer at Santam attributed the current racial and economic patterns within the 
insurance industry to the history of short-term insurance in South Africa. He said:  
One must appreciate the history of short-term insurance.  If you recall, short-
term insurance especially was provided for ships in the ocean. It was to insure 
expensive cargo and I think that concept carried through to insurance in the 
modern age. Insurance was always the preserve of people with money and 
valuable assets. Never has it been seen as an area or an opportunity for the 
low- and entry-level market because the assumption was that they don’t have 
valuable assets so they don’t need to be insured. They can find their own 
ways.152 
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An insurer from ABSA expressed similar views, saying: “We never ventured into the 
informal market because we thought there is no money there…why should we go 
there?”153  
 A life insurer at Old Mutual also openly acknowledged the insurer’s limitations in 
understanding the requirements for providing life and funeral cover to the low income 
market as follows: “When we started we wanted to put certain controls in place and it 
did not work…it became too much like the Old Mutual… We still don’t completely 
understand the market”. He further compared Old Mutual’s funeral cover to burial 
societies, citing that burial societies continue to have better success penetrating the 
low-income market because, “We [Old Mutual] cannot provide the personal touch.”154 
Another reason for Old Mutual’s success in what it calls the ‘Mass and Foundation 
markets’155 is how it distributes its products. One of its funeral cover products, the 
Direct Individual funeral cover is distributed through a ubiquitous low-priced 
supermarket, Shoprite. To purchase insurance, customers can load funds onto a 
prepaid card, starting from R49.00, with additional top up of up to R1,000.00. The 
insurance company has been in a distribution partnership with Shoprite for five years. 
Shoprite is relevant here because of its wide penetration throughout South Africa.  
Metropolitan and Sanlam have since partnered with Shoprite, also to distribute their 
funeral insurance products. A similar arrangement exists between PEP stores (a 
similarly profiled chain store to Shopright, but which sells clothing and school 
uniforms) and Hollard insurance. 
There is some variation in the funeral insurance market. Old Mutual in particular was 
lauded as an early adapter. A former life and health insurer explained this saying:  
Part of the reason that companies haven’t got into that micro insurance, it’s 
just cultural. You know, they were all set up as white organisations, middle 
class organisations – and really understand how to do things in low income 
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markets, nobody else knew how to do it. And Old Mutual has been very good 
at this. The only way that Old Mutual managed to do it – there was a guy 
called [name] and he kind of got in his head around this cultural point and he 
allowed this unit to be set up completely away from all the other Old Mutual 
units – so it’s got its own culture.156 
Old Mutual also offers group funeral cover and the distribution vehicles for these are 
funeral parlours and burial societies.  
It is important to segment the market, as burial societies in South Africa are of 
two categories, smaller burial societies that are managed by the community, 
and larger groups that are managed by funeral parlours, each of which have 
different characteristics and needs for funeral products (Old Mutual 2012:6). 
The insurer at Old Mutual explained these models further saying: 
Group funeral cover mimics community funeral cover…when we asked which 
one they would drop, individual funeral cover would be chopped first, then 
funeral parlours but community burial societies are the ultimate form of 
protection. So we [Old Mutual] decided to really focus on making group 
funeral cover more affordable because of what the people told us they 
wanted.157 
Notwithstanding this progress, the insurer noted that they are still limited in the way 
they insure low-income consumers. As he explained: 
Language influences where you insure, we didn’t understand that before. At 
the moment documents are predominantly in English. We don’t have the 
numbers yet to justify changing to other languages. But as we take on more 
Blacks we need to adjust more into the non-Afrikaans languages.158  
He added that the insurance company is trying to build a better relationship with its 
Black clients by locating call centres in provinces such as Gauteng, where there is a 
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high concentration of Black clients. Also, the insurance company was hiring more 
Black brokers and appealed to their clients to talk directly to the brokers. But again, 
this strategy was reaching more of the middle-income urban population, while the 
economically active rural population was still underserved. 
These are all commendable steps in attempts to attract more Black clients. However, 
an insurer at Santam pointed out that even these efforts were still fraught with 
problems. He explained:  
Our [the insurance industry] model is limited because for example when you 
want to insure your car, you have to talk to your broker but in that market, a 
broker cannot spend time with someone that is going to spend R20.00 on a 
premium. It’s not valuable to him. So, how do you ensure that you still 
provide a very good service and your model is such that it doesn’t ... it’s an 
obstacle. So some people will want to do business by phone or a much more 
cheaper solution.159  
In other words, even though Old Mutual is progressive, it still faced a financial 
sustainability challenge. 
First, an insurer from Sanlam said:  
The insurance industry in South Africa is inherently built on the premise that 
you are a criminal that will steal from us and submit false claims. Not that you 
are an honest person that will take care of your possessions. It is even worse if 
you are poor, with no possessions.160  
He explained that this is because the short-term insurance industry in South Africa 
pools members’ individual risks, but does not insure the group.  
The insurer also pointed out that the reality on the ground is very different. He said:  
[T]he assumption is that the Black market has not moved. But those things 
have changed because if I drive into a township – how many nice cars are 
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driven in the township, ipads, cell phones, those people run businesses. And 
yet, we still have this preconceived idea that it is high-risk business. What 
more, we need to understand the black market because we grew up there and 
we know.161 
Secondly, insurers cited profitability in the middle- and high-income markets as a 
reason why the industry was slow to see insuring the low-income earners as an 
opportunity. According to an insurer at Sanlam,  
Only 7% of the South African population had enough short term insurance and 
the industry was making a profit on those households. You only needed the 
household to earn more than R25,000 per month for it to be profitable. That 
leaves a lot of people without access…Corporate South Africa has not been 
built on social development and social justice until recently. Lately a large part 
of the black population over 25 years old are earning over R25,000.00.. 
An insurer at Santam added:  
For far too long, the insurance market has done very well – very profitable and 
so on. However, because of climate change which affects everybody, 
insurance has got to start thinking completely differently with regard to what it 
insures – who they insure. Because if you consider that the ones that are 
currently insured, the rich ones with high value assets – when they lose them 
in a catastrophic event, it costs us a lot. 162  
 
The insurer cited the example of a fire in Cape St. Francis, an affluent holiday resort, 
where he said most of the properties are valued at between R5 – 10 million and above. 
One particular fire event cost the insurer R600 million in pay outs for the 
approximately 200 homes there that they had insured. The insurer gave this example 
in an attempt to demonstrate that low-income households could be insured in greater 
numbers at lower losses. 
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Thirdly, there are other forces in the landscape that shape insurance; the biggest driver 
is the growth of the black middle-class that demands insurance.  
If you look at the middle income market, it’s growing up faster or it has 
exceeded the white, middle-income group. More and more of the low income 
or entry–level market have assets that need to be insured but all of those assets 
are in the townships because that’s where the Black people live. Our models 
are still based on the idea that townships are high-risk areas … none of our 
insurers have been out there to see how black people’s lifestyles have 
changed.163 
6.4.3.	  Flood	  risk	  properties	  ‘uninsureable’	  
Some business owners cited the assets of low-income consumers as a stumbling block 
to insurance cover. In a nutshell they thought that their assets and properties were of 
low value and therefore uninsurable. Interestingly, the view of insurers was quite 
different and varied. Some insurers’ view was that the risk of the urban poor was not 
too different from that of its middle-income clients. An insurer at Santam explained 
this, saying:  
A large part of the Garden route is insured by us and they are vulnerable to 
flash floods. We don’t just insure, we look for example at how close is it to the 
river bank…the biggest difference between George and your Khayelitshas is 
the housing structure – but they are all vulnerable to flash floods!164  
In other words, it is insurance’s general perception of these two groups that makes the 
difference in how the industry treats them. 
According to this insurer, insurance companies are more prepared to provide 
insurance cover to houses in George165 than those on the Cape Flats. He attributed this 
to insurance companies’ view of residents of low-income areas. He said:  
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Our underwriting morals and our actuaries still have a historical legacy issue 
and so they don’t understand the market.... The assumption for example that 
they have no garages – there ARE garages! People do have burglar bars 
because this is the assumption that black market necessarily means entry level 
market – and it does not. Companies need to realize that there are more 
premiums to be made from the low entry market. They have got assets and we 
need to get that.166 
Another insurer used the following example to show how problematic the insurance 
industry’s view of residents low-income areas was:  
The last earthquake that was in Orkeney, what happened? For the first time I 
think that was the first time that there was a massive wake-up call because the 
people in Orkney were saying: we need insurance. Because whether the house 
is an RDP house or not, once the house has been given over by government 
it’s my house. If there’s 1,000-1,500 houses damaged. Whose responsibility is 
that now? The government is saying, ‘I’ve done what I promised to do, which 
is provide the house for free. Here’s your house.’ The person is not insured. 
What happens now, what is his recourse? It’s an indictment to insurance 
companies because the mind-set should have been there already. We can … 
our products are accessible, we have mechanisms and structures where we 
collect premiums which are different from the conventional way.167 
6.5.	  Rethinking	  insurance	  
Despite the challenges associated with providing insurance to low-income consumers 
there seemed to be a broad shift in thinking among the insurance company 
representatives. Some insurance companies were moving away from a view of 
themselves as business players and rather saw themselves as players in a larger 
system with influences in many sectors beyond just the business of insurance. 
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This was especially visible at Santam. The insurer from Santam explained changes 
within the industry as follows:  
So there is a massive opportunity – I think something that is busy happening 
now is a mind shift change. We are not where we should be. Business 
shouldn’t be regulating in the first place – we should have seen, as insurance 
companies, the opportunity. It was our own sort of mental models about this 
environment that prevented us from capitalizing on this market.168 
Another innovative shift was seen in Sanlam’s funeral cover. To overcome a common 
problem, that is premium collections and member administration, the insurer 
partnered with informal associations. As the insurer explained:  
There are systems and processes in a township where people come together on 
a Saturday to pay their premiums for burial societies and stokvels. And yet we 
are still locked in and insist that you’ve got to have an electronic payment 
system or you can’t pay.169 
He added:  
We are beginning now – very slowly and not at a pace that we would have 
liked – to bring our products to this new market…for example, ZCC – our 
products are now being sold to large entities like the ZCC, the Shembe church. 
It’s not formal but it’s organized…religion adds structure to it.170 
6.6.	  Discussion	  
In many areas of limited statehood, the state is not the primary provider of social 
protections. In fact, “the ILO and others estimate that up to 90% of the population in 
sub-Saharan African low-income economies are not covered by the state social 
protection” (Awortwi 2014:2). In this chapter I have focused on the governance role 
of the insurance in flood management within the research sites. I have heeded 
Beckert’s (2005) cautionary call to take the attributes of insurance companies and the 
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rules that govern their activities into account in order to make better sense of why 
they are structured the way they are.  
The research findings show that the low rates of participation in market-based 
insurance are based on a combination of affordability, imperfect understanding of 
insurance and the choice not to participate even where information is available. First, 
the cost of insurance in low-income communities within developing countries tends to 
be higher due to high start-up costs, transaction costs, and underdeveloped 
infrastructure. Further poor communities often lack literacy and experience with 
insurance (Warner et al. 2013).  
Secondly, there are problems associated with asymmetric information - that is, moral 
hazard171 and adverse selection172 - do not seem likely amongst the business owners in 
the study sites because insurers already have full information about the risk levels in 
informal settlement areas because their location is what makes them vulnerable to 
flooding. The choice not to purchase insurance policies is therefore more likely driven 
by historical exclusion, particularly in South Africa. These are important findings 
because they corroborate common constraints within the insurance market and 
commonly cited in the literature (Cutter et al. 2012).  
 
Three particular themes can be pulled from the data. They are: embeddedness, 
collaboration and the duality of rationalities.  
Embeddedness 
The analysis reveals how the insurance market is structured by a “complex alchemy 
of politics, culture, and ideology” (Krippner 2001:782 in Beckert 2007:9).  
This can also be attributed to the institutional context within which businesses operate 
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and their interaction with these systems of governance. There are two contrasting 
views on this matter. On the one hand, the modernization view of the economy “sees 
the economy as an increasingly separate, differentiated sphere of modern society, with 
economic transactions defined no longer by social or kinship obligations of those 
transacting but by rational calculations of individual gain” (Granovetter 1985:482).  
On the other hand, Granovetter (1985) argues that the level of social embeddedness of 
economic behaviour is lower in non-market societies and is claimed to have changed 
less with modernization than they believe, however the level remains substantial. 
According to Granovetter’s analysis, “actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside 
a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the 
particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts 
at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations” (Granovetter, 1985:487) and religious principles are one indicator of their 
social embeddedness. 
The findings suggest that the business owners in the research sites maintain a culture 
of exclusion. In his study on financial exclusion in different households across the 
sample countries (including South Africa), Claessens (2006) reaches similar 
conclusions on the reasons that the poor are often excluded from formal financial 
services. The author categorizes exclusion as either ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’ (See 
Table 9). According to Classens’ (2006) analysis, the bulk of participants in this study 
are voluntarily excluded from insurance services in the formal sector, particularly 
because of their lack of awareness of insurance products and their pricing.  
 
Voluntary Exclusion Involuntary Exclusion 
No Need Rejected: High Risk/bad credit=No 
access 
No awareness Excluded due to price, product, income or 
respondent features=No access 






Table 9 Access to financial services.  
Adapted from Claessens (2006:211) 
The behaviour of the business owners also highlights the limitation of rational choice. 
Rational choice rationalism leaves out normative and discursive social processes that 
inform decision-making. In this case the culture of consumers, income levels and 
historical legacy are important drivers in insurance regulation. Sociological 
rationalism on the other hand makes sense of these social processes and their impact 
on decision-making. This too is an important finding, because it has implications for 
the governance of flooding through insurance in areas of limited statehood (Meagher 
2007). 
Collaborating for the common good 
The state-led efforts to promote greater access to insurance through the Guidance 
Note points to co-operation between state, government and business under a shadow 
of hierarchy (cf. Scharpf 1997 in Borzel and Risse 2010). The increased networking 
between state, economy and society is what Castells’ (2000) refers to in networked 
governance. The collaboration is also a classical example of how a social goal, that is 
the common good, can be legitimately imposed by the state through an economic 
actor (Funk 2009). 
The intention of the South African government’s collaboration with the insurance 
industry is to make insurance more accessible173 to low-income consumers, most of 
whom are poor and previously excluded from financial markets. The benefit to the 
market in this arrangement is that they can tap into a new market, which has 
previously been under-serviced. This translates to greater profits and market influence. 
On the part of government, this relationship is beneficial because the most vulnerable 
                                                
 
173 The regulation of insurance is characterized by multiple goals: solvency, fairness, 






of their population can receive insurance, which is a key service that the government 
cannot provide. 
Notwithstanding the South African government’s attempts to promote greater 
insurance access and use amongst the low-income population, the legislation has not 
been fully enacted. This could be because the collaboration did not come about out of 
a complete willingness by the insurance industry. In fact, the state threatened to 
sanction the insurance industry to provide insurance under a shadow of hierarchy. 
This is neither undesirable nor uncommon, but, to be successful it calls for strong 
state regulation.  
The success of the government’s regulation here is questionable. Already, many 
culprits of vulnerability remain legal and pose growing risks (Braithwaite 2010:9). A 
case in point is the uncontrolled growth of informal settlement areas. This points to 
the regulatory weakness of municipal and national government. The problem here, 
then, is that a whole host of legislation is not enforced well enough to stop the poor 
from continuing to take up residence in flood-prone areas, therefore putting them in 
greater need of some form of safety-net.   
The insurance literature often places a large amount of focus on the behaviours of the 
insured and what are considered appropriate societal responses to hazards. What the 
findings are illuminating is that a focus on government regulations and its ability to 
enforce this range of legislation is as important – if not more important than the 
behaviours of individual policyholders.  
This collaborative arrangement speaks to the regulation literature, particularly 
ordoliberal views of regulation. “The substance of regulation, not their quantity” 
(Siems and Schnyder 2013:2). At the heart of ordoliberalism is the need for adequate 
state intervention in favour of functioning markets. In other words, it is not enough 
that the South African government is encouraging the insurance sector to provide 
insurance services to its vulnerable population. These provisions need to be done 
within a regulatory climate that addresses the cause of vulnerability and not simply 
attempts to address the results of vulnerability. 
The insurance industry itself does not seem to address this issue, even though it places 





vulnerability, such as land and asset ownership (Huchzermeyer 2008) is not addressed, 
the insurance industry is likely to remain burdened by high-risk insureds. 
 
It seems that the incentive-based motivation to realize greater profits and expand into 
a previously under-services population does not automatically translate into solving a 
collective action problem. The same holds true for insurance companies that are 
motivated to play the governance game by their normative environment (logic of 
appropriateness). Providing insurance to low-income earners may be the ‘right thing 
to do’ but insurance too needs to address this gap in the regulatory environment, 
otherwise it might make their business too vulnerable to losses. 
 
‘Othering and mirroring’: A duality of rationalities 
The insurance industry and the business owners (as representatives of low-income 
earners) hold similar ideas of one another, which have a direct impact on the supply 
and demand of insurance. 
On one hand the insurance industry is beginning to see an opportunity in insuring 
low-income earners and the previously uninsured. But they are limited in the extent to 
which they are able to provide insurance cover because they do not understand this 
consumer base. In fact, their view of the low-income earners is still that they are high-
risk consumers with no insurable assets. These views stem from South Africa’s 
historical legacy of Africans’ exclusion from financial markets (Bahre 2011; 2007). 
The analysis has shown that these views of low-income earners are changing. In fact, 
many insurers acknowledged this as a limitation in their ability to capture the low-
income market.  
A similar pattern is seen amongst the business owners and the views that they have of 
the insurance industry. Again, there is little knowledge about the insurance industry 
and how it works. This can be attributed to exclusion and the choice not to participate 
in the formal financial markets. The business owners’ views about the insurance 
industry is striking but unsurprising in light of their limited exposure and participation 





In sum, the insurance industry and small-scale informal business owners alike are 
held back from greater interaction by the perceptions that they hold of each other. 
Therefore, contrary to popular theoretical views on the formal sector (and state’s) 
willingness to provide key services to the poor (Borzel 2010; Moser and Satterthwaite 
2008), the insurance industry’s limited insurance provision to low-income earners 
should not be interpreted solely as an unwillingness of the market to work with low 
income earners. This view overlooks the poor’s choice to participate in the formal 
economy and it assumes that the formal sector has perfect knowledge about this 
consumer base, which the study has shown it does not. 
6.7.	  Conclusion	  
I conclude by reflecting back on the research question, which is exploring the 
regulatory role of formal insurance in response to flooding in informal settlement 
areas. The findings suggest that the formal insurance market does in fact play a 
regulatory function by providing insurance services to poor households, a role that the 
government struggles to provide in other formats.  
However, ultimately, insurance companies are in the business of making profits. This 
is certainly clear in the mix of insurance products available to low-income households. 
The insurance products available to poor households tend to be conservative - that is, 
with definitive returns and low risk. This is perhaps the best explanation for the lack 
of flood insurance to low-income consumers. Also, flood damage is coupled with 
asset insurance and the nature of tenancy in informal settlement areas precludes 
personal land and house ownership. Further, property and fire insurance are both 
highly affected by moral hazard problems.  
I have demonstrated through the analysis that it is generally not possible for low-







FLOOD	  GOVERNANCE	  BEYOND	  THE	  STATE:	  ARE	  BURIAL	  SOCIETIES	  A	  
PROVIDER	  OF	  FLOOD	  PROTECTION? 
“The burial society doesn’t help people that are affected by flooding. They are there 
to help you when you die and not when you are alive” 
7.1.	  Introduction	  
The value placed on rules and rule adherence in burial societies was one of the 
striking themes that I initially found in the data. How people living, operating 
businesses and taking up membership in associations in such a volatile environment 
maintained such strict rules and regulations and held such high expectations of the 
behaviours of others around them was a huge curiosity for me. As I will show in this 
chapter, these strict regulatory codes not only ensured the smooth running of the 
burial societies under study but they also ensured behaviours of mutual assistance 
amongst their members without state sanction.  
The preceding chapter has shown that in the two high-risk research sites, the small-
scale business owners have limited engagement with the state and the market for 
flood protections. The data has also pointed to high rates of civil society association, 
particularly in burial societies. Given the nature and main function of burial societies, 
the research considers it a functional equivalent for market-based insurance and 
explores the transferability of this type of insurance for access to other goods and 
services.  
This chapter addresses the following research question: In an area of limited 
statehood, without state and market-led flood insurance, is the social capital built in 
burial societies transferable to flood protection/insurance? That is, do poor 
business owners engage burial societies for flood protection services?  
This chapter therefore considers the role of social capital in the provision of 
governance in the research sites. The analysis takes direction from the work of 
Granovetter (1973) and Paxton (2002), which draw a positive link between social 





societies revealed in the data. First is the way that burial societies manage uncertainty 
by adopting a set of norms and values, and how those norms and values legitimise and 
grow social capital. Secondly, I explore the use of the built social capital outside of 
the burial society. The analysis will also draw on the data to shed some light on the 
‘dark side’174 of social capital (van Deth and Sonja 2010; Woolcock 2001). 
7.2.	  Business	  owners’	  participation	  in	  Burial	  societies	  	  
This section will highlight the reasons behind the high rates of burial society 
membership amongst business owners in the research sites despite a growing market 
of death insurance for lower income earners in the formal South African market. 
The data presented in this chapter was collected using semi-structured interviews, 
particularly in response to business owners’ community involvement and the 
networks of help available to them. What is striking about the data is the high rate of 
burial society membership among married, female business owners. The 
characteristics of business owners that are not members of burial societies were also 
very interesting. There were also business owners that wished to become burial 
society members but were unable to, mostly because they could not afford it. 
Furthermore, some business owners were not allowed to become members of burial 
societies. I discuss these in the chapter and their implications for the business owners’ 
response to flooding.  
The main peculiarity in the data was the high incidence of burial society membership 
amongst the business owners. Burial societies are strongly focused on responding to 
the eventuality of death, while formal insurance or savings for example can be 
focused around a variety of risks and hazards. In high-risk flooding areas like the two 
research sites, I anticipated much higher insurance or savings membership with an 
                                                
 
174	  Informal	   risk	  pooling	  networks	  often	  come	  at	  a	  price.	  The	  most	  common	  of	  which	   is	   involuntary	  
exclusion	   from	   such	   networks	   that	   can	   condemn	   the	   poor	   into	   perpetual	   poverty	   and	   dependency	  





aim of saving towards the recovery of flood-related losses, but as Table 10 shows, 
savings society membership was very low.175 
The discussion in this chapter points to three critical characteristics of burial societies 
that contribute to the management of flood hazards in a way that might have 
otherwise been difficult to achieve outside of this institutional structure. These are 
cultural, religious and identity characteristics of the burial society members. I explain 
how these are exploited by the burial societies and their value to the members of the 
societies, particularly how they help users to respond to flood impacts. 
Table 10 Burial society membership in the research sites176 
Community network Characteristics Victoria Mxenge  Joe Slovo  
Burial Female 38 52 
Male 15 11 
Savings177 Female 26 7 
Male 4 3 
 
In both research sites, the most common burial society in which the business owners 
held membership was called Ncedo178 Burial society. Ncedo was established in 1999 
and has branches in Victoria Mxenge and Du Noon informal settlements in Cape 
Town. Many of the other burial societies mentioned in the study did not have a 
membership base as wide as that of Ncedo. Also, the ownership of the burial societies 
differed, with 86 per cent of the burial societies owned privately, while the other 14 
per cent was equally divided between family- owned and church-based burial 
societies. The ownership of the burial societies did not seem to affect their operations, 
                                                
 
175	  I	  also	  found	  that	  savings	  societies	  were	  more	  focused	  on	  short-­‐term	  needs,	  such	  as	  paying	  fees	  for	  
children	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year	  or	  buying	  shop	  stock.	  
176	  Data	  presented	  was	  based	  on	  the	  32	  business	  owners	  samples	  in	  the	  research	  sites.	  Values	  do	  not	  
add	  up	  to	  the	  number	  of	  respondents	  because	  of	  multiple	  value	  options	  in	  the	  questionnaire.	  
177	  Data	  on	  savings	  societies	  shown	  here	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  comparison.	  





though the church-based burial society contributions were significantly lower than the 
private and the family-owned burial societies, yet the benefits were of a higher value. 
The benefits of the burial societies are presented against the contributions in Table 10 
(further below). 
7.3.	  Highly	  organized:	  Features	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  burial	  societies	  	  
7.3.1.	  Burial	  society	  rules	  and	  the	  constitution	  
The activities of all the burial societies sampled in the study were guided by a set of 
rules. The rules were laid out in constitution-like documents. Also common in all the 
burial societies was that new members were told what the rules were, yet the actual 
document was not given to the newcomers. In Ncedo burial society in Philippi, 
members could get a copy of the society’s constitution but they had to cover the cost 
of photocopying the document. 
Some rules were common across the burial societies: the timely payment of burial 
society contributions; the attendance of meetings and punctuality; and eligibility for 
society membership. 
A crafts seller in Joe Slovo listed the main rules in her burial society as follows: 
There are many rules in the society. So you have to learn them when you join. 
Some of the rules you learn from the other members. They tell us to arrive on 
time at the meetings. Penalty for being late is R5.00.You have to tell to a 
committee member if you will not attending the meeting. But you have to have 
a good reason because people like to be lazy. You mustn’t come to the meeting 
drunk because the meetings discuss serious issues. In my society if you are not 
married, they give you cover for your children and your mother. That’s it.179  
Other society rules were very similar to the rules of formal insurance and clearly put 
in place to avoid asymmetric information problems, that is, adverse selection and 
                                                
 





moral hazard.180 For example, a crèche owner said that in her church-based burial 
society:  “There is [also] a three month waiting period during which a member cannot 
claim.” When asked to explain why this rule was in place and its usefulness, she 
replied: “it’s the rule”.181 
Another example is the rules on payments and the termination of membership that a 
burial society committee member described. She said: “If someone's payments lapse 
they lose their membership. One can only re-join twice. The third time, they are no 
longer allowed to join”.182  
7.3.2.	  Uniform	  
A common feature of the burial societies presented in the study is that they all 
required their members to wear a uniform. The clothing items selected to make up the 
uniform were also very similar; often the men wore dark pants and collared shirts 
while the women wore dresses and in many cases the women had to cover their heads. 
“The ladies have to wear a beret to cover their hair out of respect”.183 The uniform was 
worn to society meetings and when attending fellow members’ funerals. When 
members did not wear their uniform to these events, they were fined. In many of the 
burial societies the fine was R5. The members bought the society uniforms at their 
own cost. 
When asked why they wore uniforms, members and burial societies gave the 
following responses:  
“The organization is similar to a church, that’s why we [the women] don’t wear pants. 
All the people there are serious and decent”184 (emphasis added). 
                                                
 
180	  “’Adverse	  selection’	  may	  occur	  when	  the	  customers	  are	  better	  informed	  about	  their	  individual	  risk	  
profile	  than	  the	  insurance	  company.	  Thus,	  potential	  customers	  with	  a	  higher-­‐than-­‐average	  risk	  profile	  
are	   more	   likely	   to	   buy	   insurance	   coverage	   while	   low-­‐risk	   profile	   customers	   might	   not	   take	   up	  
insurance	  as	  a	  means	   to	  manage	   their	   comparatively	   lower	   risk.	   The	   term	   ‘moral	  hazard’	  describes	  
undesired	  ‘maladaptive’	  behaviors	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  insured,	   i.e.,	  reduced	  efforts	   in	  risk	  prevention	  
because	  of	  insurance	  coverage”	  (Warner	  et	  al.	  2013:21).	  
181	  Interview	  with	  crèche	  owner,	  Joe	  Slovo,	  16	  November	  2010.	  
182	  Interview	  with	  burial	  society	  committee	  member,	  Philippi,	  18	  June,	  2010.	  
183	  Interview	  with	  crafts	  business	  owner,	  12	  October	  2010,	  Joe	  Slovo.	  





“The uniform is worn because we respect what we are doing. The uniform is a show 
of respect to the deceased. The colours are used to distinguish the different burial 
societies because there are a lot of them around. There are other burial societies that 
meet in the same place where their society meets. A uniform is also a show of pride. I 
like the uniform.”185  
“The uniform is worn to show a love for the society. Even when a member dies we 
wear the uniform as a sign to the family that they love what they are doing.”186 
7.3.3.	  Society	  names	  
The names of the burial societies often held a significant meaning to the function of 
the burial society or the society was named after a place or a family name. Burial 
society names were often encouraging or offered a positive meaning. For example, 
‘Ncedo’ translated into English means help; ‘Sosebenza’187 in Langa means to work; 
while others like ‘Themba leSizwe’188 mean the hope of the nation. A church-based 
burial society in Langa was called ‘Khanya’189, meaning [the] light. Others like the 
Mawhashu and Qaka Burial Society were family names and in many cases the 
families had their roots in the Eastern Cape. For example, Nombanjana (which means 
small ribs) is the name of the place from where the burial society originates in the 
Eastern Cape. As one respondent pointed out about his burial society: “The society is 
for the people from that particular place but are living in Cape Town.”190 
Burial society members and committee members sometimes did not know the origin 
of the society names or the reasons behind the naming. 
7.4.	  What	  money	  can	  buy?	  The	  benefits	  of	  Burial	  Society	  membership	  
Business owners often used the benefits of their burial societies as a measure of their 
value. In many instances, familial association was cited as the basis on which 
                                                
 
185	  Interview	  with	  crafts	  business	  owner,	  12	  October	  2010,	  Joe	  Slovo.	  
186	  Interview	  with	  cooked	  food	  business	  owner,	  20	  October	  2010,	  Joe	  Slovo.	  
187	  Ibid.	  	  
188	  Interview	  with	  sewing	  business	  owners,	  15	  June	  2010,	  Victoria	  Mxenge.	  
189	  Interview	  with	  crèche	  owner,	  Joe	  Slovo,	  16	  November	  2010	  





dependents could gain benefits from the business owner’s membership in the burial 
society. Dependents were mostly the children of the business owner, though in some 
burial societies eligibility was quite broad and members could cover up to 13 
dependents from the nuclear and extended family across a broad age range.191 For 
example, a 28-year old, unmarried barbershop owner in Joe Slovo said that he did not 
have burial society membership of his own but that he was covered as a dependent in 
his father’s burial society. He did not know up to what age he would be covered, but 
he was aware that there was an age cut off for dependents in that burial society.192 
The benefits of burial society cover were numerous and varied, but contributions were 
a prerequisite for membership across all burial societies. A comparison of burial 
society contributions and the number of dependents covered did not reveal a standard 
figure. Burial society contributions ranged from a monthly contribution of as low as 
R40 for up to seven people to one whose cover was R200 per month for four family 
members. Surprisingly, in one burial society different members were paying different 
monthly contributions with the promise of different benefits. 
As shown in Table 11, the payout benefits of the different burial societies also 
differed.  
Table 11: An overview of the benefits of Burial Society membership 


















Themba le 120   X X  X 27,000 
                                                
 
191	  Interview	  with	  burial	  society	  committee	  member,	  18	  June	  2010,	  Victoria	  Mxenge.	  






ZCC 40 X X X X X  20,000193 
Ncedo 200  X X X   15,000 
Masakhane 100   X X   14,630 
Ncedo 100   X X   14,000 
Ncedo 120      X 14,000 
Ncedo 100 X X X  X  12,000 
Umgcakathelo 30 X X X  X  10,000 
Sosebenza 30 X  X    8,500 
Gaqa 100 X   X   8,500 
Victoria 
Mxenge 
50 X X     5,000 
Nomabanjana 30 X  X  X  7-8000 
Zigudu 110 X X X X X  5,000 
Mziomhle 50 X  X   X 21,000 
Masibambane 10 X     X 8,000 
Ncedani 100 X     X 20,000 
Amampondo 100       16,000 
Ulwalwa 150   X    19,000 
Nonceba 100 X X   X  10,000 
Sinethemba 120  X X X   15,000 
 
The benefit structure of the different burial societies was based on numerous considerations. 
                                                
 





The traditional home of the main member and their dependents were an important 
consideration, because the deceased needed to be transported there for burial. As a committee 
member in Victoria Mxenge explained it: 
A lot of people are from the Transkei194 and travelling there is expensive - that is 
why we decided on R100. The organization covers the member for R9,000 and 
a full taxi (15 members) to the Transkei and the dependents get R5,000.195 
A day-care business owner in Joe Slovo also mentioned the transportation of the 
deceased as one of the burial society benefits. She said: 
The society takes the deceased to the Eastern Cape. They also provide groceries 
to be used at the burial. The buy a cow for the family and give you 
approximately 6 to 7 20- litre containers of scones. They also buy drinks.196 
The business owner added that the cost of transporting the family and burial society 
members was valued at R7,500.00 in her burial society.197 This was because the burial 
society insisted that 10 burial society members attend the funerals of fellow members 
held in the Eastern Cape Province. Members had to volunteer to attend these funerals 
while committee members had to attend. The burial society covered the transport 
costs of the attending burial society members and provided money for meals. 
This was significantly higher than in other burial societies. For example, a burial 
society committee member in Victoria Mxenge said that the total value of cover in her 
burial society was R10,000.00, of which R6,500.00 went towards food, transport and 
the coffin, while the other R3,500.00 went towards a cash payment to the dependents 
of the member.198 
Also very common in many burial societies was the payout of burial societies in the 
form of services as opposed to cash payment. A crafts seller in Langa listed the value 
of the services in her burial societies as follows: 
                                                
 
194	  The	  former	  name	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Cape	  Province.	  
195	  Interview	  with	  burial	  society	  committee	  member,	  18	  June	  2010	  Victoria	  Mxenge,.	  
196	  Interview	  with	  crèche	  owner,	  16	  November	  2010,	  Joe	  Slovo.	  
197	  Interview	  with	  savings	  society	  committee	  member,	  21	  June	  2010,	  Victoria	  Mxenge.	  





The society does not make cash payments but the value of their services is 
between R7000-8000. The money is used for the undertaker services, to take the 
body to the Eastern Cape and to transport the family members.199 
In another instance of a family-owned burial society, a food seller in Joe Slovo told us 
of her recent experience when her father died and the value of the services that she 
received from her burial society. 
My father recently passed away and he had his own burial society membership. 
His society will give R3,000, a coffin, a tent and a machine that lowers the 
coffin in the ground. It also includes having the body in the mortuary. The 
R3,000 will be used towards buying groceries for the burial ceremony. There 
will be a cow slaughtered for the funeral. Costs R4,000 and it will come out of 
their [burial society] pockets200 [emphasis added].  
In other burial societies, cash payments were made to beneficiaries for specific 
purchases. A crèche owner in Joe Slovo said she had received money to buy a casket 
when one of her parents died.201 Another business owner said that in his burial society 
a cash payment of R5,000.00 was made to the dependents to cover the deceased’s 
outstanding debts.202 In both instances the money was earmarked for specific use and 
paid in cash. However, the burial societies were not insistent on proof that the moneys 
had been used accordingly. 
Assurance of monetary and other forms of help was another selling point for burial 
societies. For example, one of the reasons for a preference for burial society 
membership as opposed to formal insurance amongst the business owners was that 
there is transparency about the finances of the business, because financial reports 
were read out to the society members at the meetings. “We pay at Nedbank and take 
the deposit slips to the meeting on Saturday, unless there is a funeral. The treasurer 
collects the deposit slips and the society treasurer tells us how much we have in the 
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society account.” 203  Transparency around society finances gives members the 
assurance that the society has sufficient funds for them to receive help when they 
need it in return for their participation in the group and helping others when they 
needed it. 
7.5.	  “It’s	  not	  about	  money”:	  Norms	  and	  values	  as	  drivers	  of	  in-­‐kind	  
support	  
People join burial societies for one obvious reason: to receive financial assistance 
with burying their loved ones. As one business owner in Victoria Mxenge simply put 
it: “The burial society will help me to bury my family.”204 Business owners did 
however make a clear distinction between monetary assistance, which they referred to 
as ‘help’ from the burial society and closely identified with their monthly 
contributions. This monetary benefit was important, as I have shown in the previous 
section, but the value of the burial society membership extended beyond just the 
monetary assistance.  
The findings of this study suggest that there is an alternative value attached to money 
amongst burial society members. First, many respondents made reference to the 
benefits of burial societies relative to ‘policies’205 in the formal sector. The distinction 
between ‘policies’ and burial societies benefits was based on the physical presence 
and interaction with fellow burial society members, which was not available in formal 
insurance.  
A burial society committee member explained it in the following way: “For me, it’s 
because if I die, I want somebody to sing for me, the policy206 cannot sing for me.”  
A young man in Joe Slovo said that he had joined a burial society because “everyone 
is dying…I decided to join [them]. These days it doesn’t matter if you’re young or old, 
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we all die.”207 Their popularity also points to the need to belong to and participate in 
the wider community of others with similar challenges, an idea that I have tried to 
explain above using the concept of Ubuntu. 
A community leader and businessman in Joe Slovo tried to explain the value placed 
on friendships as well some burial societies’ burial focused assistance by saying:  
The burial society doesn’t help people that are affected by flooding. They are 
there to help you when you are dead and not when you are alive…It depends on 
what you choose to give to help you when you are alive. To get help you need 
to have connections, get friends…Not just when it is fun. They will be friends 
when there is darkness.208 
He further explained that people in townships have limited choices for sources of 
help: 
Choices in the township are: friends, others choose to make something that will 
help when you have a problem, for example some people will have another 
shack in a different area not the one they live in. But you see, it’s not allowed to 
have two shacks in one community so what will you choose? 
The benefit of funeral cover sought in the formal sector tends to be more secure 
because it is priced using universally verified actuarial data that protects members 
from over paying. These modes of calculation are not used in burial societies – if 
anything, burial society members often pay more than they will receive in payouts 
during the course of their membership. Notwithstanding this, burial society 
membership is preferred amongst users because it gives them access to a greater 
number of services that are not available from the formal sector ‘policies’. An insurer 
from Old Mutual called this the ‘personal touch’ and he too acknowledged that the 
formal insurance model did not lend itself to personalized service and that this was 
one of its weaknesses.  
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The financial assistance gained through the burial societies was always associated 
with the costs of food, the coffin and transporting the deceased to the burial place. 
The value of the in-kind support sought through fellow burial society members was 
not numerically valued, if at all mentioned. It seemed that burial society members 
took it as a given that fellow burial societies would provide in-kind support, therefore 
it was not valued in financial terms, though it was highly valued amongst members. 
A burial society in Victoria Mxenge had very strict rules to ensure that its members 
support one another. The society’s committee member recounted one of the rules 
outlined in the society’s constitution: 
When our members die here in Cape Town we attend the funeral. When we go 
to funerals there is a record book which needs to be signed for attendance. If a 
member doesn’t attend meetings or prayers and they have a death in the family - 
they have to wait until there is a meeting and come and get their money there. 
This is problematic for them because they then have to borrow money in the 
time that they are waiting for money from the organization.209 
She explained why the burial society offers the support that it does: 
Most people in [Burial society] depend on [Burial society], they don’t have 
money to pay other burial societies … We are just helping because for R5.00 
you cannot bury the person but it’s better than nothing. It is not about money, 
that is why we pray and sing at our meetings.210 
The value of in-kind support also points to the importance of the network of burial 
society members and the uniqueness of this resource, and it cannot be bought in the 
formal market. A burial society committee member in Victoria Mxenge tried to 
explain that the difference between formal market insurance was very different to 
what the burial society provides by saying: “We are not a policy.”211 She was 
particularly relating this statement to the burial society practice that I mention above 
of not attending the funerals of those members that do not show support to others.  
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7.5.1.	  “One	  hand	  washes	  the	  other”:	  The	  value	  of	  religious	  and	  cultural	  beliefs	  
“…for if God can turn it [the rain] on then perhaps God can also turn it off” (Mitchell 
2003, emphasis added) 
Religion significantly shapes worldviews and these in turn affect the way that people 
respond to climate-induced hazards (World Disasters Report 2014). I found religion 
to be an important driver of perception amongst the business owners in the research 
sites. Prayer is a key feature of Black Africans in the city, who often used it to 
communicate with the ancestors and ask for protection in their new and often, harsh 
city environment.212 The data shows that prayerfulness and beliefs around prayer and 
protection are still very prevalent. Many business owners said that they prayed often 
for their businesses both in their respective churches and at burial society meetings.  
These datum were not surprising to me but were most interesting because they forced 
me to reflect on my own normative judgements in the analysis of this data (Norgaard 
1994). I therefore try and approach the arguments raised by the data with this in mind. 
In Joe Slovo, a crèche owner said that she prayed together with other business owners 
with whom she was a member in church-based burial society. She added:  
[After the prayers] we are then given water that has been prayed over by the 
congregation priests. The water is then taken home and sprinkled around the 
business premises. For example, at my other business selling ‘amathombo’, 
my food sells very quickly.213 
Elsewhere in Joe Slovo a fruit and vegetable business owner said that he was not a 
member of a church or a burial society, but that he prayed on his own. He said: 
I ask the ancestors for protection. For example, I walk home every night. I don’t 
know what can happen to me on the road…I pray for them to give me money. 
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To give me luck for whatever I ask for…I pray for work – I prayed for more 
work to come.214 
Prayer not only serves to ease feelings of vulnerability to a hazard event, it is 
instrumental in the psychological adaptation of its users in dealing with the stress of a 
threat (World Disasters Report 2014). However, it can also be destructive because it 
neither removes the threat nor removes the vulnerable from the area of the threat. 
Mitchell (2003) confirms this in his study of flood response among the poor in 
Bangladesh, where he found that vulnerability often persisted because of the belief 
that flooding is an ‘act of Allah’ over which they have no control. The result of which 
was a cyclical loss of lives and valuables to the recurring floods.  
I found very similar belief systems to be held by business owners in the study site, 
who, despite repeated experiences of flooding, had limited flood protection 
mechanisms. For example, a handful of business owners raised the level of their 
houses at the doorways or used sandbags while others seemed to do very little, if 
anything at all to protect their businesses from flood damage. 
A recurring African proverb in the interviews was a translation of a Xhosa proverb: 
‘Isandla sihlamba esinye’, which, translated into English means ‘one hand washes the 
other’. Ndlovu (1987:10) states that “most burial societies have a policy of one-hand-
washes-the-other, that is, a member gets as much sympathy as she gives to the other 
members during their time of grief.” For instance, one of the rules of a burial society 
in Victoria Mxenge is that when a member of the burial society dies or loses a family 
member, fellow society members are expected to visit the grieving family’s home 
where they host a prayer meeting or a vigil. A committee member of this particular 
burial society said that this is important in Xhosa culture, because the deceased will in 
turn ask the ancestors to keep safe those left on earth. Although some burial societies 
assisted flood-affected members and neighbours, community members were less 
insistent on the principle of ‘one hand washes the other’ and assistance to flood 
affected community members was voluntary. 
                                                
 





The acts of help are enforced by strict society rules. In Victoria Mxenge, a burial 
society was particularly strict about the attendance of its members to prayer meetings. 
The members of the society had to sign a roster to indicate attendance of prayer 
meetings. Failure to attend meetings resulted in a fine or forfeiture of support upon 
the loss of a family member. Also, members were encouraged to attend the funerals of 
fellow society members. There are several incentives for following these rules. For 
example, the above-mentioned burial society in Victoria Mxenge assisted the family 
of the deceased with the cooking for the funeral. Again, these rules were only strictly 
enforced in matters relating to burial societies and less so to assist flood affected 
households. 
The findings also suggest that the values of the cultural and religious elements of 
burial societies are important. Business owners’ decision-making seemed to follow 
the logic that the network of burial society members provides a level of certainty that, 
in the event of a flood, albeit unpredictable, there will be assistance from the members 
of the network. Those who share a certain level of love for God root this expectation 
of assistance in the religious order of good neighbourliness and mutual assistance as a 
show of goodness. These values are very pronounced in numerous verses in the Bible, 
for example Romans 8:28 which reads:  “And we know that in all things God works 
for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose.” 
This in-kind support was associated with the friendships and relations from whence it 
came. Many business owners expected fellow burial society members to assist them 
in times of need because doing so was seen as an obligation to fellow Africans, 
especially as “God fearing people”. One business owner went on to explain why she 
personally felt that it was important to be a burial society member by stating: “Death 
is inevitable and it is something we all have no control over. Being of service to 
others however influences whether one receives God’s favour or that of the ancestors 
after death.”215 
                                                
 





The issues of religious and cultural beliefs and their influence on decision-making are 
important because they are embedded in the social realities of their users and can 
point to the various reasons that people make sense of their realities the way that they 
do. One argument for these belief systems can be explained by what scholars such as 
Migdal (1988) and Meagher (2007) point to as choices made within the confines of 
only what is available. In other words, the choices that people make in order to 
survive need to be legitimised and one way  of doing so in conforming to social 
norms. 
7.6.	  For	  ‘decent’	  people:	  The	  dark	  side	  of	  social	  capital	  
In conversations with the business owners some reference was made to the behaviours 
of burial society members and the views of the burial society toward them. 
Parenthood out of wedlock was particularly discouraged. The first time that I heard of 
this was through my research assistant in Victoria Mxenge, (a 27-year-old unmarried 
male with one child) as he explained to me why he was unable to get membership of 
any burial society: 
I would not be allowed to join a burial society even if I could afford it… it is 
because of the rules. For example, I fathered a child out of wedlock and there 
was no way that I would get married to her [mother of his child] because what I 
did is wrong. 
The burial society in his community would not grant him membership even though 
one of the committee members is his close relative. He said that the only way that he 
could gain membership would be if he got married to his child’s mother or got 
married to another woman.216 When asked whether he had actually approached the 
burial society to enquire about membership he said that he had not yet asked, but that 
his cousin had told him that he would not be accepted. He did not know why the 
burial society did not accept unmarried parents. He added that being unmarried with a 
child was also a problem at his church, where he is a member of the youth fellowship. 
Some business owners touched on the issue of why burial societies prefer their 
                                                
 





members to be married, but many of the responses were vague. However, the 
explanation of a committee member of a burial society in Victoria Mxenge offered 
some clarity. According to her, it was a way of managing future conflict over the 
estate of the deceased. She explained:  
If married, a partner gets a claim ONLY against a marriage certificate…we [the 
burial society committee] are strict because there is a lot of 'vat ‘n sit’217 here in 
Cape Town. We have had situations in which people do not sign on who their 
money should be given to when they die so their family members fight over the 
money.218 
A business owner in Joe Slovo also explained that it was a way of ensuring that the 
family of the deceased receives the benefits of the burial society. In her burial society, 
benefits were extended to the mother of the member and his/her children, but not the 
partner. She explained that: “If the person is not married, there is cover for the 
children and the main member’s mother because they are the family of that person” 
(emphasis added). 
Bahre (2007) cautions that mutual obligations such as those enshrined by Ubuntu can 
lead to tensions within the society because of their exclusionary nature and the basis 
on which such exclusion is decided upon. For instance, the case of young unmarried 
people being excluded from burial societies can cause tension in a society already 
characterized by exclusion. The case of my research assistant demonstrates this. The 
27-year-old father is excluded in both formal and informal social spheres: he cannot 
get a job in the formal sector because he did not complete school and does not have 
money to go to the City and search for employment. On the other hand he cannot gain 
membership in burial society because he has a child outside of wedlock and because 
he does not have a regular income, he cannot pay the society contributions.219 Dercon 
et al. (2008) reach similar conclusions in their study of burial societies in rural 
Ethiopia.  
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7.7.	  Unregistered	  and	  unregulated:	  Flood	  governance	  beyond	  the	  
state?	  	  
It came as no surprise that the burial societies placed such a high value on relations 
within the society, after all these close relationships play an important role in ensuring 
that there is reciprocity amongst burial society members, particularly in response to 
hazards outside of death. However, I was still very puzzled as to why the bulk of 
burial societies did not offer assistance to those of their members affected by climate-
related hazards.  
In some burial societies, in-kind support extended beyond times of death and society 
members gave one another support when they experienced climate-related hazards, 
like fires and flooding. Such instances of support were rare, but in both research sites 
I came across burial society members whose societies had assisted them or other 
members that were victims of climate-related hazards.  
In Joe Slovo a young businesswoman said that the burial society that she is a member 
of gives different types of helps to its members, but only to its members. She 
explained: “The society only helps its members. For example, the other women they 
bought zinc, wood and all the building material and even built a house for another 
woman whose house had been burnt.”220 
Another businesswoman explained the type of assistance that members of her burial 
society offered to fellow members affected by climate-related hazards. She explained: 
“They help burial society members and close family members when they have 
problems. For example, they buy clothes, food and some building materials for 
families whose homes burn down or are flooded.”221 
In Philippi, another businesswoman told us of an instance in which her burial society 
had provided assistance to a fellow burial society member whose shack had been 
damaged in a flood. She said: 
When you have problems they do help you…There was a member whose shack 
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was cold in winter and the wind blew the zinc sheets on her shack off so the 
inside of her shack got wet and her bed was soaked. So everyone put R5.00 on 
the table, the committee went to PEP stores to buy some sheets, blankets and a 
carpet, and some food hampers. They do that strictly only if the person is a 
[burial society] member affected is close a family member. For example, the 
mother, father, sister and brother of the member.222 
In other instances, assistance to burial society members is voluntary. A business 
owner in Victoria Mxenge explained: 
The burial society does not help its members when they are affected by flooding 
because they agreed that the money is for the burial society only. If a member is 
affected by a flood or something, if you want to help him/her you can do that at 
your own expense, on your own as a person [individual].223 
Even though only a handful of burial societies were willing to offer support to their 
members affected by flooding and fire, in many cases this assistance extended also to 
the members’ extended family. There seems to be great importance attached to 
friendship and knowing people in the burial society. For example, in Joe Slovo a 
businessman who does not yet have burial society membership explained why he 
wanted to join the particular burial society in which his neighbour had membership. 
He said:  
The neighbour that invited me to the burial society is very helpful for me. 
There are people in the burial society that advice with business. So I want to 
be a member of the burial society…the society solves the problem quickly and 
the bank is a process...it’s easy, the people are here.224 
As a result, many of the participants indicated that they had sought help from 
neighbours, friends, family, and fellow burial society members in the last flood 
incident. A young shebeen225 owner in Philippi recounted a time when the shack226 
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from which he works was damaged by water and he got a loan from his fellow burial 
society members: “…the money was repaid with no interest. The money was useful. 
With the money I bought stock for the business, bought groceries and paid the burial 
society contribution.”227 
Mutual assistance between community and family members was a common flood 
response. In response to how they had dealt with the impact of previous floods and 
current preparedness, business owners said they relied on family members, friends 
and colleagues. This was not the case amongst foreign nationals, many of whom said 
they did not have access to this type of support. A Zimbabwean craftsman in Philippi 
recounted his first flooding experience in Cape Town shortly after arriving in the city.  
The water would destroy all my things. I didn’t have a proper shed to protect 
the produce. I couldn’t afford the shed because I was starting at the time, I 
didn’t know anyone. It happened a lot of times, especially in the winter – like 
last winter; it was a long winter.228  
In comparison to the local business owners, the respondent’s experience suggests that 
a lack of access to a network of help can heighten one’s exposure to flood impacts.  
7.8.	  Discussion	  
In this chapter I have tried to make sense of business owners’ high membership rates 
in burial societies. On the one hand it seems obvious why so many business owners 
join burial societies, that is, for their financial support at the time of death, which is a 
certainty of life. Coupled with the high crime levels and limited healthcare in the 
research sites, preparation for death seems logical. On the other hand, and particularly 
in light of the threats that business owners cited as the greatest risks to their business, 
the high burial society membership rates were surprising.  
Interpretations of the findings reveal three important meanings. First, death and the 
funeral market are a significant Southern African phenomenon. Consequently, burial 
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societies continue to grow in group size and economic value (Smith and DeVos 2012). 
They are the main source of death insurance for many South Africans. Also, burial 
society membership correlates to income and cultural values, therefore burial society 
members tend to be people who do not participate in the formal economy (Posel and 
Thompson and Posel 2002), and whose cultural values view funerals as an important 
cultural event.229  
Although business owners were neither insuring nor saving against climate-induced 
hazards, they were making adjustments for the hazards. The biggest adjustment that 
respondents make is by joining burial societies with those in their immediate 
environment with an aim to provide benefits and an opportunity to do what Schneider 
(2010:2) refers to as “important reputational and relational work”. Burial society 
members define the character and reputation of their members within their 
communities.  
The high incidence of hazards in the reasearch sites is what led to the hypothesis that 
burial societies might provide flood protection to their members. As the analysis has 
shown, there was no evidence of this. While this finding is valuable in itself, of 
greater value might be the potential that burial societies have to provide flood 
protection to their members. The idea that burial societies or any other civic 
association could provide protection against (climate) hazards is not unheard of.  
The literature on flooding and its management in poor Bangladesh points to 
communities’ strong desire to create self-reliant, community financed and managed 
funds for disaster relief and recovery rather than depend on relief from government or 
charity organization (Fox 2005; Hoque 1995). Another relevant example is that of 
women’s housing schemes in one of the research sites, Victoria Mxenge. Here, it was 
savings groups that formed the basis of the  community participation in a housing 
scheme (Baumann et al. 2002). Here too, accountability was leveraged against shared 
norms and beliefs. The results were not only the built homes of the participants but 
“options and opportunities…to ensure ling-term viability: a constant capacity to 
                                                
 





replicate and self-generate” (ibid: 37). This suggsets that burial societies can be 
trasnferred to flood insurance230.  
The ways in which the norms and beliefs of burial societies can effectively be 
transferred to the field of flood protection is beyond the scope of this study. While 
this is admittedly a limitation of the dissertation, pursuing this line of discussion 
would have called for more time, resources and even a different theoretical framing. 
For example, the study might have better taken a more positivist approach231 to test 
theories of civic association transferability to climate hazards. 
Secondly, burial societies are a functional equivalent of funeral insurance in the 
formal sector. They provide a service that is otherwise unavailable to actors outside 
the formal economy. This can be interpreted through the nodal governance literature 
and the limited statehood framework. In different areas (as opposed to whole 
territories), informal governance institutions often emerge to provide social and 
political order as well as collective goods where “formal state institutions have ceased 
to exist or to provide governance services” (Risse 2011:14). Rather than acting 
against state institutions or, in the complete absence of political order, “the various 
institutionalised modes of social coordination produce and implement collective 
binding rules, or provide collective goods” (Risse 2011:9).  
The relationship between the state and the civic society pivots on the reality that the 
state can influence the nature of these social networks by either supporting or 
neglecting them (Evans 1996). With limited state legislation to regulate the informal 
sector, there is little risk of state co-option through legislation. And while the formal 
market finds its bearings in these environments, the informal sector will be left to 
provide a large portion of funeral insurance to the poor. In other words, the lack of a 
shadow of hierarchy and the weak market – both the result of limited statehood - may 
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actually strengthen burial societies. This finding therefore refutes Chazan’s (1994) 
view that state decline hinders the growth of civil society. Here is an instance of a 
civil society institution whose growth is in large part the result of a weakness in state 
regulation. Further, it is not in contest or against state laws, but can rather be seen to 
fill a governance void that the state and the market are unable to meet. 
Municipal and national level responses to climate impacts in South Africa have also 
had major shortcomings, particularly as a result of weak policy regulation and 
enforcement (Paradza et al. 2010; Mukheibir and Ziervogel 2007). The literature does 
not fully explain why the urban poor do not make more use of formal insurance 
(despite its availability to low income earners) but it does suggest that work and well-
being in these environs is supported by the norm-based institutions embedded in the 
informal economy (Casson et al. 2010).  
Thirdly, contrary to what is presented in some strands of the informality literature 
(Simone 2010), burial societies are an informal institution largely operating outside 
formal, state regulation, yet it is very well organized. Burial societies also have 
regulatory codes designed for loss prevention, but members often do not have any 
historical credit information. These institutions rely on the testimony of the 
community that members belong in order to ensure preventative behaviours such as 
sharing, support and mutual help (Kritzinger 1996; Thomson and Posel 2002; Verhoef 
2001; Lukhele 1990).  These traits play the important function of discouraging 
members from defaulting on payments and encourage assistance to others.  
Lastly, the social capital built in burial societies offers security when members face 
difficult life events other than death. The in-kind support offered to victims of 
flooding is not usually sanctioned by the burial society. Instead, the norms and culture 
of the burial society create expectations amongst members to help one another in 
times of need.  
This is a critical finding in the research, because it points to the role of burial societies 
in creating more resilient households and communities. It also contributes to our 
understanding of social capital and its uses. As Borzel (2010:5) explains:  





capital can substitute for (the shadow of) hierarchy in solving collective action 
problems. Rather than incentives, it is a sense of moral obligation that generates 
civic engagement, which is not undermined by the anticipation of defection 
since free riding is not acceptable and entails social sanctions. 
7.9.	  Conclusion	  	  
In this chapter I wanted to understand whether the mutual assistance available to 
members during death and grief was extended to other periods of stress, particularly 
dealing with flooding.  
Probing to understand this difference in support between death and environmental 
stress was not very revealing and left me with more questions than answers. The most 
common response from burial society members was that they had never questioned 
nor thought of building a support system for flooding. My research puzzle had yet 
another missing piece to it – if government and market-led support are not easily 
available and civic associations do not provide support to flood victims, why aren’t 
they building civil associations around flood management? Also, why isn’t support to 
flood affected members in burial societies made compulsory? Most importantly, do 
the findings mean then that entrepreneurs are doing ‘nothing’ to reduce the impacts on 
flooding on their businesses and their livelihoods? 
The answers to these questions are not without gaps, but there are some clues to this 
puzzle. First, as I have shown in Chapter 5, business owners regard flooding as 
seasonal and outside of their control. Therefore, the low rates of assistance to flood 
victims could be because multiple members are affected at the same time, reducing 
the ability of the group to come to the aid of other flood affected community members.  
This can be explained by the nature of flooding hazards and how it differs from death. 
While flooding is a threat to many households in informal settlement areas, there is 
still a chance that one will not be affected or that the impacts will be limited, therefore 
business owners do not take proactive measures to mitigate the risk of the possibility 
of a future flood.  
Secondly, the high reliance on family amongst the business owners could also explain 





member, the government or the formal sector. It could be because of this - as some of 
the data suggests - that the business owners that experienced flood damage had 
enough resources elicited from family members to rebuild their businesses 
independently and therefore did not need to seek external assistance.  
The principal reasons for the existence of burial societies can be summed up as 
follows: first, burial societies provide a stable environment through which a key 
service, primarily death insurance, can be solicited. Second, the rules are socially 
acceptable as they reaffirm their members’ cultural and spiritual needs. Third, burial 
societies provide a social network that is responsive to the immediate needs of the 
communities that they serve, including responding to the impacts of a changing global 
climate such as flooding. Sometimes individual members of the burial society 
voluntarily help one another, rather than the burial society as an organization. 
The high importance attached to Ubuntu in African belief is still alive and visible in 
many urban dwellers’ worldview today. This worldview is based on caring, sharing, 
and compassion bodes well for a civil society association culture and ensuring a better 
quality of communal life (Steynberg and Grundling 2013). However, Ubuntu also has 
a downside in that its hierarchical structure lends itself to top-down decision-making 
and leaves little room for disagreement and individuality within the group. In addition, 
the Ubuntu philosophy encourages an expectation of provision from others, which can 
be burdensome if there is little reciprocity. However, Ubuntu builds trust and co-
operation in civil associations and this can be used as a vehicle to enhance livelihoods 
and create more resilient communities.  
Within civil society associations, social capital is critical because it encourages shared 
values and commitment. In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate how burial 
societies use the principles of Ubuntu, religion and culture to encourage social capital 










8.1.	  Introduction	  	  
Informal settlement areas are home to many of South Africa’s informal businesses. 
Attempts to restrict migration into these environmentally vulnerable areas have been 
unsuccessful because of weak settlement regulations and monitoring of their 
expansion (Ziervogel and Smit, 2009; Wood 2004). Meanwhile, the incidences of 
flooding – often with devastating impacts for residents’ livelihoods, health and well-
being - continue unabated. The number of informal businesses too has grown in line 
with the increase in the numbers of people in these settlements.232 
This research came about as a result of my personal curiosity as to why people 
continue to flock to informal settlement areas when the risk of flooding is so high in 
these sites. Further, I was curious about the mechanisms that communities in informal 
settlement areas used to protect themselves and their means of a livelihood from 
recurring flood risk. The first part of my questioning was quickly answered in the 
literature, namely that poor job seekers migrating to the city find affordable 
accommodation in informal settlements to be closer to work and services such as 
health facilities and school (Huchzermeyer 2010, Swilling 2010) despite hazards in 
these areas.  
8.2.	  Overview	  of	  thesis	  argument	  
To satisfy the second part of my curiosity, I embarked on a research study to explore a 
central research question, being how poor business owners in informal areas 
respond to flood hazards. In this study, the unit of analysis is business owners 
operating small-scale, unregistered enterprises in informal settlement areas. These 
                                                
 
232	  The	  natural	  annual	  national	  population	  growth	  rate	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  1.1	  per	  cent	  with	  the	  average	  
growth	   rate	   of	   cities	   being	   3	   per	   cent.	   This	   has	   resulted	   in	   a	   continuing	   proliferation	   of	   informal	  
settlements	   in	   the	   country’s	   cities	   and	   towns,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   3.1	   per	   cent	   increase	   in	   year-­‐on-­‐year	  





types of informal enterprise are a common feature of the urban African economic 
landscape – providing key services, such as employment, shelter, transportation and 
various other social services (Stren and Halfani, 2001). Informal businesses are 
especially interesting because they operate outside the regulation of the state.  
The governance literature shows that being outside the regulation of the state does not 
mean that they are completely unregulated and points to the variety of actors and 
institutions (the institutional field) in the informal economy through which rules are 
made beyond the state (Borzel 2010; Burris et al. 2007). I therefore used the 
governance literature as a theoretical lens to frame the argument that in areas of 
limited statehood (ALS), such as informal settlement areas, poor communities build 
social capital in non-state institutions, using these to respond to flooding.  
It is important to answer this research question, particularly in ALS, because weak 
state and market-led governance characterizes such environments. It is important to 
get a better understanding of what the poor do in this regulatory gap (Churchill 2006), 
and how regulations are enforced outside of the state. This of course is not new. In 
fact, ALS has been used as a theoretical lens to explore numerous governance 
assemblages in the EU (Risse 2006). What is needed is more empirical cases in 
developing economies, which are characterized by a plurality of governance as 
opposed to the theoretically assumed idea of whole nation states as homogeneous 
units of governance. 
The research question and argument are analysed in three analysis chapters. I present 
a summary of these chapters and their contributions to answering the overall research 
question. Key themes emerge from the analysis chapters 
8.3.	  Summary	  of	  Empirical	  findings	  
This thesis explored how small-scale business owners in informal settlement areas 
respond to climate-induced hazards, particularly flooding. The findings have shown 
that at first glance small business owners do not seem to take any mitigative actions 
against flooding despite its high occurrence in the informal settlement areas.  
The empirical chapters present the ways in which the business owners engage the 





flooding. In the following section, the main findings are synthesized to answer the 
broad research question. 
Chapter 5 set out to describe the hazard management options available through the 
state and its partners. In the City of Cape Town, the flood governance context is made 
up of different state departments, civil society partners and, in some cases, even 
informal leaders participate. This collaboration is collectively referred to as the 
‘Flooding Task Team’. In theory this “blurs the line between public and private, 
fostering networks between different parties that can work towards common goals” 
(Joubert 2013:24).  
Community leadership takes on an important role in the success of the Flooding Task 
Team in different informal settlement areas, because they are the key link between the 
community, the Flooding Task Team and other external agencies. A comparison of 
leadership in the research sites revealed surprising results. The community of Victoria 
Mxenge is represented in the City Council and has access to City funding to respond 
to flooding in the different wards. An informal, community-led task team (the Joe 
Slovo task team, to differentiate it from the Flooding Task Team) on the other hand 
represents the community of Joe Slovo, which has no representation in the Council. 
This difference in community leadership showed how the different communities used 
collaborative partners to respond to flooding. This was especially interesting in the 
case of Joe Slovo with its informal leadership structures, because they formed 
collaborative partnership with NGO actors primarily because they could not access 
state resources.  
The City’s attempts to reduce flood risk in its informal settlement areas have not all 
been unsuccessful. For example, Ziervogel and Smit (2009) point to the success of 
infrastructure interventions in the form of drainage channels, but longer-term 
proposed solutions, such as the relocation of residents, have been met with great 
resistance, perhaps due to a fear of the social fragmentation that can result (see Olfield 
2002). Even though these strategies are geared toward the protection of informal 
settlement dwellers, they fail to acknowledge and build on existing civic networks, 
such as burial societies, in crafting more effective approaches to climate change-





augmenting the activities of civic associations that already support the poor in their 
response to flooding. 
Unfortunately, “the city of Cape Town’s flood risk management strategy has been 
weakened by the institutional and governance constraints that result in a focus on 
narrow technical solutions and on the provision of disaster relief” (Ziervogel and Smit 
2009:2). One of the biggest complaints of the business owners was that the City’s 
response is mis-targeted. This points to a lack of consultation, another area of 
dissatisfaction amongst the business owners. The limited participation and 
consultation with the poor goes against the ethos of the collaborative approach upon 
which the Flooding Task Team is built.  
Chapter 6 explored the idea that in ALS, where state capacity to govern is limited, 
the market steps in to provide goods and services under a shadow of hierarchy (Risse 
and Börzel 2010). The chapter uses formal insurance as a lens to look at the formal 
market services available to the poor in areas of limited statehood. The insurance 
industry, itself a regulator of risk, is revealing of the weakness in state-led regulation 
in two ways. 
First, the state has failed to sanction the industry to provide insurance to the poor and 
most vulnerable to flooding and its impacts. Even with the South African 
government’s recent efforts to sanction greater access to short-term insurance, there 
are still loop holes that suggest that this too will not bare the desired fruits. One 
reason for this is that the Insurance Access Guidance Note still does not address the 
key culprits of flood hazard in poor communities. In fact, it does not urge formal 
insurance to provide climate hazard insurance at all. Further, it does not address the 
infrastructural problem. As the findings in Chapter 5 show, flooding in the City of 
Cape Town is to a large extent the result of a lack of infrastructure – particularly 
drainage, which is clearly not the domain of the private sector.  
Insurance companies have no incentive to provide insurance to the poor living in 
informal settlement areas at affordable premiums because they face high risks. The 
poor live in dangerous sites because the government will not provide the 
infrastructure to make their communities safer (Satterthwaite 2011). I conclude 





more attractive to formal insurance by addressing the key cause of flooding through 
the provision of appropriate goods and services. 
Chapter 7 points to the characteristics of burial societies, a type of civil society 
association, with an emphasis on their religio-cultural principles as key building 
blocks of social capital. The main thrust of the thesis argument is that members of 
burial societies draw on social capital to hold one another to account and as a 
determinant of trust.  To do this, burial society members call upon for in-kind support 
when confronted with a climate-induced hazard, like flooding.  
The chapter also discussed the seemingly irrational response of small business owners 
to flooding by enrolling in burial societies as opposed to seeking insurance cover from 
the formal market which is targeted at responding to climate events.233  
These findings make two important contributions. First, they demonstrate the ways in 
which (informal) institutions govern themselves outside of the state regulation. This is 
a useful learning, particularly in ALS where weak state and market-led governance 
have resulted in many poor people seeking goods and services in the informal sector 
(Lindell 2008; Enjolras 2000).  
Secondly, this chapter also adds to our knowledge on the governance function of civil 
society associations and how they both encourage grass-roots level participation 
(Mingui-Pippidi 2003) and promote social capital (Fukuyama 2001; Putman 1993). 
This advances the idea that civil society association, in this instance, burial societies, 
which are formed to respond to death, can in fact respond to other hazards, including 
flooding. 
8.4.	  Theoretical	  Implications	  
The governance of risk in the City of Cape Town takes a holistic view of the causes 
and possible impacts of the hazard. Therefore, it has developed a collaborative 
governance approach to flooding in the City’s informal settlement (Joubert 2013). In 
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theory this will result in a more effective response to the flooding problem and result 
in greater community resilience against flooding. 
The theoretical contribution of the research has been to the governance literature, 
particularly nodal governance. Nodal governance suggests that governance is shared 
amongst state and non-state actors (Burris, Drahos and Shearing 2005), although the 
role of the state is deemed important. The role of the state is considered especially 
beneficial because of its ability to enforce a shadow of hierarchy (Borzel 2010).  
This is consistent with the findings of the research. The idea that the market takes on 
governance actions where the state is weak was not found to be the case in the 
instance of formal flood insurance amongst poor users in the research sites. This 
variation has been explained theoretically in that, often, where the state is weak, it is 
also too weak to sanction the market to take on governance actions (Borzel 2010). 
However, this is based on the presumption of a strong state. In the research sites, the 
mere fact that people continue to settle in and operate informal businesses on state 
and private-owned property points to the weakness in enforcement of residential 
regulations. 
The capacities of the state in ALS are often too weak to oversee goods and service 
provision by the private sector. Also, ultimately the function of business is to make 
profits. Poor business owners have limited financial resources and little if any assets 
against which to take up insurance.  
The research also makes a contribution to our understanding of rationalism and what 
informs human action. New institutionalism suggests that civil society action has 
moved away from being against the state (as was the case, for instance, during 
apartheid). This shift has rather focused more on the sustainability of social 
movements (Scott 2003; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This reveals that human action 
is informed by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Schmidt 2010) and at the heart of it lie 
culture and social capital as drivers of social action (Kode 2013).  
This challenges what we have believed for a long time - that human action is 
informed by rational choice. Indeed, the research shows that, in the face of flood 
hazard, it is not rational choice that informs business owners’ decisions on how best 





networks are in turn embedded in cultural and religious principles that inform 
members’ ideas of what is an appropriate response. The observed pattern is that 
vulnerable communities in ALS respond to hazard communally rather than 
individually. 
This has a related implication to our theoretical understanding of the poor’s response 
to hazard; that is of our understanding of resilience – what it looks like and where it is 
found. The resilience of the research sites to flooding is questionable and far from 
perfect. However, the literature relating to resilience remains fairly broad, often 
describing the characteristics of resilient communities, leaving a gap in the literature 
on community-level adaptation and the numerous drivers of resilience to hazard at the 
informal level (Bahadur et al. 2010). The analysis has pointed to the potential 
opportunity for resilience that lies in informal associations. 
Herein lies the answer to civil society associations’ contribution to climate change 
governance, particularly as it affects their members in informal settlement areas 
where flooding is a common occurrence. The governance principles of mutual 
assistance are not only geared strongly towards protecting the association and its 
members, but they also facilitate climate governance because they build systems of 
accountability among their members and offer a mutually shared response to a 
common threat to their livelihoods.  
Perhaps what is an even greater contribution to climate change governance is that 
civil society associations facilitate a shared understanding of the risk of flooding, as 
well as the response. Even though business owners’ response to flood risk may seem 
passive and perhaps even fatalistic to the onlooker, when viewed in light of civil 
society as an agent of mutual association, its appeal to the poor becomes more evident. 
Liebow (1966) and Granovetter (1985) caution that what may look like irrational 
behaviour may be sensible, given the present situational constraints under which 
decisions are made. An appreciation for the logics of the poor can therefore inform 





8.5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  
The way in which the state and its governance role are understood warrants a 
contextual understanding. This research has shown that the theoretical framing of the 
state is limited in explaining governance in areas outside the OECD world (Borzel 
2010). This research therefore heeded a call for empirical studies to extract the 
nuances of governance in ALS, where the state is too weak to provide key goods and 
services. 
The findings have shown how with limited state and market-led goods and services, 
business owners turn to the informal sector for governance. Although the informal 
sector is outside the regulation of the state, it does mean that they are chaotic or weak. 
In fact, the research findings show that they are highly regulated. I have argued that 
the effectiveness of non-state institutions hinges on strong social capital that is a 
functional equivalent of state regulation. This however does not mean that the state no 
longer performs a regulatory role, but rather suggests that governance is in fact 
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Resilience and Risk in the Informal Economy: A study in the regulation of risk. 
Survey questionnaire: Philippi/Langa, Cape Town 
Brief description of research project 
My research project is about understanding what people with small businesses in this community do 
when their businesses are at the risk of being destroyed by fire and flooding. My research will 
particularly look at the role of social support (e.g. friends, churches, schools etc.) as well as municipal 
laws that the business owners use to protect their businesses and/or to rebuild their businesses 
destroyed by either a fire or a flood. 
Date: ___________________________________ 
Identifier: _______________ 
1. SECTION A Demographic profile 
Age 16-25 [  ]    
26-34 [  ]    
35-44 [  ]    
45-54 [  ]    
55-64 [  ]    
65+    [  ]    
Gender Male  [  ]  Female [  ]    
Education level No schooling  
Primary school Complete [  ] Incomplete [  ]     
High school      Complete [  ] Incomplete [  ]     
University         Complete [  ] Incomplete [  ]     
Postgraduate     Complete [  ] Incomplete [  ]    
Post-matric other than University     
                          Complete [  ] Incomplete [  ]    
Marital Status Married [  ]  





Divorced [  ] 
Separated [  ]  
Widowed [  ]  
Single [  ] 
Nationality South African [ ] non-African [ ] other 
(Specify)___________________ 
 
2. SECTION B Respondent Economic profile 
a. What type of business do you have? _____________________________________ 
b. How many people are employed in your business? __________________________ 
c. What type of structure does your business operate from? 
Shack [   ]  RDP house [   ]  Formal house  [   ]  Hostel  [   ]  Pavement  [   ]  Other [   ]  (e.g. shipping 
container) 
 
d. Do you or anyone in your family receive a welfare grant? Yes [   ]  No [   ]   
e. If yes, what kind:  Disability [   ]  Pension [   ]  Child [   ]  Refugee [   ]  Other [   ] 
f. How much of your monthly income goes towards the following? (Give estimated percentage) 
Insurance  [   ]  Savings [   ]  Burial  [   ]  Other club/community groups  [   ]   
g. Do you have any of the following insurable assets in your business? 
Car  [   ]  TV  [   ]  Fridge  [   ]  Furniture  [   ]  Computer  [   ]  Other? ____________ 
h. If yes, are they insured? Yes [   ]  No [   ]   
i. If yes, with which insurance company? ___________________________________ 
SECTION C Business profile 
a. What are the challenges associated with business operation in this community? (Please explain for 
each selected variable) 
Economic  [   ] Environmental  [   ] Security  [   ] Financial [  ] Legal [  ]  Other [   ]  (elaborate)   
 






Section D:  Respondents no longer in business 
a. What type of business did you own? Service [  ] Production [  ] Retail [  ] 
 
b. Please state reason(s) why you stopped operating the business? 
c. Do you have any plans to re-open the business? Yes [ ] No [ ] 
 
d. If yes, what steps are you taking to do so? _________________________________ 
 
e. If no, please provide reasons 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION E Sources of assistance 
a. Have you ever sought help from any of the following to overcome those challenges?   
































Other (please specify) 
 
  
b. If yes, how did they help you? _________________________________________ 
c. If no, why did you not ask for help? _____________________________________ 
d. Do you know where to ask for government assistance when you need it?  
Yes  [   ]  No  [   ]   
e. If yes, do you do so through any of the following? 






















Community leader    

















Insurance company representatives – Discussion points 
Name of insurance company ___________________ 
Position/role in institution _____________________ 
 
1. What property and business insurance products does [insurance company] offer and are 
these products available to all consumers across income level?  
 
2. What are the conditions of eligibility for property or business cover? 
2a. If there are conditions for eligibility, what are they for a person living in an informal 
settlement? that is, a person without an official residential address? 
2b. What laws/policies guide informal settlement dwellers' access to insurance services? 
2c. Are the laws/policies cited in 2b regulated by the state? If yes, how and by which 
government department? If no, does this cause any challenges to [insurance company name] 
in providing insurance to low income area? 
3. How and where does [insurance company] advertise its products to lower income 
consumers? 
4. What has been the rate of insurance uptake amongst consumers in LSM 1-5- of [insurance 
company’s] property and business insurance products in the last decade?  
 
Which products seem to be most popular?  
 








Pilot Interviews: Discussion Points 
Section C: Information on business/enterprise 
Community involvement – are you involved in any of the following?  
• Church ! Local school ! Community savings scheme ! Burial society ! Business forum ! 
Other__________________ 
If yes, how are you involved in/with them? 
• Do you currently own and operate a business in this community? Yes [ ] No [ ] 
• If yes, how long have you been operating it? Weeks ! Months ! Years !   
       If no, have you done so in the past?  Yes[ ]  No[ ]  If yes, go to section D.  
• What type of business do you operate? _________________________________________ 
• What type of premises do you trade from? 
Construction material: Brick [ ]  Aluminum [ ]  Wood [ ]  Other [ ] 
• Is the building suitable for all weather conditions? Yes[ ]  No [ ]  If NO please explain the 
problems. 
Section D:  Respondents no longer in business 
• What type of business did you have? 
• When did you stop operating the business in (20) 
• Please state reason(s) why you stopped operating the business? 
• Do you have plans to re-open the business? Yes [ ] No [ ] 
        If yes, what steps are you taking to do so? Elaborate __________________________ 
        If no, please state reasons ________________________________________________________ 
Section E: Business environment 
• In which particular area of business do you have the greatest difficulty? 
Financial ! Environmental ! Legal ! Market-related ! Other…Explain 
• How often are you exposed to the problem (in 30)? 
Daily ! Weekly ! Monthly ! Annually ! Seasonally ! Please explain. 
Section F: Business help/support 
• Do you need support or assistance in running your business? 
If yes, what type of assistance do you need? If no…go to Q.26. 





Family ! Friends ! Community organizations ! Govt. ! NGOs ! Other ! Specify 
• If no, why do you not need help? 
•  When was the last time you asked for help? 
• Who helped you? 
• How did he/she/they help you? 
• Was their help useful? 
















Guide to introducing project to respondents 
RESEARCH TITLE: Resilience and Risk in the Informal Economy: A study in the regulation of 
risk. 
Good day. My name is Moliehi Shale. I am a student in the Centre of Criminology, University of Cape 
Town where I am studying towards a Doctoral Degree. I would like to invite you to take part in my 
research project, which is about understanding what people with small businesses in this community do 
when their businesses are at the risk of being destroyed by fire and flooding. My research will 
particularly look at the role of social support (e.g. friends, churches, schools etc.) as well as municipal 
laws that the business owners use to protect their businesses and/or to rebuild their businesses 
destroyed by either a fire or a flood. 
I would like to interview you and other small business owners like yourself. I would appreciate it also 
if you could refer me to other small business owners that no longer have businesses because they have 
been destroyed in a fire or flood in this community.  
I will be very grateful if you choose to take part in my research. Taking part in the study will mean that 
you grant me permission to ask you questions whose answers will either be noted or tape recorded. If 
you choose not to take part, there will be no negative consequences to you and you will not be asked to 
state reasons for this decision. If however you do choose to take part in the research, please note that 
this should be by your choice. If you wish to writhdraw during the research/interview – please feel free 
to do so and there will be no negative consequence to you. 
The information gathered in our interview and any other relevant reading material that you wish to give 
me relating to the study will be used for academic purposes only. If you would like the information to 
remain confidential, it will remain so. In the interviews, you will be asked to talk about what you do at 
times of fire or flooding to protect your business from harm. I would especially like to know what or 
which of the protection methods that you currently use/have used in the past have been most useful for 
protecting your business or put it at greater harm. To conclude the interview, I will ask that you please 
comment on how the municipal laws of the City of Cape Town have either helped you to protect your 





I wish to make you aware of the fact that it is not likely that this research will have any direct or 
emmidiate benefits for you or your organisation. Also, there will be no negative consequences to others 
because of your participation. I will do my best to protect your identity and keep all senstive 
information in confidence. Therefore, I will not record your name in any reports or public 
correspondence nor will I share the audio recordings of the interviews. Also, I will assign a code to 
your name so that it is protected. All the written notes of interviews with you will be kept safely at the 
university and only myself and my academic supervisor will have access to them. Upon completion of 
my degree, these audio and written notes may be used for journal publications but will eventually be 
destroyed. 
I plan to discuss the notes that I will take with you after the interview. This will ensure that I have the 
correct information as you have given it to me. It will also be a useful way to make sure that you are 
happy with me making use of the information that you have given to me – and if you do not want the 
information used, please feel free to say so. At the end of my research, I plan to share the findings of 
my study as a whole with you and all the other people that will have taken part in the research. 
You may give me  permission for me to interview you through either verbal or written agreement to 








This serves as agreement to take part in the research project by Moliehi Shale titled: Resilience and 
Risk in the Informal Economy: A study in the regulation of risk.  The research aims to investigate 
the risk management strategies of small businesses within poor communities. An understanding of the 
different types of risks and the coping mechanisms of the poor is critical in developing a better 
understanding of the ways in which poor communities do, and can, manage environmental risks and 
the regulatory environments sucitable for such. 
I hereby acknowldege that I have been informed of the purpose of the research and agree to the 
following issues: 
• My participation in this research is voluntary;  
• I may choose to withdraw from the study at any time, I may also choose NOT to respond to questions 
if I do not feel comfortable doing so; 
• I  grant the researcher permission to record the interview; 
• My identity will be protected by the use of an indentification code and my identity will not be revealed 
in the project report; 
• All information that I supply in this study will be kept confidential; 
• I know that I will not be paid for taking part in the research; and  
• There are no risks of harm when participating. 
I understand and agree to the above stated issues. 
       
     ____________________                                       __________________ 
                 Participant                                                             Researcher 
Date: _________________ 
         
Researcher contact details: Moliehi Shale / e-mail: mt.shale@uct.ac.za / Tel: 073 419 9961If you have 
concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about your rights as a research participant 
in this study, you may contact the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Ms Sue 
Wright, at 021 650 3080 or at Sue.Wright@uct.ac.za.  Alternatively, you may write to the Law 
Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Law Faculty, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch 
7701. 
